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Through contrasting institutional discourses with frontline official and non-official 
knowledge gleaned from interaction narratives from past social interactions and supplied by 
border services officers (BSOs) and members of travelling publics circulating at ports of entry in 
the Windsor, Ontario, Canada borderland, this thesis accomplishes the work of considering 
border security and mobility governance as an everyday practice (Côté-Boucher, Infantino, and 
Salter 2014). While previous literature has expertly documented the governmentality of modern 
borders, its privileging of institutional forms of knowledge means findings are inherently limited 
in that they ignore subjugated forms of knowledge (Foucault 1972), the role of diverse publics in 
shaping the field of (in)security, and renders invisible the presence of (in)security in everyday 
life (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2016:43). To this end, this thesis is unique in considering – 
for the first time – interaction narratives supplied by BSOs and members of travelling publics 
circulating regularly within a geographically specific borderland. This thesis is also unique in 
considering how knowledge generated by such narratives potentially challenges institutional 
discourses supplied by Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA). Lastly, this thesis is also 
unique in examining how border technologization and digitization potentially influence frontline 
social interactions between officers and publics, generate additional knowledge concerning the 
nature of digitized borders, and function to establish a gulf between institutional discourses and 
localized frontline practices. 
 This thesis employs a multi-method approach, utilizing: 1) a content analysis and 
discourse analysis of various primary and secondary institutional documents, 2) content and 
thematic analyses performed on transcripts generated from in-depth, semi-structured interviews 
performed with 10 BSOs working in the Windsor borderland, and 3) content and thematic 
vi 
 
analyses performed on transcripts generated from in-depth, semi-structured interviews performed 
with 30 members of travelling publics, the vast majority of whom resided in the Windsor 
borderland at the time interviews were conducted.  
Combined, official and non-official knowledge generated from interaction narratives 
provided by participants provides several critiques in terms of analyzing institutional knowledge 
generated by CBSA. Findings generated through interaction narratives indicate: 1) officers have 
experienced a shift in “lifeworld” (Habermas 1981) alongside shifts in agency mandates toward a 
neoliberal risk-management model of mobility governance; 2) officers receive very little formal 
training in terms of frontline interactions; 3) officer training displays a systematic bias toward 
constructing all interactions as “security moments” designed to fulfill a security mandate, 
ultimately leaving officers ill-trained in terms of the “facilitation” (CBSA 2018e:8), non-
securitized, humanitarian side of border work; 4) despite being couched by CBSA institutional 
discourses as being professional, courteous, law-abiding, and thorough, much evidence exists to 
suggest BSOs act in ways differing substantially from this knowledge, including: officers not 
performing full primary inspections on travellers, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
violations in terms of officers routinely asking travellers about their mobility while outside of 
Canada, and a variety of negative frontline interactions including: a) aggressive or unnecessary 
questioning by officers, b) officers presenting a rude or unfriendly demeanor, c) harassment by 
officers about purchases made abroad, d) officers unfairly or incorrectly applying policies, e) 
unnecessary examinations, and f) enforcement actions resulting in the seizure of purchased 
goods; 5) officers are often forced to develop shared ad hoc best practices in terms of social 
interactions on the frontline, where there is a real danger of BSOs “parroting” the poor practices 
of just one or two veteran officers; 6) the existence of a substantial gulf between national policy 
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and training modules and the localized and geographically-specific practices occurring at 
disparate ports of entry across Canada.  
Findings generated in terms of the technologization of contemporary borders suggest 
border security and mobility governance practices are best understood as forms of simulation 
(Baudrillard 1981) and cyborg work (Bogard 1996), whereby digitized subjects (Goriunova 
2019) – which are not at all representative of human subjects – are taken as irrefutable copies or 
“dividuals” (Deleuze 1992) by border officers, and ultimately become the unit of analysis under 
neoliberal risk-management schemes in making decisions possible and rendering the personal 
narratives and performativity of embodied subjects (travellers) effectively irrelevant. Despite 
CBSA institutional documents couching technologization in terms of improving efficiency at the 
border, augmenting officer decision-making, and enhancing security provision, official and non-
official knowledge gleaned from interaction narratives generated from perceptions related to past 
social interactions serves to provide a serious critique of these discourses. This includes 
knowledge concerning perceived deficits related to border technologization, including: 1) 
discussions of data errors causing travel problems (duplicated NEXUS card numbers, mistaken 
warrants in the CPIC database, false travel histories in customs databases, and so forth); 2) the 
advertised benefits of the NEXUS trusted traveller program (efficiency crossing borders) as 
being either non-existent or irrelevant; 3) the use of Automated Border Clearance (ABC) kiosks / 
Primary Inspection Kiosks (PIKs) at major Canadian international airports as serving to produce 
superficial and robotic frontline social interactions guided exclusively by computer-generated 
risk codes; and 4) the apparent negative effects of technologization in terms of eroding the ability 
of officers to make informed decisions on the basis of anything other than information provided 
by computerized databases. 
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Combined, findings generated by comparing institutional knowledge with official and 
non-official interaction narrative knowledge are subsequently considered through the lens of 
simulation, human and mobility rights, bureaucratic secrecy, and potential policy change. 
Additionally, slippage between nationalized institutional discourses and localized frontline 
practices are explained through the lens of neoliberal systems of power and governance. Finally, 
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ABC – Automated Border Clearance (kiosks) 
ACROSS – Accelerated Commercial Release Operations Support System 
ATIA – Access to Information Act (1985) 
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ATIP – Access to Information and Privacy (request) 
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The power position of a fully developed bureaucracy is always great, under normal 
conditions overtowering. The political ‘master’ always finds himself, vis-à-vis the trained 
official in the position of a dilettante facing the expert. This holds whether the ‘master,’ 
whom the bureaucracy serves, is the ‘people’ equipped with the weapons of legislative 
initiative, referendum, and the right to remove officials; or a parliament elected on a more 
aristocratic or more democratic basis and equipped with the right or the de facto power to 
vote a lack of confidence… This superiority of the professional insider every bureaucracy 
seeks further to increase through the means of keeping secret its knowledge and 
intentions. Bureaucratic administration always tends to exclude the public, to hide its 
knowledge and action from criticism as well as it can. Prussian church authorities now 
threaten to use disciplinary measures against pastors who make reprimands or other 
admonitory measures in any way accessible to third parties, charging that in doing so 
they become ‘guilty’ of facilitating a possible criticism of the church authorities… 
Bureaucracy naturally prefers a poorly informed, and hence powerless, parliament – at 
least insofar as this ignorance is compatible with the bureaucracy’s own interests.  
– Max Weber (1922), Pp. 991-993, Chapter XI – Bureaucracy, “Economy and Society”. 
 
 In 2004, Bill C-24, The Canada Border Services Agency Act, established Canada Border 
Services Agency (CBSA) as a legal entity and transferred to it several additional powers from its 
three legacy agencies: Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA), Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada (CIC), and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) (Parliament of 
Canada 2004). Officers called “border services officers” (BSOs) became responsible for 
enforcing over 90 domestic acts and regulations as well as international agreements governing 
travel and trade. Prior to the establishment of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) in 1992, customs officers largely served revenue collection functions through 
enforcement of taxation on goods at the Canadian border. After NAFTA diminished the taxation 
function of customs officers, it became more common for the Government of Canada to promote 
the border enforcement activities of officers as the “first line of defence against drugs, 
contraband, and illegal firearms” (Pratt 2005:191). Section 5(1) of The Canada Border Services 
Agency Act formalized these discourses and stated: “The Agency is responsible for providing 
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integrated border services that support national security and public safety priorities and facilitate 
the free flow of persons and goods, including animals and plants, that meet all requirements 
under the program legislation…” Other legislation enabling the powers of BSOs includes the 
Customs Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). The Customs Act outlines 
the taxation and enforcement powers of BSOs, including personal searches (s. 98), search of 
goods and people (s. 99), detention of controlled goods (s. 101), the seizure of goods and 
conveyances (s. 110), and the power to make criminal arrests (s. 163). The Act also outlines 
various customs offences related to borders, including false statements and evasion of duties (s. 
153), hindering a customs officer (s. 153.1) and smuggling (s. 159). IRPA provides border 
officers with the power to examine applicants (s. 18), outlines migration requirements, and 
establishes categories of inadmissibility used by officers on the frontline to deny applications and 
subsequently remove individuals.  
 BSOs working for CBSA at nearly 1200 ports of entry (including land border offices, 
international mail processing centres, airports, sufferance warehouses1, and other service 
locations) have millions of face-to-face interactions with members of the travelling public every 
year (Bridge and Lancaster 2015; CBSA 2018c). Over the course of 2015-2016 alone, CBSA 
processed over 93 million travellers, 16 million commercial shipments, and collected over $30 
billion in revenue (CBSA 2016c:1). In the same fiscal year, only 3.2% of all processed travellers 
and non-commercial goods and 0.08% of all commercial goods were found to be inadmissible to 
Canada (CBSA 2016c:32). This implies that 97% of all frontline interactions did not result in 
enforcement actions as a result of customs, immigration, or other laws.  
                                                 
1 Sufferance warehouses are third-party facilities (mostly commercial) CBSA officers attend (inland, away from the 
physical border) to assess and clear goods into Canada. 
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 Frontline interactions have recently received increased public attention in Canada. As a 
result of an Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) request filed by The Canadian Press, 
documents related to complaints filed by travellers against BSOs during the 2017-2018 fiscal 
year became public for the first time (and were widely reported on in the press). As Tutton 
(2018) documents, there were 105 “founded” cases of complaints related to officer misconduct. 
Complaints included cases of officers yelling and swearing at travellers, participating in acts of 
racism, denying travellers access to translators, and, in one case, allegedly yelling at a traveller in 
medical distress (Tutton 2018). While CBSA subsequently downplayed what spokespersons 
claimed were the comparatively low number of “founded” cases relative to the total number of 
all travellers processed, there is a substantial possibility that travellers are hesitant to report 
negative interactions with officers through official channels for various reasons (not the least of 
which is potentially fear of future mistreatment at the border). Indeed, as the criminological 
literature has demonstrated in terms of criminal activity generally, there may be a “dark figure” 
(Biderman and Reiss 1967) of hidden cases of misconduct that exist in reality but are never 
officially reported or enumerated. The low number of “founded” cases of complaints is also 
troubling given CBSA has no independent or arms-length external review body, meaning all 
investigations related to complaints occur in-house. While the Trudeau Liberal Government is 
currently promising to advance legislation to establish a National Security and Intelligence 
Review Agency to hold Canada’s national security agencies (including CBSA) accountable 
(Tutton 2018), it is unclear what powers of investigation such a body would have, how this body 
would investigate complaints against officers (if at all), or to what extent CBSA will still be 




Examining the Literature 
 With the aforementioned concerns in mind, this dissertation focuses its lens on 
interaction narratives supplied by BSOs and members of travelling publics regularly circulating 
through ports of entry. “Interaction narrative” knowledge includes perceptions of past frontline 
social interactions supplied via BSOs and travelling publics regularly circulating through ports of 
entry and engaging in securitized and other forms of social action. Given the volume of travellers 
processed every year by BSOs, it is perhaps surprising that the literature is noticeably silent in 
terms of examining interaction narrative knowledge generated through the perceptions of BSOs 
and publics related to past social interactions at ports of entry across Canada. The literature has 
largely limited analysis to six key areas: 1) public policy construction and analysis; 2) the 
governance of global migration; 3) state border governance efforts; 4) the deployment of various 
technologies at borders; 5) the geospatiality of contemporary borders; and 6) the perceptions of 
border and immigration officers on topics related to: a) discretion, b) decision-making, and c) 
security generally. 
 Research concerning public policy construction and analysis has largely centred on 
subsequent examinations of the governance of global migration. For example, Bosworth (2016) 
examines the convergence between criminal and immigration laws and the related 
criminalization of migration. This phenomenon of rendering migrants as “crimmigrants” (Aas 
2012) through criminal law is well-documented in the literature (see for example Bosworth 
2013; Salter and Mutlu 2013; Aas 2014). Others have focused on the use of prisons and other 
carceral spaces of detention located inside and outside of the sovereign state (i.e. offshoring) and 
designed to warehouse, punish, deny rights, and expel regular and irregular migrants (see for 
example Bosworth 2014; Mountz and Loyd 2014; Kaufman 2015; Mountz 2015; Bosworth 
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2015). Other policy research has focused on domestic law and international agreements as they 
pertain to border security specifically, including analyses focusing on the governance efforts of 
the state (see for example Ackleson 2009; Vaughan-Williams 2010; Lalonde 2012; Topak et al. 
2015; Vollmer 2017). 
 The literature has also documented the expanded use of technologies of risk at ports of 
entry in Canada, the United States, and Europe. Particularly, such research has focused on 
documentation, including passports, ID cards, visas, and the NEXUS trusted traveller program in 
North America (see Salter 2004; Salter 2006; Sparke 2006; Lyon 2009; Muller 2010b; Salter 
2011; McPhail et al. 2012; Bradbury 2013); biometric technologies, including fingerprinting, iris 
scans, facial recognition, and so forth (see Amoore 2006; Muller 2009; Muller 2010a; Muller 
2011; Muller 2013; Popescu 2015; Leese 2018); the development of smart borders in Europe and 
North America (see Amoore, Marmura, and Salter 2008; Leese 2016); and the use of databases 
and algorithms on the frontline of enforcement (see Broeders 2007; Dijstelbloem and Broeder 
2015; Pötzsch 2015; Topak et al. 2015; Amoore and Raley 2017; Lalonde 2018)2.  
 When combined, research discussing offshoring of migration detention as well as 
technologization away from traditional sovereign borders have subsequently contributed to 
debates concerning border geospatiality (or lack thereof). Such debates have examined logics of 
“remote control” (Broeders and Hampshire 2013), deterritoralization (Muller 2010a; Mountz 
2011; and Salter and Mutlu 2013), the border as “everywhere” (Lyon 2005), the border as part of 
a continuum also including other enforcement locales (Vaughan-Williams 2010; Lalonde 2018), 
and as a form of visual “security performance” (Rumford 2006; de Lint 2008). 
                                                 
2 Lalonde (2018) is reproduced (in part) as Chapter 5 in this thesis. 
6 
 
 Lastly, several recent studies have examined the perceptions of border officers – 
employed in Canada and elsewhere – regarding discretion, decision-making, and security 
generally (see for example Côté-Boucher 2013; Pickering 2014; Pickering and Ham 2014; Aas 
and Gundhus 2015; Côté-Boucher 2016; Côté-Boucher 2018). In terms of the Canadian context, 
Bouchard and Carroll (2002) examine how immigration officers use both “professional” and 
“personal” forms of discretion in performing their duties. Officers are left to make discretionary 
decisions given various ambiguities associated with immigration policies. Pratt and Thompson 
(2008) determine how race knowledge functions to influence frontline officer discretionary 
practices. Ambiguities surrounding the meaning of “racial profiling” and an associated slippage 
between “race” and “nationality” allows officers to officially deny participating in racial 
profiling while continuing to deploy racialized risk knowledges at the border. Pratt (2010) 
explores how legal and other knowledge informs the “moment of decision” when frontline 
officers determine reasonable suspicion for searches at the border. Officer decision-making is 
shielded from serious scrutiny because the supposed objective nature of employed risk language 
serves to obscure other knowledges also at play. Côté-Boucher (2013) queried frontline BSOs 
regarding various aspects of their employment with Canada Border Services Agency, generating 
key findings regarding how frontline officers negotiated shifts within the governing logics of 
CBSA mandates from a focus on tax collection to a new emphasis on security, anti-terrorism, 
intelligence, and so forth. Côté-Boucher’s subsequent research continues with this important 
work, documenting officer use of discretion within the “new CBSA” (Côté-Boucher 2016) and 
also “generational borderwork” whereby officers rely on generational categorizations to 
negotiate change in their workplace (Côté-Boucher 2018). 
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While the aforementioned literature has employed state, institutional, and frontline 
official knowledge in exploring contemporary borders, research has remained largely silent in 
terms of examining frontline non-official knowledge.3 Limited research in North America has 
examined non-official knowledge within the context of local borderlands. In the Canadian 
context, Helleiner (2010) examines non-official border knowledge within the context of the 
Niagara region of Ontario. Specifically, Helleiner’s (2010) analysis draws upon interviews 
conducted with 40 Niagara residents between September 2001 and August 2004 in considering 
how participants experienced changes in border securitization post-9/11. Helleiner’s (2010) 
findings ultimately demonstrate a need for the literature to contrast non-official knowledge with 
official knowledge in order to identify points of divergence between official state narratives and 
community experiences concerning border security. In the US context, Bjelland (2016) 
conducted interviews with ten families living along the Point Roberts, Washington border. 
Findings demonstrate that Point Roberts is defined by its international border as a hybrid 
borderland: “a privileged exurb for U.S. citizens working in Vancouver, a U.S. service center for 
Canadians, and a seaside retirement community with pockets of isolation and neglect” (Bjelland 
2016:516).  
Various additional studies in the Canadian context have examined the lived experiences 
of migrants transiting across international borders, including Somerville (2015) examining how 
decisions to migrate to Canada are informed by (and in turn shape) migrant networks, with 
“migrant pioneers” deliberately settling in countries in which their families are not yet located in 
an attempt to expand their migrant network globally; and Horgan and Liinamaa (2017) analyzing 
interviews with former Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP) participants to determine 
                                                 
3 See Key Definitions and Theoretical Perspectives subsection below for more details regarding how official and 
non-official knowledges are defined within this thesis.  
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how uncertainty regarding legal, immigration, and employment status is personally experienced 
by migrants. McLaughlin (2009) similarly examines the SAWP program through the lens of 
migrants in the Niagara Region of Ontario, exploring how legal precariousness contributes to 
non-citizens being effectively excluded from many of the rights guaranteed to all residents of 
Canada (including healthcare).  
While official knowledge – and particularly interviews with officers – generates 
important findings on the unfolding of frontline border governance (Loftus 2015), such 
knowledge is ultimately incomplete in that it largely ignores the perceptions of political subjects 
of (in)security (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2016: 43). By privileging institutional and 
official knowledge, such research ultimately ignores forms of subjugated knowledge (Foucault 
1972, discussed below), the role of diverse publics in shaping the field of (in)security, and makes 
invisible the presence of (in)security in everyday life (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2016: 43). 
To these points, this thesis will also argue that such research favours a uniform view of borders 
and security practices, examining public policy and governance technologies as “one-size-fits-
all”, uniform approaches, and ultimately ignoring potential local realties and differences in terms 
of governing ports of entry. 
Additionally, while the aforementioned research has focused much attention on public 
policy as well as governance practices and technologies deployed within modern borders, 
research has not examined knowledge generated from interaction narratives supplied by officers 
and members of travelling publics as social actors regularly circulating within spaces of security. 
While analyses of state and institutional discourses provide evidence of a “governmental” view 
of modern borders, such research neglects to consider how (and to what extent) this knowledge is 
actually deployed by agents responsible for border security and mobility governance on the 
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frontline of enforcement. In other words, while the literature provides an excellent overarching 
view of how borders likely function, what is missing is any sort of context in terms of how 
governance efforts might unfold within the social interactions between border services officers 
and travellers at the frontline of enforcement. This is problematic because while the literature has 
expertly documented border security through the lens of governmentality, it has also largely 
failed to consider border security as an everyday practice (Côté-Boucher, Infantino, and Salter 
2014). Only by contrasting institutional discourses with interaction narrative knowledge supplied 
by official (BSO) and non-official (publics) perceptions regarding past frontline social 
interactions can research begin the work of “shedding light on contemporary problematizations 
of security” (Côté-Boucher, Infantino, and Salter 2014:195) as they relate to borders specifically. 
Purpose 
The thesis that follows will analyze institutional discourses produced by Canada Border 
Services Agency through the lens of both official and non-official knowledge generated vis-à-vis 
interaction narratives derived through the circulation of BSOs and members of travelling publics 
at ports of entry. Particularly, this thesis will focus on two main areas of analysis. First, the thesis 
will assess institutional discourses concerning the nature of frontline social interactions that 
occur at ports of entry in Canada. Secondly, the thesis will further assess institutional discourses 
concerning the effects that increases in border technologization have on frontline social 
interactions. Relatedly, the dissertation will propose a new theoretical orientation for 
understanding both technologization and perceptions related to past frontline social interactions 
occurring between officers and members of travelling publics. As such, this dissertation 
addresses six overarching key research questions: 1) How do institutional discourses located in 
CBSA training documents, manuals, policies, and other obtained documents potentially 
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influence frontline interactions between officers and members of travelling publics? 2) To what 
extent do frontline officers participate in social interactions that are irreducible to institutional 
discourses (and particularly from knowledge located in BSO formative training)? 3) How does 
contemporary border and port of entry technologization potentially influence frontline 
interactions between officers and members of travelling publics? 4) How should modern border 
and port of entry technologization be understood theoretically? 5) To what extent does 
knowledge produced vis-à-vis interaction narratives generated through the circulation of BSOs 
and members of travelling publics at ports of entry serve to challenge institutional discourses 
produced by CBSA? 6) How should the literature understand findings generated from the above-
mentioned questions through the lens of human and mobility rights?  
CBSA – Hidden in Plain Sight 
 It is likely that the literature has remained silent in terms of analyzing interaction 
narratives generated through perceptions of past frontline interactions given that BSOs are a 
difficult population to access and recruit to studies. While limited success has occurred in the 
past (i.e. Côté-Boucher 2013), current success is limited by CBSA policies and procedures that 
are decidedly unfriendly to academic research participation. Attempts were made (twice) to gain 
official CBSA approval of this thesis study, which were met twice with refusals. In refusing to 
officially support the study, an agency representative cited CBSA Code of Conduct section 5.1, 
which states that: “only authorized spokespersons can issue statements or make comments about 
the CBSA's position on any given subject” (CBSA 2018d). The agency representative also cited 
section 8, which states:  
We are legally obliged to protect the privacy of individuals and our commercial 
clients' business information. In doing so, we comply with section 107 of the 
Customs Act and section 8 of the Privacy Act in the collection, use, sharing, 
storage, disclosure, distribution and disposal of any personal information 
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pertaining to individuals or commercial information pertaining to businesses 
(CBSA 2018d).  
 
When the researcher sought clarification from CBSA regarding which specific parts of the 
proposed study violated cited policies and if any revisions to the study procedures could be made 
to avoid these issues and continue with the research, the agency representative did not reply with 
a clarification. Subsequent ATIP requests filed by the researcher related to all documents and 
emails pertaining to this dissertation project revealed an email exchange (now public information 
as a result of the ATIP request) between the aforementioned agency representative and the 
Manager of Creative Services at CBSA National HQ in Ottawa. Providing advice on whether or 
not to support the thesis project, the manager stated (emphasis original): 
He mentions conducting one-hour interviews with officers pertaining to their 
social interactions with members of the travelling public, how they perceive the 
public. BSOs’ roles are not to socialize with the public they serve nor to 
necessarily speak to how they perceive the public. They are there to assess 
travellers and make a determination on admissibility, etc. I’m not sure this is 
relevant and would probe further as to what is meant by this and why it is being 
looked at. 
 
From the above email exchange, it appears that national knowledge-brokers interpret the BSO 
occupation and the actions of officers as strictly following CBSA policies and mandates 
pertaining to questions posed to the public, determinations made, and other duties performed. 
The notion that officers’ “roles are not to socialize with the public” demonstrates this strict 
interpretation. As findings in this thesis will demonstrate below, BSO training documents and 
other agency materials also reach this same conclusion – that officers strictly “interrogate” or 
“interview” members of travelling publics and do not “interact” in any other way. Indeed, The 
Canadian Press story listed above in terms of “founded” complaints filed against officers 
seriously challenges this strict interpretation of the role and behaviours of BSOs in that there is at 
least anecdotal evidence to suggest officers do diverge from institutional discourses, policies, and 
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procedures. In short, the lack of communication and lack of willingness of an agency answerable 
to the Minister of Public Safety, the Minister of Border Security and Organized Crime 
Reduction, and to the Parliament of Canada (and therefore to all Canadians) to assist an 
academic researcher with a project that has received federal government funding (through the 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada) is distressing.  
 Given the inability of researchers to examine the frontline activities of CBSA, the fact 
CBSA effectively accomplishes a ban against officers speaking out on matters related to their 
employment (via the Code of Conduct and privacy policies cited above), and the current lack of 
an independent or arms-length external review body to oversee CBSA activities, it is possible for 
agency “authorized spokespersons” to carefully craft the image of Canada Border Services 
Agency that is presented to the media and Canadian public, while also simultaneously avoiding 
any sort of informed critical analysis or debate concerning these carefully constructed discourses 
and institutional knowledge. This is reinforced by draconian measures identified in the CBSA 
Code of Conduct that accomplish the task of preventing officers from sharing opinions related to 
their employment or CBSA with members of the academic community or the Canadian media. 
The CBSA Code of Conduct – Chapter 4: Disciplinary Measures and Resolutions of Issues 
Pertaining to the Code of Conduct – outlines the potential consequences for officers: 
A decision regarding disciplinary measures will be determined on a case-by-case 
basis taking into consideration the nature of the breach and the seriousness of the 
misconduct. Serious breaches will result in consequences up to and including 
termination of employment. Some cases of misconduct may result in an employee 
being found guilty of an indictable offence and liable, on conviction, to fines 
and/or imprisonment based on legislative and regulatory requirements. 
 
These draconian measures are only further enhanced by CBSA’s ability to hide behind “national 
security” and “secrecy” imaginaries that essentially render the agency beyond reproach. In short, 
researchers must resolve to work around the opacity generated by this shroud of secrecy, privacy, 
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and security, and explore new avenues for critically analyzing the activities and practices of an 
agency that has, until now, largely been immune to public scrutiny, critical analysis, 
accountability, and debate. Indeed, the words of Max Weber on the domination of bureaucracies 
provided at the outset of this thesis are as relevant now in 2019 as they were then in 1922.  
Reflecting on Issues of Access and ATIP Requests 
 Other researchers have had similar difficulties accessing the inner-workings of secret 
agencies. For example, Côté-Boucher (2013) was only able to secure access to interview BSOs 
employed by CBSA after an exhaustive search for any sort of connection between the researcher 
and a frontline border worker. Only after two years of searching was Côté-Boucher able to locate 
such a connection, and only because she was ultimately connected to the frontline worker 
through an extended family member (Côté-Boucher 2013:27). As Côté-Boucher (2013:27) 
acknowledges, “a bit of luck” was involved in ultimately securing access from the agency. 
Despite having numerous frontline connections and a fair amount of frontline experience myself, 
CBSA was in no way welcoming or supportive of my research (despite a number of emails sent 
between myself and local as well as national managers seeking clarification, proposing 
amendments to my study to allay identified agency concerns, and so forth). In my case? Luck 
was definitely not on my side.  
 Several scholars have attempted to negotiate the difficulties associated with accessing 
secretive organizations by filing Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) requests with 
Canadian government agencies and departments. The Access to Information Act (hereafter 
ATIA) gives Canadian citizens, permanent residents, and any person or corporation present in 
Canada a right to access records of government institutions that are subject to the Act 
(Government of Canada 2018). According to Walby and Larsen (2012): 
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Shadowing government employees (see McDonald, 2005) may provide the most 
in-depth data about how workers work in government agencies and how 
organizations change over time. However, if shadowing is not possible for lack of 
entry, or when dealing with agencies that do not allow researchers entry (such as 
some security and intelligence agencies), [ATIP] requests present a viable means 
of producing textual data (p. 32).  
 
Such archival analysis serves to reveal governance processes and forms of knowledge that would 
otherwise be completely opaque to researchers, the academic literature, news media, and 
Canadian publics. Agencies examined through ATIP requests in relation to borders, security, 
migration, detention, and policing activities have included (but are not limited to): Canada 
Border Services Agency (Larsen and Piché 2009; Bond 2017; Lalonde 20194; Moffette and 
Ridgley 2018; Lalonde 20185), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (Monaghan and 
Walby 2012), Citizenship and Immigration Canada6 (Rehaag 2009), Correctional Services 
Canada (Larsen and Piché 2009), the Immigration and Refugee Board (Rehaag 2017; Bond 
2017), Public Safety Canada (Larsen and Piché 2009), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(Monaghan and Walby 2012; Puddister and Riddell 2012; Boyle, Clément, and Haggerty 2015; 
Boyle and Speed 2018), Transport Canada (Saulnier and Thompson 2016), and 21 agencies and 
departments (including aforementioned units) as part of a large study on Government of Canada 
media relations practices (Marland 2017). 
 Archival analysis of documents garnered from ATIP requests is not without several 
potential pitfalls. As Walby and Larsen (2012:35) indicate, researches must be aware of 
differences in terms of how individual agencies define and use vocabulary surrounding requested 
                                                 
4 This refers to an article published in Policing and Society entitled “Border officer training in Canada: identifying 
organisational governance technologies.” This article is reproduced (in part) as Chapter 3 in this dissertation.  
5 This refers to an article published in the British Journal of Criminology entitled “Cyborg Work: Borders as 
Simulation.” This article is reproduced (in part) as Chapter 5 in this dissertation. 




items. Wording ATIP requests with too wide or too limited a scope can result in either 
incomplete or unnecessary results. Similarly, researches must also know where records being 
sought are located within the entire government system of agencies and departments (Walby and 
Larsen 2012:35). Requesting documents across several units simultaneously can result in 
unnecessary delays in receiving release packages. Such problems were largely avoidable in this 
study given the researcher was previously employed by Canada Border Services Agency and had 
inside knowledge about the types, names, and locations of documents sought through ATIP 
requests (please see the discussion on reflexivity below for more details). While Walby and 
Larsen (2012) state that ATIP requests are often flagged for follow-up and questioning regarding 
wording by ATIP coordinators within government agencies, I did not have this issue while filing 
requests related to this dissertation research (i.e. requests were simply accepted verbatim by 
CBSA each time).  
Additionally, according to Walby and Larsen (2012:36-37) there is a potential issue with 
the Hawthorne effect – the phenomenon involving social actors changing their behaviour when 
they are aware of being subject to analysis or scrutiny. Government departments or agencies may 
carefully work through problems to avoid producing records that could be subject to an ATIP 
request (i.e. discussing problems orally rather than via email or printed memo). Indeed, after my 
research was summarily dismissed twice by CBSA representatives, I filed an ATIP request for 
all emails and other communications related to discussions about this research project. I found 
that while some emails were exchanged at National Headquarters in Ottawa (detailed above), the 
vast majority of local decision-making within the Southern Ontario Region of CBSA had 
occurred orally (and therefore could not be gleaned from ATIP documents released by the 
agency). To this I would also add the possibility that agencies may not be releasing all 
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documents to researchers (despite federal laws mandating federal departments comply with 
ATIP requests). ATIP requests (much like agencies themselves) are bureaucratic and contain 
rules and procedures – including inter-agency policies – for completing requests that are largely 
opaque to researchers and other “outsiders”. In other words, it is difficult to ensure accountability 
and integrity within ATIP processes (particularly when agencies like CBSA lack any sort of 
external review body designed to assess and investigate agency activities and adherence to 
federal law).  
Luscombe and Walby (2015) elaborate on the above challenges in discussing how 
information management practices of policing agencies and the laws that enable their 
surveillance and intelligence capabilities actually function to curtail ATIP requests. For example, 
ATIP offices typically have high turnover rates and often new coordinators are unfamiliar with 
their assigned department or where specifically to locate requested documents (Luscombe and 
Walby 2015:493). Additionally, ATIP coordinators can obstruct and seek to limit the scope of 
requests by citing undue burden to the department in terms of filling the request (in terms of cost 
and/or time and human resource requirements) (Luscombe and Walby 2015:494). Such 
obstruction has led to lengthy delays in processing files. For instance, during the 2016-2017 
fiscal year, 2,326 individual ATIP requests took more than a year to process in each case (Beeby 
2018). Additionally, in 2016-2017, 19.3 per cent of all responses were delivered beyond time 
deadlines established in the ATIA (Beeby 2018).  
Federal policing and intelligence agencies like CBSA and the RCMP can also redact or 
exclude from release many documents that fall under several exceptions within the ATIA, 
including information related to investigative techniques, information that could be used to 
facilitate the commission of a crime, and personal information as defined by the Privacy Act 
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(Rigakos and Worth 2011:647). Also included in the ATIA are exceptions regarding information 
related to “methods of, and scientific or technical equipment for, collecting, assessing or 
handling information” (Government of Canada 2019). Indeed, given my prior familiarity with 
training and other documents as a former employee with CBSA, it became immediately apparent 
to me that various pieces of information had been redacted from my fulfilled ATIP requests. This 
included information related to investigative techniques (the standard primary questions posed 
by officers, the psychological and other indicators used by officers to form suspicion, indicators 
related to the falsification of passports and other documents, and information related to risk 
profiling), information that could be used to facilitate the commission of a crime (information 
regarding common hiding places in passenger vehicles and other conveyances), and personal 
information (actual names included within case studies used in officer training modules). While 
some of these redactions obviously fall within the scope of exceptions outlined in the ATIA, 
some redactions (like the redaction of primary questions posed by officers) are questionable at 
best given this information is already widely known by anyone regularly crossing borders.  
Nonetheless, I ensured the accuracy of information I received through ATIP requests 
using three methods. First, I contrasted received documents with my personal experience using 
these and other documents as a former student border services officer employed by CBSA 
between 2008 and 2009. Second, in many cases, interviewees (off the record) offered up their 
own unredacted copies of training and other documents to the researcher. These unredacted 
documents offered the researcher a point of comparison between released ATIP documents and 
unredacted documents employed by officers on the frontline and in formative training. Third, 
certain questions were designed into qualitative interviews with officers (see Methods section 
below for more details) to attempt to increase the efficiency of the first two methods in ensuring 
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the accuracy of fulfilled ATIP requests. These questions also allowed officers to serve as 
informants to point the researcher toward additional documents that might exist. For example, 
the interview schedule contained questions such as: “What type of training did you receive from 
CBSA (or the Government of Canada) related to dealing with members of the travelling public?” 
and “What policies, standard operating procedures, or other documents exist to guide your 
interactions with members of the travelling public?” Officers regularly cited in answers the same 
training documents, policies, standard operating procedures, manuals, and other documents that 
had already been obtained through ATIP requests (see Methods section for more details). 
Combined, using these three methods left me very confident that documents received from 
CBSA as a result of ATIP requests were accurate, free from redaction of necessary information, 
and featured minimal questionable redactions of additional material. Questionable redactions that 
did exist were largely superfluous to the main research questions associated with this study and 
therefore did not negatively impact results. 
Results generated from ATIP requests combined with a multi-method approach including 
qualitative interviews, content analysis, thematic analysis, and discourse analysis (elaborated 
below) allowed for a triangulation of data related to institutional discourses generated by CBSA. 
Triangulation is most commonly achieved in research by employing two or more different 
collection techniques to gather and analyze data (Gravelle 2014:49). Triangulation is often 
employed to overcome problems associated with validity and reliability. According to Walby 
and Larsen (2012), triangulation of data in terms of ATIP is achieved when: “The use of [ATIP] 
requests, interviews, and discourse analysis [is] staggered; information gleaned from one module 
of data production can inform future data production efforts” (p. 39). While ATIP documents, 
results from qualitative interviews with frontline officers, and subsequent analyses of transcripts 
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and documentation did not create a need to refine the research process in this study given the 
information largely coincided at each level, this harmony nonetheless suggests that information 
obtained by the researcher using the variety of methods elaborated below was accurate and 
complete.  
A Further Note Regarding Reflexivity 
 I have already noted above how my personal experiences as a former student border 
services officer with CBSA allowed me to precisely file and also verify the accuracy of 
documents received through ATIP requests. These experiences also helped inform various other 
stages of the research project that are worth noting. Several challenges related to access and the 
bureaucratic secrecy surrounding CBSA were negotiated through my unique position as an 
outsider’s insider. According to Gravelle (2014):  
Outsider’s insiders refer to those individuals who have previously been a part of 
the [policing] organisation but have subsequently left through transfer or 
retirement. Having left the service, such individuals no longer enjoy 
unprecedented access or cultural acceptability; however, it is likely that outsider’s 
insiders will retain some influence and contacts within the service” (p. 59).  
 
When I presented the idea for this thesis at a major Canadian academic conference in 2014, one 
observer asked me, “How can you reconcile the potential weaknesses associated with this study 
in that you formerly worked as a student BSO and now are proposing to conduct research on 
CBSA?” My answer today is the same as it was then: “My weakness is my strength.” Many 
academics, members of the media, and Canadian publics can only speculate about the inner 
workings of a secretive state agency like CBSA, and therefore also tend to shy away from 
analyses and critiques related to frontline practices. My insider perspective is unique to the 
interdisciplinary literature and allows me the rare opportunity to shed light (informed through 
research) on the inner workings of CBSA. I received training from CBSA on frontline duties, 
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enabling legislation, human rights, use of force, and safe handling of firearms. I worked for two 
years on the frontline at the 452 Tunnel Traffic port of entry at the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel, 
processing hundreds of travellers on a daily basis in the Windsor borderland. I worked alongside 
many of the officers still employed at Windsor’s ports of entry today. I processed travellers with 
them, performed vehicle searches with them, seized prohibited goods with them, made arrests 
with them, performed personal searches with them, and collected intelligence with them. On 
midnight shifts when the traffic slowed and night descended, I got to know many BSOs 
personally – and they got to know me too. They had my back, and I had theirs. And when all was 
said and done, and the Government of Canada cancelled the recruitment of student BSOs at ports 
of entry in the Southern Ontario Region, I left CBSA with an extraordinary look at processes that 
few Canadians (and even fewer scholars) are permitted to have. Notable policing scholar James 
Sheptycki, also in the audience for my presentation, agreed and suggested that I write an 
ethnography of my frontline experiences. Unfortunately, the very policies and laws CBSA uses 
to prevent its current officers from speaking out also govern its former officers – so there is not 
much I can personally speak to. This is why my perspective is often “silent” regarding the 
findings associated with this thesis. But while this thesis ultimately falls short of a personal 
ethnography, because I had access to publicly undisclosed processes I knew exactly which 
documents to ask for, exactly how to interpret their use, exactly how to analyze them; I knew 
exactly what kinds of questions needed to be posed about the agency and its practices; and I 
knew exactly how to provide a detailed examination of the undisclosed processes informed by 
research findings rather than from my own (prohibited) personal observations.  
 For instance, my personal experiences regarding training, personal frontline interactions, 
and my observations related to frontline interactions involving other BSOs led me to identify 
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various “lacks” or gaps in terms of CBSA practices and procedures. First, these observations 
contributed to various themes I then converted into key research questions associated with this 
thesis. These questions (elaborated above) specifically focus on issues related to institutional 
discourses located in training and other documents as potential drivers of officer frontline 
interactions with publics, the extent to which these official discourses are ignored by officers, the 
influence of technologization on frontline interactions, and the extent to which interactions 
occurring between officers and publics challenge institutional discourses. In light of findings 
related to these questions, it also became necessary to provide the academic literature with an 
accurate metaphor and theoretical perspective for how border governance unfolds in reality at 
contemporary borders (again, partially informed by my personal experiences).  
 Second, my personal experiences and observations also helped inform the methods I 
initially proposed to explore these key research questions. Firstly, in addressing question one –
institutional discourses potentially informing interactions between officers and members of 
travelling publics – I determined the variety of formative and in-service training modules, 
manuals, memoranda, and federal policies I had been exposed to during my own formative 
training and over the course of my frontline experience. I then filed ATIP requests for each 
document not previously publicly released under the ATIA. Furthermore, I culled additional 
publicly available information from CBSA and other Government of Canada websites, including 
corporate documents, website pages, CBSA D Memoranda, and various acts of Parliament. I 
then analyzed all documents (following the methods outlined in the next section) to identify key 
institutional themes and discourses contained within the texts of these documents. In further 
addressing questions one, two – regarding frontline interactions irreducible to training – and 
three – regarding technologization potentially influencing frontline interactions – I proposed 
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combining an analysis of documents with qualitative interviews performed with BSOs employed 
by CBSA along with frontline observations of social interactions between officers and members 
of travelling publics occurring at ports of entry in the Windsor borderland. Analysis of findings 
from qualitative interviews and frontline observations would determine whether and to what 
extent officers employ training modules, manuals, policies, and other documents in interacting 
with publics as well as whether and to what extent technologization serves to influence or 
mediate these interactions. Findings generated from qualitative interviews and frontline 
observations would also answer the fifth question by contrasting such findings with institutional 
themes and discourses generated from obtained CBSA documents and policies. From such 
findings, additional conclusions could be reached by the researcher regarding how contemporary 
border governance should be theorized within the literature.  
 Third, and perhaps most important to this study, my personal observations and personal 
experiences as a former student BSO with CBSA helped this study adapt and overcome the 
challenges associated with accessing a secretive agency for research. Particularly, as a result of 
repeated refusals from CBSA to participate in or support my research study, significant 
challenges emerged including recruiting frontline officers and also my inability to access ports of 
entry to observe actual frontline interactions occurring between officers and members of the 
public. In short, I am extremely well-versed in exactly how frontline interactions between 
officers and publics unfold at ports of entry given my former employment within the agency. 
However, as highlighted above, I am also unable to provide a personal retroactive ethnography 
of frontline interactions given the prohibitions against current or former officers sharing such 
information publicly. I navigated these challenges in a number of ways. First, I knew that I could 
continue soliciting officer participation (as I had before) without agency approval and that a 
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number of officers would eventually agree to participate. Recruitment, consent, and other 
research ethics materials associated with the study had already been crafted and approved to 
solicit officer participation without agency approval (given I anticipated potential problems 
associated with requesting agency permission). Recruitment and consent documents outlined to 
potential participants a plethora of measures designed to protect the confidentiality of 
interviewees, ensure CBSA could not possibly become aware (in any way) of any individual 
officer participating in the study, and ensure the strict protection and retention of all data 
resulting from qualitative interviews. The Research Ethics Board (hereafter REB) at my 
institution also suggested I rely on oral consent exclusively rather than requiring officers to sign 
consent documents (a suggestion I incorporated). The REB also required I present officers with 
strong warnings regarding their potential participation in the study. This included the following 
explicit excerpt outlined on all recruitment and consent forms: 
Specifically, it is possible that if CBSA found out about your participation in this 
study and also discovered you made certain prohibited comments during the 
interview (i.e. revealing “Protected” information, exposing weaknesses in 
Canadian border security, etc.) that violate the Value and Ethics Code for the 
Public Sector and/or the CBSA Code of Conduct, you may be punished as follows 
according to Code of Conduct Chapter 4: Disciplinary Measures and Resolutions 
of Issues Pertaining to the Code of Conduct: 
 
If a breach of either Code or the Policy occurs, managers are responsible 
for reviewing the breach and if required, consulting with Labour Relations 
and/or referring the case to Personnel Security and Professional 
Standards to determine appropriate action. 
 
A decision regarding disciplinary measures will be determined on a case-
by-case basis taking into consideration the nature of the breach and the 
seriousness of the misconduct. Serious breaches will result in 
consequences up to and including termination of employment. Some cases 
of misconduct may result in an employee being found guilty of an 
indictable offence and liable, on conviction, to fines and/or imprisonment 




While such wording ultimately posed additional issues with recruitment (see discussions of 
sample size in the Methods section below), combined, these explicit warnings alongside a 
plethora of protections ultimately allowed a handful of officers to reach an informed decision to 
participate in the study despite the fact I did not have CBSA’s approval in conducting the 
research. Had I not anticipated (as a result of previously working within the secretive agency that 
is CBSA) various difficulties associated with obtaining the agency’s permissions and had 
research ethics documents and consent forms been designed based on the assumption that agency 
permissions would be obtained, the recruitment of officers to this study would have been 
impossible.  
 In terms of lack of access to observe frontline interactions, my former employment as a 
student BSO (in addition to much discussion with my thesis supervisor) led me to conclude that 
an adaptation of proposed study methods was required to continue the study. After filing 
requisite research ethics amendment documents with my institutional REB, another sample of 
participants was subsequently recruited to participate in qualitative interviews from which 
findings could be generated to either corroborate or refute knowledge gleaned from qualitative 
interviews with recruited officers (as well as additionally test institutional discourses related to 
frontline interactions). This involved recruiting members of travelling publics (see Methods 
section below for more information) residing and working within the Windsor-Essex County 
borderland (the same region from which officers were recruited). While obviously not as 
methodologically strong as conducting frontline observations at ports of entry, the triangulation 
of methods to confirm findings generated as a result of documents obtained through ATIP 
requests, interviews with frontline officers and members of travelling publics related to 
interaction narratives generated from past frontline interactions, and subsequent content, 
25 
 
thematic, and discourse analyses of resulting data (in addition to my own personal experiences as 
a student BSO with CBSA and also as a regular border traveller) leads me to conclude that 
findings generated through this study are fairly representative and illustrative of the types and 
range of social interactions regularly occurring at ports of entry within the Windsor borderland. 
As further elaborated in the Methods section below, interviews with officers and members of 
travelling publics also allowed an especially informative inclusion of additional perspectives (in 
the form of subjugated official and non-official knowledge) not often included within security 
and border research. Such knowledge also serves to only further test and critique institutional 
discourses located within training and other documents generated by CBSA and the Government 
of Canada. Combined, this adaptation of methods allowed the researcher to address all 
aforementioned key research questions without the necessity of conducting frontline 
observations (which were subsequently removed as a method of analysis). 
Fourth, my personal experiences and observations also contributed to the formation of 
various questions I ultimately posed to frontline officers (in qualitative interviews – elaborated in 
the Methods section below) to begin answering various key research questions. Such questions 
ultimately focused on (among other matters) issues of officer training in related to interacting 
with travelling publics; the existence (or lack thereof) of policies, manuals, and other documents 
guiding interactions with travelling publics; the extent to which officers disregard formal training 
in interacting with publics; officer use of various technologies deployed by CBSA to guide 
interactions with publics; and so forth. My understanding of the types and range of frontline 
interactions (garnered from my own personal experience as a former frontline officer and current 
frequent traveller) also allowed me to develop various questions posed to members of travelling 
publics to “pull out” information related to the key research questions of this thesis. This 
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included questions related (but not limited) to: officer attitude, perception of officers, interactions 
with officers, previous positive experiences, previous negative experiences, perceptions 
regarding officer training, and experiences involving officers employing technologies of various 
kinds in frontline interactions.  
Finally, my observations and personal experiences as a former frontline officer also 
contributed to the scope, details, and wording of the ATIP requests I filed with CBSA. In 
attempting to answer key research questions and triangulate data with findings generated through 
interviews with officers and members of travelling publics, I knew I had to obtain various 
previously unreleased documents (elaborated in the Methods section below) related to officer 
formative training related to frontline interactions, technologization, and enforcement activities 
generally; frontline manuals, standard operating procedures, and other documents used by 
officers to guide frontline interactions, the use of technologies, and the unfolding of 
enforcement-related activities; as well as previously released documents including memoranda, 
corporate documents, and public policy documents freely available on the CBSA and 
Government of Canada websites. Further discussion of reflexivity in relation to ATIP requests 
can be found in the section above.  
In short, it is my sincere hope that readers of this thesis will agree that the secrecy 
surrounding CBSA has been at least partially revealed through the methods employed by and 
findings generated from this thesis.  
Methods 
 While (as explored above) lack of agency approval severely hampered the progression of 
this dissertation and ultimately partially contributed to officers declining to participate in the 
study (along with rather harsh wording concerning potential career consequences associated with 
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participating mandated by the REB at the researcher’s institution of study), the lack of approval 
nonetheless proved to be a blessing in disguise. This complication ultimately led the researcher 
to also consider knowledge generated by non-official travelling publics rather than simply 
relying on the knowledge of frontline official BSOs alongside analyses of institutional 
discourses. Combined, interviews with officers and members of travelling publics provided a 
much more comprehensive and robust picture of interaction narrative knowledge generated from 
perceptions of past frontline interactions than had this project focused exclusively on knowledge 
generated by BSOs. While a complete picture cannot be obtained due to the inability of the 
researcher to observe actual frontline interactions between officers and members of travelling 
publics, information gleaned from interviews with officers and travelling publics (alongside 
descriptions contained in various governing documents highlighted below) provides the most 
comprehensive overview of interaction narratives generated from frontline interactions occurring 
at Canadian ports of entry completed by a researcher to date. The fact that even Côté-Boucher 
(2013) – despite identifying an inside connection to secure interviews with officers – was still 
unable to obtain permission from CBSA to conduct frontline observations highlights the bleak 
prospects of researchers ever being allowed to analyze actual frontline social interactions at ports 
of entry. As such, the methods employed within this research study are likely as close to 
analyzing knowledge generated from frontline interactions as researchers will ever venture.   
 While each article (or chapter) below will provide specific details regarding the particular 
methods employed in each distinct part of the study, this section will provide general detail as a 
matter of summary. A multi-method approach was used for this study. First, to glean information 
regarding institutional discourses, frontline officer discourses, and discourses generated by 
travelling publics related to frontline social interactions, training, and technologization, a content 
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analysis was first performed on various primary and secondary documents garnered through 
ATIP requests, government and agency websites, government publications, and other sources. 
Subsequently, a content analysis was also performed on transcripts resulting from in-depth, semi-
structured interviews conducted with officers and members of travelling publics. Semi-structured 
interviews were employed to “reflect an awareness that individuals understand the world in 
varying ways… Researchers can accomplish this through unscheduled probes… that arise from 
the interview process itself” (Berg 1998:61-62). In each case, content analysis allowed for the 
systematic identification of the frequency of information related to social interactions, officer 
training, and technologization at ports of entry. Given lack of specific research literature and 
theoretical perspectives pertaining to Canadian border services officer training and agency, 
officer, and public discourses related to frontline social interactions and also technologization, a 
grounded or “emergent” process of variable identification was used in this study. According to 
Neuendorf (2002:103), when existing theory or literature does not give a complete picture of 
possible variables for analysis, the researcher can employ a grounded approach by self-
immersion in a representative subset of the content to be examined. “In this way, variables 
emerge from the message pool, and the investigator is well grounded in the reality of the 
messages” (Neuendorf 2002:107). This coincides with standard practices in recent policing 
research that employs a constructionist and inductive approach toward analyzing shared 
understandings held by officers, policing agencies, and publics in relation to a variety of issues 
ranging from police misconduct, race, and agency governance structures (see for example 
Schulenberg and Warren 2009; Powell et al. 2015; and McMillan 2018).  
Particularly, in terms of interview data, a phenomenological approach was employed to 
capture individual self-experience as well as perceptions related to the research questions. “This 
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process allows for the researcher to derive meaning and themes of phenomena from individuals 
with similar or shared experiences” (Reynolds and Hicks 2015:470). Phenomenological studies 
are designed to understand social phenomena from the perspective of social actors involved with 
the issue that is being researched (Groenewald 2004:44). The researcher’s preconceptions were 
bracketed in order to ensure questions posed to participants served to gauge the participants’ own 
experiences and perceptions regarding themes generated from key research questions (Wellman 
and Kruger 1999:196 as cited in Groenewald 2004:47). Accordingly, interview questions were 
posed to participants from the perspective of an academic researcher (and not from the 
perspective of a former BSO). In order to reduce data to locate phenomena of interest, 
researchers using grounded approaches to coding and analyzing data can employ 
phenomenological techniques to eliminate data that is irrelevant to answering research questions 
(Roulston 2014:304). This is a particularly useful tactic for researchers “aiming to represent 
participants’ stories, [with] interviews edited to represent the central ideas discussed” (Roulston 
2014:304). This phenomenological approach has been employed in a variety of recent policing 
studies involving in-depth qualitative interviews with officers (see for example Birzer 2008; 
Reynolds and Hicks 2015; Reynolds, Fitzgerald, and Hicks 2018).  
 Open coding was first used to address the research questions listed above. Coding was 
therefore “driven by the researcher’s theoretical or analytical interest” (Braun and Clarke 
2006:84). Data generated from interviews and documents are broken down into discrete parts, 
examined, and compared for similarities and differences (Strauss and Corbin 2004:303). This 
process allowed various “codes” to emerge from the data. Codes were then grouped together in 
categories to allow for more “focused coding” of interview and documentary data (Strauss and 
Corbin 2004:305). This grounded approach was also employed to ensure that researcher feelings 
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and experiences (as a former student border services officer employed by CBSA) would not have 
an influence on the data analysis. However, as in similar studies in policing conducted by former 
officers (see for example Reynolds and Hicks 2015), familiarity with CBSA, ports of entry, and 
BSO work “provided the [researcher] a greater understanding of the experiences and feelings 
described in the participants’ responses” (Reynolds and Hicks 2015:474).  
 A discourse analysis was also conducted on coded data generated from government 
documents as a result of the content analysis described above. This allowed the researcher to 
generate findings regarding how discourses generated from officer training, frontline manuals, 
shifting agency mandates, and other sources function in shaping and reproducing BSO social 
relations, identities, and ideas (Tonkiss 1998:248). The discourse analysis sought to identify the 
technologies of governance that are employed in shaping officer realities while also considering 
the implications of these findings within broader structures of power. Miller and Rose (2008:14) 
state that governmentality serves to reflect on what it means to govern, or otherwise to conduct 
conduct. An analytics of government examines “what authorities of various sorts wanted to 
happen, in relation to problems defined how, in pursuit of what objectives, through what 
strategies and techniques” (Rose 1999:20). Through a discourse analysis of documentation, one 
can identify language and other signifying systems that are elements in forming and shaping 
realities and subjectivities, which in turn render reality governable (Rose, O’Malley, and 
Valverde 2006:89). Governmentality analyses also consider just what rationalities – styles of 
thinking and ways of rendering reality thinkable – and technologies – assemblages of persons, 
techniques, and institutions – are employed for the purposes of governing conduct (Miller and 
Rose 2008:16). The bulk of this work is accomplished in Chapter 3 below. 
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 In terms of selecting primary and secondary documents for analysis, purposive sampling 
was employed. Purposive sampling is valuable in exploratory research where previous 
theoretical perspectives and literature are largely absent in that while the researcher will never 
know if their sample is representative of a population (given randomness is not a feature of 
purposive sampling) it nonetheless allows the researcher to select cases that are especially 
informative. Additionally, the value in purposive sampling is that it allows the researcher to 
select members of a difficult-to-reach, specialized population (like border services officers or 
government documents that can only be obtained through ATIP requests) (Neuman 2006:222). 
Finally, purposive sampling allows researchers to conduct in-depth and intensive interviews and 
examinations toward identifying “insights, anomalies, and paradoxes, which later may be 
formalized into hypotheses that can be tested by quantitative social science methods” 
(Hochschild 1981:23-24 as cited in Neuman 2006:222). Particularly in terms of accessing 
government documents through ATIP requests, the researcher could only employ purposive 
sampling given that large swaths of documents either have “Protected” classifications (and are 
not made available for analysis) or have been heavily redacted. Nonetheless, various primary and 
secondary documents were examined as part of the content and discourse analyses highlighted 
above. Sources included federal government websites; over 300 pages of government reports; 
thirty-one training modules consisting of 1324 pages of material from a late-2000s intake of the 
CBSA Port of Entry Recruit Training (POERT) program; various documents partially released 
by CBSA under ATIP requests filed by the researcher, including: 1274 pages of material from 
the CBSA Enforcement Manual, 296 pages of material related to communicating with the public 
(mostly newer Officer Induction Training Program documents), 471 pages of material from the 
CBSA People Processing Manual, and 100 pages of material from the CBSA Immigration 
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Enforcement Manual and associated training documents; over 280 CBSA D Memoranda publicly 
available on the agency’s website; and various policies, including the Customs Act (1985), the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2001), and the Canada Border Services Agency Act 
(2005).  
 Second, semi-structured, face-to-face interviews unfolded with two samples from the 
Windsor-Essex County region in order to compare institutional discourses with interaction 
narratives generated from knowledge of past frontline social interactions supplied by 
participants. All interviews were audio recorded, transcribed, and coded in relation to the 
theoretical and analytical interest of the thesis. Key themes were identified in transcripts first 
using an open coding method, and second using focused coding (Emerson et al. 1995). For the 
first sample, in-depth interviews of approximately one hour to one and a half hours in length 
were conducted with ten BSOs currently or formerly employed at ports of entry in Windsor. As 
obtaining access to BSOs was challenging, purposive sampling was employed for this study 
(Weiss 1994:25). Former colleagues of the researcher were interviewed first, as rapport had 
already been pre-established.7 Subsequently, this study employed chain-referral sampling to gain 
access to other potential participants. The chain-referral sampling technique enables the 
identification and tracing of social networks using a small number of initial contacts who then 
provide researchers with an ever-expanding set of potential contacts (Spreen 1992; Thomson 
1997; Kuzel 1999). Critiques associated with chain-referral sampling strategies (and other forms 
of purposive sampling) include that they are not generalizable given that the technique will only 
reach members of a population who are involved in a particular social network, ultimately 
missing potential participants isolated from these networks (Milliner 2014:174). According to 
                                                 
7 The researcher worked as a student border services officer through the Government of Canada’s Federal Student 
Work Experience Program from 2008-2009. 
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Milliner (2014:174) however, chain-referral sampling can be particularly effective in reaching 
hard to reach groups within grounded policing studies with research aims of providing insight 
rather than attempting to generalize findings beyond the sample (or to the entire agency). In total, 
the researcher forwarded twenty-five invitations to participate in the research and ultimately 
successfully recruited ten participants – seven current BSOs, two retired officers, and one former 
officer now employed outside of CBSA.8 Six officers identified as male, while four officers 
identified as female.9 Questions were posed to BSOs related to the key research questions of the 
study, including questions regarding: 1) frontline interactions with members of the travelling 
public; 2) training received from CBSA and the Government of Canada related to frontline social 
interactions; 3) CBSA and Government of Canada policies, standard operating procedures, and 
other documents designed to guide frontline interactions with the public; 4) deviations from 
training and policy in interacting with the public; 5) whether and to what extent officers 
prioritize their disparate duties; 6) how digitized risk technologies used at the frontline influences 
interactions with members of the travelling public; 7) perceptions regarding which technologies 
are most important to performing officer duties; 8) the total percentage of all duties involving 
digitized risk technologies; and 9) how BSOs understand and define “the border”. 
Generally, in policing studies involving in-depth and inductive qualitative interviews 
with officers, 10 to 25 interviews are recommended to obtain saturation (Reynolds, Fitzgerald, 
and Hicks 2018). Various policing studies employing in-depth interviews with officers fall 
                                                 
8 It is likely that current officers were hesitant to participate in the project given CBSA did not give its formal 
approval for the study and given the researcher’s institutional research ethics board mandated the use of strong 
warnings in study recruitment letters regarding the potential career consequences associated with participating in the 
study. 
9 Data concerning ethnicity and other sociodemographic characteristics was not gathered for officers participating in 
this study out of concern for participant confidentiality. Given the (relatively) small size of the Windsor BSO 
workforce (relative to the entire population of BSOs – see next page for more details), including additional 
sociodemographic characteristics could potentially allow for the identification of individual officers and also would 
severely compromise the ethical nature of this study.  
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within the 10 to 20 interviewee range (see for example Regehr et al. 2003; Aarons, Powell, and 
Browne 2004; Beletsky, Macalino, and Burris 2005; Olivia and Compton 2010; Spalek 2010; 
Evans, Pistrang, and Billings 2013).  Furthermore, in terms of phenomenological studies, Boyd 
(2001) and Creswell (1998) recommend in-depth interviews with up to 10 participants 
(Groenewald 2004:46). Many policing researchers have also attempted to apply a simple 
working percentage of 5% of the population to ascertain appropriate sample size (Gravelle 
2014:70). While specific details regarding number of officers employed at individual ports of 
entry across Canada are unavailable for public consumption, estimates of staffing levels at 
Windsor ports of entry can be obtained through recent media reports. An article in 2013 
mentions that the Customs and Immigration Union (CIU) – responsible for representing frontline 
officers, intelligence officers, inland enforcement officers, hearings officers, and support staff – 
represents “more than 500 workers in Windsor” (Pearson 2013). Given that, across Canada, 
CBSA has a total workforce of 14,000 employees including 7,700 frontline uniformed officers10 
(55% of the total number of employees), one can conclude that Windsor ports of entry have at 
least 275 frontline officers rotating between shifts in 24-hour security environments. Therefore, 
5% of the Windsor borderland population of frontline officers is roughly 14 officers. Notably, in 
a similar recent investigation, Broll and Huey (2015) conducted in-depth interviews with 12 
police officers from three municipal police departments in Southwestern Ontario to gauge officer 
perspectives on cyberbullying.  
 In-depth interviews were also conducted with thirty members of travelling publics 
familiar with crossing the border and interacting with BSOs. The majority of interviews lasted 
about 30-45 minutes and were conducted in-person or via Skype. Participants had to be at least 
                                                 
10 Numbers derived from CBSA website. Cited as CBSA (2019) in Bibliography section. 
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18-years-old to participate in the study. Again, purposive sampling was employed to, first, 
identify “key informants” from a variety of age groups and occupational groups. Particularly, 
this purposive sampling initially focused on identifying five key informants in fields of work 
involving the informant regularly crossing the border and interacting with border officers, 
including, for instance, nurses, accountants, and other professionals employed in the United 
States. Also included in this initial sample of key informants was a commercial transport truck 
driver who crosses into the United States daily to deliver commercial goods. From this initial 
sample, chain-referral sampling was again used to gain access to other potential participants. The 
vast majority of participants (24) were current residents of Windsor Essex-County at the time 
interviews were conducted. The remaining participants were mostly former long-term residents 
of Windsor Essex-County. In terms of gender, seventeen participants identified as female, while 
thirteen identified as male. Self-reported ethnicity of participants included: twenty White, three 
Arab, three Asian, three Black, and one Latin American. At the time of interviews, participants 
fell into the following age groups: five were 20-29 years-old, ten were 30-39 years-old, two were 
40-49 years old, seven were 50-59 years-old, five were 60-69 years-old, and one was 70-79 
years-old. In terms of employment, at the time of interviews participants fell into the following 
sectors: four in business / finance, four in communications / media, four in education, two in 
government, four in healthcare, two were post-secondary students, three were employed in the 
service industry, three in skilled trades, and one in transportation. Four additional participants 
were retired, and one participant was unemployed at the time interviews were conducted. 
Questions were posed to members of travelling publics related to the key research questions of 
this study, including questions regarding: 1) frequency of border crossing; 2) frontline 
interactions with BSOs; 3) the demeanor of BSOs; 4) perceptions regarding the extent of training 
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BSOs receive related to interacting with the public; 5) cataloguing the range of technologies 
travellers believe BSOs use at ports of entry; 6) how the use of digitized risk technologies 
influences frontline interactions travellers have with officers; 7) membership in trusted traveller 
programs like NEXUS and FAST; and 8) how members of travelling publics understand and 
define “the border”. 
 Prior studies have employed similar sample sizes (see Helleiner 2010; Bjelland 2016) and 
recruitment methods (see Horgan and Liinamaa 2017) in interviewing non-official borderland 
populations. The researcher continued conducting interviews until saturation - the point at which 
collecting additional data provided no new information (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Mason (2010) 
suggests that grounded theory methodology generally reaches the point of saturation after 20 to 
30 interviews have been conducted (Creswell 1998:64 as cited in Mason 2010).  
As stated above, the chapters that follow include sections detailing the specific methods 
employed within each specific article. Ultimately, when interaction narrative knowledge 
generated from in-depth interviews regarding perceptions related to past frontline social 
interactions between official and non-official social actors circulating within ports of entry was 
contrasted with institutional discourses derived from analysis of various documents, this 
dissertation was able to reach conclusions regarding key – and perhaps systematic (see Lalonde 
2012) – differences in terms of how borders, frontline social interactions, technologization, as 
well as security and mobility governance are constructed by states, institutions, and social actors 






Key Definitions and Theoretical Perspectives 
 Various key definitions and theoretical perspectives used throughout this thesis must be 
explored within this introduction to situate the reader appropriately. The following section 
highlights these key concepts. 
Key Definitions 
Knowledge 
 This thesis will seek to identify knowledge through first-hand accounts. While this thesis 
(as the above discussion of governance suggests) will identify institutional discourses 
(governmentality) related to the state, its agencies, and associated border governance 
technologies, it is also particularly interested in the knowledge generated by official and non-
official social actors who actually circulate within spaces (the milieu) of security. This 
knowledge is what Foucault (1972) refers to as subjugated knowledge, or: 
…a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their 
task or insufficiently elaborated: naïve knowledges, located low down on the 
hierarchy… I also believe that it is through the re-emergence of these low-ranking 
knowledges, these unqualified, even directly disqualified knowledges… and 
which involve what I would call a popular knowledge… a particular, local, 
regional knowledge… that it is through the re-appearance of this knowledge, of 
these local popular knowledges, these disqualified knowledges, that criticism 
performs its work (p. 82).  
 
In other words, it is precisely because subjugated knowledge is disregarded as irrelevant and 
subordinate in relation to official knowledge that it serves so well as a radical – and, indeed, 
unexpected – way to perform critical analysis of taken-for-granted official discourses. As 
Foucault (1972) proceeds to elaborate, subjugated knowledge performs the work of critical 
discourse in that they are concerned with a “historical knowledge of struggles” in which, “there 
lay the memory of hostile encounters which even up to this day have been confined to the 
margins of knowledge” (p. 83). This thesis will attempt to challenge institutional discourses and 
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official knowledge of borders, the nature of frontline interactions, and border technologization 
through the lens of such subjugated knowledge that has, until now, largely been confined to the 
margins of knowledge related to security. 
 For the purposes of this thesis, “institutional” knowledge includes knowledge generated 
by Canada Border Services Agency and the Government of Canada.  “Official” knowledge 
includes knowledge supplied in interviews with federal officers currently or formerly employed 
by CBSA or its legacy agencies (BSOs). “Non-official” knowledge refers to knowledge 
generated in interviews with travelling publics (excluding federal employees employed by 
Canada Border Services Agency).  
Publics 
 Throughout this thesis, non-official suppliers of knowledge related to borders will be 
referred to by four primary terms: 1) members of travelling publics, 2) travellers, 3) travelling 
publics, and 4) publics. “Publics” (Calhoun 1997; Warner 2002) dismisses the notion that there 
can be a homogenous collection of individuals denoted by the term “the public” (as if there is 
only one public). Rather, as Mahoney, Newman, and Barnett (2010) explain: 
[A] public is not best thought of as a pre-existing collective subject that 
straightforwardly expresses itself or offers itself up to be represented. Rather, we 
are interested in elaborating on how publics, in the plural (Calhoun, 1997), are 
called into existence, or summoned. On this understanding, ‘[p]ublics are called 
into existence, convened, which is to say that they are sustained by establishing 
relations of attention whose geographical configurations are not given in advance’ 
(Barnett, 2008, emphasis in original). This emphasizes how publics are formed 
through processes of address (Warner, 2002; Iveson, 2007) and implies that the 
precise spatial dimensions and socio-cultural composition of a public cannot be 
determined in advance of the actions and activities through which it makes its 
presence felt (p. 2). 
 
This means that publics (in the plural) are not pre-established, coherent groupings that are 
immediately intelligible (i.e. what is commonly referred to as “the public”), but rather are 
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assembled and called forward to the extent that they are generated “from the uneasy and 
impermanent alignments of discourses, spaces, institutions, ideas, technologies and objects” 
(Mahoney, Newman and Barnett 2010:3). As such the public sphere (and public discourse) is not 
generated by a single, overarching, homogeneous public, but rather is constituted as a sphere of 
multiple intersecting heterogenous publics that are only discernible to the extent that they make 
their presence felt through social action (Mahoney, Newman and Barnett 2010:250). The 
multiplicity of publics also presumes that no one public is superordinate to or more legitimate 
than any other public – all publics (when called forth) potentially contribute to public discourse 
(Mahoney, Newman and Barnett 2010:251). By employing the term “members of travelling 
publics”, this thesis acknowledges that there is not a homogenous “travelling public”, but rather a 
multiplicity of potential heterogenous travelling publics that have been constituted here to 
provide knowledge pursuant to the key research questions of this project.    
Key Theoretical Perspectives 
 While individual articles contained in this thesis (summarized below) will employ 
theoretical perspectives in disparate ways, several overarching perspectives guiding this research 
must be discussed at the outset. 
Governmentality 
Government is “a right way of arranging things in order to lead them, not to the form of 
the ‘common good’… but to a ‘suitable end,’ an end suitable for each of the things to be 
governed” (Foucault 1991:95). In other words, governmentality serves to reflect on what it 
means to govern, or otherwise to conduct conduct (Miller and Rose 2008:14). As Rose (1999) 
states, an analytics of government examines “what authorities of various sorts wanted to happen, 
in relation to problems defined how, in pursuit of what objectives, through what strategies and 
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techniques” (Rose 1999:20). If something appears to require governing, the imposition is that a 
problem has been constructed, and governmentality examines how certain actions or non-actions 
of individuals come under the scope of governmental control toward achieving some end. 
Governmentality analyses also consider just what rationalities – styles of thinking and ways of 
rendering reality thinkable – and technologies – assemblages of persons, techniques, and 
institutions – are employed for the purposes of conducting conduct (Miller and Rose 2008:16). 
There are three primary ways of governing. The first, punishment, involves the 
(typically) sovereign use of power against the body, including, for instance, torture and execution 
(Foucault 1975). The original purpose of punishment was representation – the sovereign act of 
torture or murder of the body served to reinforce the power of the sovereign over individuals (i.e. 
the power over life and death). Punishment, according to Foucault (1975) became gentler with 
the birth of the prison, with the body now confined inside walls. Individual behaviour came to be 
governed primarily through representations of confinement. Governance predicated on 
punishment exercises power on individuals rendered as legal subjects capable of voluntary 
actions (Foucault 1978:21). Discipline then emerged within the panoptic prison design, with the 
behaviour of individuals trained through constant surveillance by guards who were invisible to 
prisoners (and thus omniscient and omnipresent). Finally, discipline becomes dispersed outside 
of the prison through various other social institutions (hospitals, schools, and so forth). 
Disciplinary forms of power work not to train via the body (as punishment primarily did) but 
rather via the “soul” – through the threat of constant surveillance, individual behaviour can be 
governed. Power is exercised on “a multiplicity of organisms, of bodies capable of performances, 
and of required performances” (Foucault 1978:21).  
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According to Foucault (1978) one can chart shifts in the ends of government (raison 
d’état) throughout history. Sovereign states exercised power in order to reinforce, protect, and 
strengthen the principality and also maintain territory (Foucault 1991:93). In this sense, for 
sovereigns, the end of government is strictly the maintenance of power and sovereign territory 
over individuals, or, as Foucault (1991) states, “the end of sovereignty is circular: the end of 
sovereignty is the exercise of sovereignty” (p. 95). By contrast, population emerges as the 
ultimate end of government (Foucault 1991:100). Social life is rendered governable through the 
use of statistics, with states seeking to maintain certain regularities within populations through 
programs of governance (Foucault 1991:100).  
 While panoptic technologies of governance located within institutions function to govern 
individual behaviour, the governance of entire populations (the end of government) is an entirely 
separate concern. Foucault (1978) identifies circulation as one of the fundamental problems with 
the governance of spaces of security (like the state). Foucault employs the example of “the town” 
to illustrate his point. The fundamental problem of towns as spaces of security is: 1) the town 
cannot simply shut down circulation entirely (or it will face economic death), 2) the town cannot 
simply allow free circulation (or it will face a host of social problems like criminality, disease, 
and so forth). So governance of the town becomes a problem of circulation, whereby:  
It is simply a matter of maximizing the positive elements, for which one provides 
the best possible circulation, and of minimizing what is risky and inconvenient, 
like theft and disease, while knowing that they will never be completely 
suppressed... and since they can never be nullified, one works on probabilities 
(Foucault 1978:19).  
 
In other words, since problems with circulation can never be completely eliminated and are 
considered natural features of social life, “instead of a binary division between the permitted and 
the prohibited, one establishes an average considered as optimal on the one hand, and, on the 
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other, a bandwidth of the acceptable that must not be exceeded” (Foucault 1978:6). Such 
becomes the problem of government – the security of the population in terms of the maintenance 
of averages and bandwidths in terms of problems generated as a result of circulation. This is 
further articulated by Foucault’s concept of the milieu: 
Finally, the milieu appears as a field of intervention in which, instead of affecting 
individuals as a set of legal subjects capable of voluntary actions - which would 
be the case of sovereignty - and instead of affecting them as a multiplicity of 
organisms, of bodies capable of performances, and of required performances - as 
in discipline - one tries to affect, precisely, a population. I mean a multiplicity of 
individuals who are and fundamentally and essentially only exist biologically 
bound to the materiality within which they live. What one tries to reach through 
this milieu, is precisely the conjunction of a series of events produced by these 
individuals, populations, and groups, and quasi natural events which occur around 
them (Foucault 1978:21). 
 
In other words, while flows circulate within an environment (a space of security) that is 
somewhat random, specific flows may be governed through technologies designed to mediate 
regularities within populations (statistics). This marks a clear shift in the problem of government 
from one centred on governing individuals to one instead focused on governing entire 
populations. Thus emerges Foucault’s (1978) concept of biopower, which describes the 
mechanisms whereby “biological features of the human species become the object of a political 
strategy, of a general strategy of power” (Foucault 1978:1). Biopolitics becomes the governance 
strategy employed by states (and others) to govern entire populations within the milieu (or spaces 
of security) characterized by the culmination of predictable and unpredictable events 
(particularly as a result of circulation). Security of the population within the milieu is achieved 
by governing certain natural (or inevitable) features of the population (birth rates, death rates, 
criminality, unemployment, and so forth) according to bandwidths (established acceptable levels) 
of these features.  
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Governmentality studies enable a historical perspective that can serve to “discern family 
resemblances in… ways of rendering problems thinkable at certain times and places” (Miller and 
Rose 1008:17). Three such “families” of governmentality may be identified: classical liberalism, 
contemporary welfare liberalism, and advanced liberalism (or neoliberalism). Liberalism as a 
mentality of rule in general abandons the fantasy of totally administered society in favour of 
governing through the market, civil society, and rights-bearing citizens, each of which have 
“their own internal logics and densities, their own intrinsic mechanisms of self-regulation” 
(Miller and Rose 2008:203). Neoliberal strategies of governance specifically ask whether it is 
possible to govern at a distance, or “to govern through the regulated and accountable choices of 
autonomous agents” (Miller and Rose 2008:216). Accordingly, “The enhancement of the powers 
of the client as customer… specifies the subjects of rule in a new way: as active individuals 
seeking to ‘enterprise themselves’, to maximize their quality of life through acts of choice…” 
(Miller and Rose 2018:213-214). Whereas under classical liberalism the state was limited by the 
inalienable rights of individuals, under neoliberalism, the subject of governance becomes a 
“behaviouristically manipulable being”, subject to a governmentality “which systematically 
changes the variables of the ‘environment’ and can count on the ‘rational choice’ of individuals” 
(Lemke 2001:200). It aspires, then, to “construct prudent subjects whose moral quality is based 
on the fact that they rationally assess the costs and benefits of a certain act as opposed to other 
alternative acts” (Lemke 2001:201). 
Neoliberalism and Risk 
Neoliberalism as a logic of governmentality takes biopower to the extreme. In attempting 
to govern the milieu, neoliberal forms of governmentality seek to not only govern the present but 
also to predict the future. As Ericson (2007:6) argues, one way societies attempt to control the 
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future is through “scientific” measures of risk. Given responsible neoliberal subjects require 
ever-increasing amounts of knowledge to manage uncertainty in social life, data collection 
(surveillance) proliferates in an attempt to harness risk-management practices in taming the 
future. Risk unfolds as a neoliberal technology of governance, with individuals and other entities 
responsibilized in self-governing personal behavior to ensure their own security and prosperity 
(Ericson 2007:6). Accordingly, a “precautionary logic” develops to attempt to manage certain 
uncertainties (i.e. eventualities beyond the scope of risk calculation) that are potentially 
catastrophic in nature (Ericson 2007:22). According to Ericson (2007), precautionary logic and 
uncertainty serve to fuel “extreme pre-emptive measures for which designated agents are held 
responsible, and monitoried and sanctioned accordingly” (p. 23). Pre-emptive measures create 
the need for further surveillance, more data collection, and greater risk analysis in a never-ending 
spiral of amplification. Surveillant assemblages (Haggerty and Ericson 2000) proliferate 
throughout social life, “engulf[ing] all imaginable sources of harm” (Ericson 2007:35). For more 
details on risk and neoliberalism, please see the Findings section of Chapter 3 as well as the 
Literature Review section of Chapter 5. 
Societies of Control 
Neoliberalism and risk-management schemes also give rise to increased societal 
digitization to accomplish data collection and analysis necessary to make risk calculations 
toward the liberal imaginary of predicting (and taming) the future. This has thrust governance 
logics beyond Foucault to a post-disciplinary age. As Deleuze (1992) contends, there exists two 
poles in disciplinary societies: “the signature that designates the individual, and the number or 
administrative numeration that indicates his or her position within a mass” (p. 5). Power in 
disciplinary societies is exercised through the individual and the mass via institutions. 
45 
 
Conversely, in societies of control, the signature or number is replaced by “a code: the code is a 
password… The numerical language of control is made of codes that mark access… We no 
longer find ourselves dealing with the mass/individual pair. Individuals have become ‘dividuals,’ 
and masses, samples, data, markets, or ‘banks’” (Deleuze 1992:5). Dividuals are generated 
within databases through the aggregation of bits of data (generated by surveillance technologies 
demanded by neoliberal risk-management schemes). Dividuals come to form “passwords” 
(Deleuze 1992) for the purpose of governing mobility. Passwords can be considered as clusters 
of bits of data that reveal, conceal, and represent nothing but that serve as signs that mark access. 
Such passwords become “more real than our real selves” (Bogard 1996:21) and are ultimately 
mistaken as irrefutable copies of the embodied subject (the individual) in digital form. However, 
such passwords are, in reality, not reflections of the individual, but rather are nothing more than 
aggregated data derived from prior movements, passages, exchanges, transactions, and 
associations. This dissertation will innovate on Deleuzian theory by referring to such passwords 
not as “dividuals” (as data doubles held as irrefutable copies of embodied subjects), but rather as 
“digitized subjects” or “digital subjects” (Goriunova 2019). As Goriunova (2019) argues, there is 
a “distance” or gulf that exists between the embodied subject that appears in reality and the 
digital subject that is derived from databases. This distance does not permit the duplication of 
perfect digital subjects as personal “shadows” or precise mappings of embodied subjects. Rather: 
The story is made of patterns, similarities, models, and clusters, which are sorted, 
re-arranged, stored, and sold. Therefore, we write ourselves by generating data 
that is worked upon and then produced as digital subjects, which are inconsistent 
and not very coherent, and serve different purposes: advertisement, secret 
services, or consumption. These digital subjects do not coincide with any 
originating ‘we’. They are rather at a distance. Yet… there continues to be a legal, 
industrial, and techno-scientific pull to map computed digital subjects onto human 
beings… After all, an identifiable person can be assigned debt or a prison 




In other words, digital subjects are nothing more than the aggregate of past actions and 
behaviours that are coded as relevant to risk-management practices. Accordingly, a society must 
code in order to govern circulation (as in Foucault’s milieu). Non-coded circulation (or flows) 
represent a threat in that they may not be controlled, and therefore serve as “the flood, the 
deleuge which is the flow that breaks through the barriers of codes” (Deleuze 1971). Risk 
societies rely on the imaginary of perfect knowledge of flows (of aggregated digital subjects) to 
attempt to control them in regulating mobility and access. Given that criminal law, immigration 
law, and other forms of law cannot be applied to digital abstractions, digital subjects are assumed 
to be directly linked to embodied subjects in order to make the leap necessary to subsequently 
govern the associated individual. 
In summary, neoliberalism and risk-management as governing logics have contributed to 
the reformulation of populations (of human beings) into digitized, coded flows (taken as 
irrefutable dividuals that are, in reality, nothing but digital subjects) within societies of control. 
In essence, the end of government is no longer strictly “population” but also digitized 
abstractions of populations located in innumerable databases. Biopower is (perhaps) 
reformulated into “cyberpower” or “binarypower”, with modern neoliberal states governing 
circulation via controlling the mobility of digitized subjects (rather than individuals). For greater 
elaboration on the relationship between societies of control and risk, please see Chapter 5. 
Combining Theoretical Perspectives 
 The above theoretical analysis was a roundabout way of describing the history of 
strategies of governance advancing from classical liberalism to neoliberalism; from punishment, 
to discipline, to control; and from individuals, to populations, and finally to digitized subjects 
located within databases. This thesis will proceed to locate contemporary borders as well as 
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frontline practices and interaction narratives within the context of post-panoptic, control, and 
neoliberal forms of governance predicated on risk-management, digitization, and the 
construction of risk profiles in the form of digitized subjects within databases. Such arguments 
will employ the work of Baudrillard (1981), Bogard (1996), and Deleuze (1992) in arguing that 
contemporary borders are best understood as forms of simulation, increasingly employing cyborg 
work in governing digitized subjects as the unit of analysis in terms of governing risk, mobility, 
and human flows. Some brief comments must be made now to defend the use of Baudrillard 
(1981) in relation to various critiques regarding simulation and simulacra.  
Lived Experience and Governmentality 
 Some have argued that Foucault’s treatment of power as omnipresent implies that his 
work is too abstract and separate from ‘lived experience’ (of embodied subjectivity) to offer 
alternatives to power (see for example Sanger 2008:44). However, as Sanger (2008) argues:  
Instead, Foucault offers an explanation which focuses on power as productive and 
only existing insofar as those involved in power relations are free, as in they ‘are 
faced with a field of possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several ways 
of reacting and modes of behavior are available’ (Sanger 2008:45). 
 
While Sanger’s analysis is limited to the question of gender, conclusions reached are directly 
applicable to this thesis as well. While, according to Sanger (2008), individuals are undoubtedly 
structed by norms and discourse, women can exercise freedom within systems of governance by 
questioning the gender binary. Similarly, despite the supposed common-sense nature of 
technologies of governance predicated on digitized risk analysis, the knowledge of publics is 
important precisely because lived experience provides a point of analysis and critique for 
supposedly fixed systems of governance (like the production of digitized subjects or gender) by 
injecting embodied subjectivity back into seemingly objective, perfect, and closed “black box” 
(Latour 1999) of scientific activity. By considering interaction narrative knowledge provided by 
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embodied subjects, this dissertation considers the lived experiences of the subjects of governance 
as a way of demonstrating the tangible and measurable human consequences of intangible and 
opaque digitized technologies of governmentality. Only by considering the knowledge of publics 
(of subjugated knowledge) within systems of governmentality can we begin to discuss 
alternatives, human rights, freedoms, and shift discussion and debate to a sociological lens (from 
the supposedly apolitical, benign, and clinical application of risk information). Sociology can 
point out that risk technologies have tangible effects for embodied subjects, and that technologies 
of risk unfold not as apolitical tools for determining the truth, but rather as racialized, classist, 
and gendered tools for rendering truth. 
Defending Baudrillard 
 While Chapter 5 of this thesis will expound on simulation in relation to contemporary 
border governance practices, some initial comments must be made to defend using Baudrillard’s 
work. Firstly, how can this thesis combine the work of Michel Foucault alongside the work of a 
man – Jean Baudrillard – who published a stinging critique infamously entitled Forget Foucault? 
I have wrestled with this apparent theoretical disjuncture for quite some time and reached the 
following conclusions. Baudrillard (1976) states: “Foucault unmasks all the final or causal 
illusions concerning power, but he does not tell us anything concerning the simulacrum of power 
itself” (p. 50, emphasis in original). In this sense, Baudrillard dismisses Foucault’s historicism of 
power (summarized partially above) as nothing but a simulated construct. Baudrillard goes on to 
compare power with currency as ultimately meaningless constructs that are self-referential. He 
goes on to announce that simulation is a crisis for critical analysis: “But this is the sign that the 
substance of power, after a ceaseless expansion of several centuries, is brutally exploding and 
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that the sphere of power is in the process of contracting from a star of first magnitude to a red 
dwarf, and then to black hole absorbing all the substance of the real…” (Baudrillard 1976:59). 
 It is the conclusion of this thesis that neither theorist is fully right, nor is either theorist 
fully wrong. Followers of Foucault argue that discourses are powerful in that they serve to 
discipline individuals to adopt certain ways of thinking and acting (Rose 2007:143). Is there not 
concrete evidence of this in social reality? The university as an institution provides a powerful 
example. Why do university students judiciously and liberally provide citations within their 
course papers? Because of discourses generated by their institution (the university) regarding 
academic integrity, the value of degrees, and the consequences of plagiarism. These discourses – 
gradually developed over the history of the university, shaped and moulded by key events – are 
undoubtedly powerful in disciplining (and with modern electronic plagiarism-detection 
surveillance methods, controlling) the population of students toward properly citing papers. If 
one does not properly cite, one cannot receive a degree from one’s institution. If the entire 
population of students plagiarizes papers as a matter of routine, then the value of that 
institution’s degree subsequently crashes. 
On the other hand, what are universities, academic integrity, and the value of academic 
degrees if not forms of simulacra? Degrees (like currency) have no actual value as simple pieces 
of paper – and students (particularly modern ones) are acutely aware of this fact given the current 
labour market. Hence “the cheating of a generation” (Bourdieu 1979:80). “Academic integrity” 
similarly has no intrinsic value or properties that make it “real” in any way. Rather, signs of 
various types have colonized academia to such an extent that it is now impossible to differentiate 
what is “real” from what is “fake”.  Nonetheless, academic integrity is laden with powerful 
discourses (some of which are produced by official knowledge generated by institutions) and 
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students continue to strive toward obtaining an (apparently) simulated degree while following 
(apparently) simulated rules imposed by an (apparently) simulated institution along the way. 
 In short? It is the argument of this thesis that just because (as Baudrillard argues) social 
life is increasingly characterized by simulation does not mean we should therefore reject all 
commonsensical and blatantly obvious evidence of knowledge-power (or governmentality) at 
play. Regardless of the extent of the “nuclear fallout” of simulation in modern social life, social 
actors are still clearly disciplined by powerful discourses (simulated or not) toward certain 
behaviours. Additionally, this thesis does not advocate a pious following of Baudrillard’s 
assertions that power (and indeed everything) is in fact simulacra. Rather, this thesis employs a 
“selective reading” of Baudrillard’s (1981) arguments as they have been applied by Bogard 
(1996) in terms of the simulation of surveillance. By applying simulation to modern borders, this 
thesis does not (in turn) therefore disregard all evidence of societies of control and governance 
efforts on the part of the state. Neither does it assume that everything is simulated. Rather, as 
alluded to above, this thesis sees increasing simulation as potentially characteristic of societies 
of control as well as neoliberal and risk-management logics of governance. Similarly, this thesis 
does not advocate strict adherence to Foucault’s genealogy in tracing back discourses and the 
nature of power and knowledge surrounding borders to the beginning of documented history – 
such research would inevitably obscure important discourses and knowledge located in the 
immediate present. In short, devout Foucauldian researchers can be guilty of diving so deeply 
down the “rabbit hole” of the history of knowledge and power that they ultimately become 
surrounded by the darkness of the distant past (which obscures more pertinent and pressing 
knowledge generated in the recent past).  
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Instead, this thesis will employ aspects of governmentality theory and simulacra theory 
toward reaching important conclusions about contemporary borders as well as security and 
mobility governance in Canada. In doing so, this thesis follows the lead of Giddens (1996) in his 
deconstruction of grand narratives of social evolutionism (history) in examining the contours of 
modernity. As Giddens (1996) states, “Deconstructing social evolutionism means accepting that 
history cannot be seen as a unity, or as reflecting certain unifying principles of organisation and 
transformation. But it does not imply that all is chaos or that an infinite number of purely 
idiosyncratic ‘histories’ can be written” (p. 6). Had this thesis employed a pious reading of 
governmentality and its grand narratives or simulation and its inherent chaos (to the exclusion of 
the opposite perspective), findings would be severely lacking in terms of both context and 
richness of description. In other words, this thesis is made better by employing aspects of both 
governmentality and simulation simultaneously. Some may see this as theoretical 
gerrymandering, but I see this as refusing to engage in theoretical polemics. This thesis will not 
Forget Foucault, nor will it Forget Baudrillard.  
Secondly, and more critically, Baudrillard’s critics generally portray his work as post-
modernist, lacking in moral seriousness, irrelevant, and obsessed with claims concerning “the 
mass” (see for example Callinicos 1989; Kellner 1989; Clarke 1991; Norris 1992; Turner 1993; 
King 1998). It is worth noting at the outset that the vast majority of critiques levied against 
Baudrillard originate from the 1990s, with very little consideration of his theoretical perspectives 
over the nearly two decades that have elapsed since. Most of these critiques are therefore mute 
on various aspects of modern social life, choosing to critique (for example) Baudrillard’s (now) 
frustratingly dated assertion that television is hyperreal (see King 1998) or Baudrillard’s 
infamous failed predictions concerning the Gulf War (see Norris 1992) while not analyzing his 
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theoretical perspectives in relation to more recent contemporary developments and debates 
surrounding risk society, computerization, digitized forms of surveillance and data collection, the 
spread of database technology, the increasing importance of mass media, and so forth. 
Meanwhile, Baudrillard has experienced a resurgence of largely unchallenged applications of his 
theoretical perspectives within the interdisciplinary literature in exploring aforementioned 
features of contemporary social life (see for example Taylor 2013; Kline 2016; Lundborg 2016; 
Smith 2016; Kaneva 2018; and Lalonde 2018). As Kaneva (2018:638) also rightly points out, 
many of Baudrillard’s critics may be located within the realm of cultural studies. As Turner 
(1993) also clarifies, many sociologists have also joined the ranks of Baudrillard critics 
following his bold assertion that the death of the social necessarily involves the end of sociology 
given its inability to explain modern life.  
It is therefore not surprising that sociologists balk at any mention of Baudrillard – the 
villain who prophesized the very death of their field of teaching and research. But in examining 
contemporary society, can one actually argue that Baudrillard’s notion of simulation is wrong 
(full stop)? As Turner (1993) explains, “Baudrillard’s theory of consumption and the hyperreal 
society offers a perspective on culture which has been generally missing from traditional 
sociology and Marxism” (p. 84). To that end, Kaneva (2018) also argues that essentialist neo-
Marxist and cultural studies are equally inadequate at exploring contemporary society. 
Accordingly, neo-Marxist and essentialist thought generally accomplish only the work of 
representation. Baudrillard (1983) discusses the relationship between representation and 
simulation: 
[Representation] starts from the principle that the sign and the real are equivalent 
(even if the equivalence is Utopian, it is a fundamental axiom). Conversely, 
simulation starts from the utopia of this principle of equivalence, from the radical 
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negation of the sign as value, from the sign as reversion and death sentence of 
every reference. (p. 11, emphasis in original). 
 
As such, when opponents of Baudrillard “see” culture and social life as operating at a 
representational level, they in turn perpetuate its reality effects – elements of social life are real 
because they consist of signs, which are also real. This argument becomes rather tautological in 
nature. Kaneva (2018) refers to this as “the trap of representations” in which essentialist thinking 
and neo-Marxist studies do not actually accomplish the work of critical analysis at all. Rather, 
they simply attempt to describe “the nature of social reality” as intelligible within the limited 
confines of the global marketplace.  
Indeed, nonrepresentational theory – developed by Thrift within the context of human 
geography specifically – argues: 
…the emphasis of human geography should be on practices – either on their 
reproduction (stable repetitions), or on the production of new practices (perhaps 
inspired improvisations) – because it is practices (performances using materials to 
hand) rather than representations that are at the root of the geographies that 
humans make every day (Smith 2003:68).  
 
While Thrift implicates several “poststructuralists” as his inspiration (i.e. Deleuze, Foucault, 
Bourdieu, Giddens, and Latour), Smith (2003:68) argues that he leaves out others (i.e. 
Baudrillard, Lyotard, and Derrida) that serve to push beyond representation theory and towards 
“representational theories” (in the plural). Accordingly, Baudrillard’s simulacrum can be used to 
“burn signs in the pursuit of that nothing which runs beneath the apparent continuity of meaning” 
(Smith 2003:69).  
For instance, Smith (2003) uses the metaphor of the map and territory (employed also by 
Baudrillard) to demonstrate the difference between representational critical theory and 
nonrepresentational critical theory. Baudrillard (1981) identifies the stages of simulation in terms 
of signs. In stage one, the sign is a reflection of a basic reality. In stage two, the sign masks and 
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perverts a basic reality. In stage three, the sign masks the absence of a basic reality. In stage four, 
the sign bears no relation to any reality whatsoever – it is its own pure simulacrum (Baudrillard 
1981:11). In terms of the metaphor of the map, during phase one, territories precede maps and 
maps serve as representations (duplications) of “the real”. In this sense, maps serve to reflect a 
basic reality. During phase two, maps suddenly precede territories (and begin replacing physical 
territory as “the real”). Maps now function to pervert a basic reality. To illustrate this point, 
Smith (2003:74) discusses how an entire county can be effectively erased from reality through 
cartographer error. In future planning and governance meetings, it is the map that is cited in 
resolving problems or conflicts (despite its errors, the map is reality – the physical territory no 
longer matters). This begins the slippage into Baudrillard’s third and fourth phases wherein the 
map (formerly a representation of the real) becomes more real than reality itself (i.e. becomes the 
way to “see” and understand a territory – thus rendering the territory effectively irrelevant). The 
result, according to Baudrillard’s simulation, is that we can no longer distinguish between what 
is “real” and what is “fake” – the map (no matter what fallacies or inaccuracies went into its 
construction) replaces the territory irrefutably such that it is the territory in its absence.  
As Smith (2003) further elaborates, representational critical theory becomes fixated 
(exclusively) with the first and second phases of simulation (elaborated above) in considering 
how the map serves as a “sign” for or “perversion” of reality. Nonrepresentational critical 
theorists (like Baudrillard) deny the apparent reality the sign of the map represents and instead 
consider how the map has served not to simply represent reality but rather to replace reality to 
such an extent that the apparent binary opposition between map (fake) and territory (real) no 
longer exists. The map (to legislators and policy makers) becomes the unit of analysis for 
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governance (it serves as a “perfect” reproduction of reality such that it becomes the reality of 
governance).  
In relating the metaphor of the map to borders and surveillance, this thesis argues that 
essentialist representational critical theorists fail to grasp the realities of an increasingly 
technologized society where the traditional modes of sociological analysis and social sorting – 
the socioeconomic classes and various inequalities associated with individuals and groups – are 
increasingly reduced to irrelevancy within the context of a risk society predicated on surveillance 
and data collection generated from “the mass” in order to render the digitized subject intelligible. 
In terms of mobility, for example, essentialist studies of migration (see for example Crépeau and 
Nakache 2006; Basok 2009; Mountz and Hyndman 2013; Oberman 2016; Kusow 2017; Boyd 
2018) tend to emphasize the inequalities faced by individuals when, in reality, plenty of evidence 
exists to suggest risk society has supplanted the individual with a digitized subject (the only unit 
of analysis that truly matters). By taking the perspective that the sign and the real are equivalent, 
essentialist migration studies tend to focus on visible “realities” such as race, gender, country of 
origin, and class of the individual migrant as the focus of critical analysis. While instances of 
racist, gendered, nationalist, and classist enforcement and state policies are visible and 
describable, such “critical analysis” obscures various other inequalities that are only intelligible 
when we take the radical position of Baudrillard in dismissing the purported “reality” of visible 
signs (characteristics of living, breathing human beings) in order to attempt to understand how 
such “realities” are in fact pure simulacra. In terms of migration governance – and as this thesis 
indicates – visible signs are overshadowed and indeed replaced by simulations (in the form of 
digitized subjects) that, much like in the metaphor of the map highlighted above, come to serve 
as the unit of analysis in governing risk, circulation, and human mobility. This point is often 
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missed by migration scholars focusing on narratives highlighting prima facie evidence of 
discrimination while glossing over (simulated) systems of oppression occurring beneath the 
surface (in this case, in a digital space). In short, phase one: the “cartographer” (the coder) has 
generated the digitized subject to be taken as a “shadow” or direct reference to the embodied 
subject (individual) it represents, phase two: the digitized subject begins to “stand for” the 
individual and becomes the unit of analysis for all governance decisions, and stage three and 
four: the “reality” of the embodied subject becomes obscured and is replaced by the digitized 
subject that represents it, and the digitized subject ultimately becomes more real than the 
supposed “reality” it represents.  
As Kaneva (2018) argues, the value of Baudrillard’s perspectives does not lie in a 
comprehensive reading of his entire body of work (an entire academic career could be spent 
accomplishing this task). Rather, research can selectively employ Baudrillard’s key ideas without 
necessarily adopting his wholesale anti-realism. Accordingly: 
In short, Baudrillard’s theory is anti-representational but, in my view, therein lies 
its radical potential. At the same time, this anti-representational stance makes his 
ideas difficult to work with and ‘apply’ in concrete terms. Nevertheless, they offer 
a productive provocation that destabilizes the familiar patterns of critique rooted 
in neo-Marxist media and cultural studies (Kaneva 2018:639). 
  
This is exactly the argument this thesis wishes to make in terms of the aims of interdisciplinary 
studies tasked with examining contemporary borders. By embracing the radical, anti-
representational potential of Baudrillard’s notion of simulacra, the death of the social does not 
necessarily have to coincide with the death of sociology. Rather, in de-emphasizing essentialist 
and representational forms of critical analysis and understandings of culture and social life and in 
recognizing that the simulation of surveillance is removing the “individual” and thus also “the 
social” as a unit of analysis, sociology can accomplish the work of critiquing contemporary 
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(digitized) social life in relation to borders (and thus also reinforce its modern relevance as a 
field of study).  
If, as Baudrillard argues, simulation is the true nuclear fallout of the social, does it not 
make sense for sociologists to document this metastasis? Does it not make sense for sociologists 
to also document the associated rise of the digitized subject and digitized mass and the decreased 
emphasis on disciplining embodied subjects and groups as subjects of governance? Lastly, how 
will taking the stance of simply ignoring evidence of simulation (of surveillance, of borders, of 
digitized subjects, and so forth) benefit sociology as a field of science? The argument underlying 
this thesis is that ignorance is not bliss – to ignore evidence of phenomena in our social world 
(no matter how uncomfortable it may be to the field) works completely against our fundamental 
goal as sociologists. Refusing to acknowledge evidence of phenomena in our social world is not 
at all informed critical analysis, but rather is simply an act of intentional blindness and a 
yearning for tired esoteric knowledge out of a desire for self-preservation. We, as sociologists, 
must follow the work of geographers and media studies academics in looking “beyond the map”, 
looking beyond representation, and seriously question the assumption that signs are always 
linked directly to reality.    
Outline of the Thesis 
 The sections that follow are arranged as distinct articles of publishable quality that each 
uniquely contribute to the interdisciplinary border literature and, when combined, produce a 
narrative about institutional as well as official and non-official frontline knowledge related to 
modern Canadian borders (specifically within the Windsor borderland). This “sandwich thesis” 
was arranged in this way to allow the Examining Committee to easily assess the publishable 
quality of each article on its own merits (rather than as a series of thesis “chapters” that provide a 
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running narrative). However, the articles cite findings from previous articles throughout and, in 
totality, are arranged in such a way to provide a running narrative nonetheless. This running 
narrative is summarized in the paragraphs that follow and also in the Conclusion section of this 
thesis.  
 First, institutional knowledge is gleaned from training modules, frontline manuals, 
memoranda, public policy, and other documents outlined above in the Methods section. Through 
a content analysis of documentation, I reach several conclusions regarding agency governance 
technologies that serve to control the behaviour of BSOs at ports of entry. Findings indicate that 
various governance technologies are employed, including training documents, manuals, public 
policy, a non-paramilitary-style national governance structure, and a paramilitary-style local 
governance hierarchy serving to enable, support, and constrain BSO frontline duties, public 
interactions, as well as potentially officer knowledge concerning publics. Findings also reveal 
that officers receive very little training related to interacting with travellers on the frontline. 
Officers also receive very little instruction related to how they should prioritize their disparate 
duties related to interacting with travelling publics. Findings also suggest that when training is 
present, these governance technologies – alongside recent shifts in agency organizational 
governance – contain systematic biases that produce officer worldviews and social interactions 
that are rooted exclusively in security provision, while leaving BSOs without the tools necessary 
to handle other types of “facilitation” (CBSA 2018e:8) or humanitarian public interactions that 
regularly occur at the border. A subsequent discourse analysis of coded documentation revealed 
that such a bias is likely rooted in larger trends in terms of the spread of neoliberal risk-
management schemes to policing agencies as well as private corporations, governments, and 
other organizations as a feature of “risk society”.  
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 These findings are then tested through qualitative interviews with BSOs and members of 
travelling publics. First, institutional discourses identified above (i.e. the prevalence of security-
related training to the exclusion of other forms of interaction training) are combined with 
additional institutional discourses projecting officers as professional, courteous, law-abiding, and 
thorough. Second, such institutional knowledge is contrasted with knowledge gleaned from data 
generated from content and thematic analyses and coding of interview transcripts detailing the 
phenomenological lived experiences of a sample of frontline official (BSOs) and non-official 
(travelling publics) populations. Knowledge of frontline social action generated from perceptions 
of past frontline interactions, officer training in relation to frontline interactions, as well as the 
existence of borderlands potentially informed by geographical proximity to ports of entry are 
identified as key themes generated through interviews. When combined, official and non-official 
interaction narrative knowledge generated through perceptions of past frontline social 
interactions between BSOs and members of travelling publics confirm many of the previous 
findings of this study, including: 1) a severe lack of officer frontline interaction training; 2) the 
necessity of and dangers associated with officers forming collective best practices on the 
frontline; 3) the notion that officers are ill-trained in terms of handling the facilitative, 
humanitarian, non-securitized side of frontline border interactions; and 4) existing agency and 
government policies providing few details in terms of frontline social interactions and how they 
should or must unfold. Additional findings generated from analysis of interview data suggests 
the existence of: 1) Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms human rights violations in terms 
of officers posing secondary intrusive questions as a matter of routine; 2) perceptions generated 
by travelling publics that BSOs are potentially complacent or lazy; 3) negative interactions 
involving officer abuse of authority related to: a) aggressive or unnecessary questioning, b) 
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generally rude or unfriendly demeanor, and c) harassing travellers about purchases made abroad; 
and 4) the existence of local borderland realities, differences, and demographics. Findings 
highlighted above seriously call into question identified CBSA institutional discourses 
surrounding professional, courteous, law-abiding, and thorough BSOs. Findings also call into 
question existing officer training models. Finally, identified local borderland realities seriously 
calls into question the relevancy of CBSA’s uniform national training model for officers. 
 Next, the thesis looks to the issue of continued technologization of borders and how this 
potentially serves to influence (or control) frontline interactions occurring between BSOs and 
members of travelling publics. First, the thesis conducts an examination of existing literature 
concerning debates and metaphors related to contemporary borders. It is argued that existing 
debates and metaphors (borders as filters, borders as firewalls) are inadequate in describing what 
is understood and agreed upon in the literature in terms of contemporary borders. The nature of 
contemporary borders is then catalogued, and the thesis reaches conclusions that modern borders 
may be characterized by: 1) border work occurring at a variety of state (official) and non-state 
(unofficial) sites; 2) the continued existence and functioning of traditional, physical borders at 
the limits of the sovereign state; 3) the governance of borders and mobility achieved through the 
calculation and analysis of risk information contained in databases (related to findings generated 
earlier in the thesis about the spread of neoliberal risk-management logics); 4) the 
responsibilization of various third-parties in collecting and reporting data on behalf of the state; 
5) because of risk-management, data collection, and the use of databases (discussed elsewhere in 
this thesis), borders are inherently part of security continua, working alongside other police and 
intelligence agencies, enforcement locales, private actors, and so forth in producing ‘security’ 
(however constructed); 6) the continued function of borders to provide securitization and the 
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governance of various mobilities and flows (of people, financial instruments, goods, and so 
forth).  
As a result of these conclusions (informed as well by previous findings), this thesis 
attempts to provide a theoretical orientation and metaphor for border technologization and its 
potential effects on frontline social interactions. It proposes a refinement of existing theory for 
contemporary borders, employing Baudrillard’s (1981) concept of “simulation”. The metaphor of 
the “simulated border” functions to avoid unnecessary binary debates surrounding border 
geospatiality – which has become something of an obsession for the interdisciplinary border 
literature in recent memory – while also incorporating aspects of risk society (Beck 1986) and 
societies of control (Deleuze 1992) in concluding that borders are anything but organic security 
environments, with the “stretched screens” (Lyon 2009) of border agents serving to produce 
digitized subjects (Goriunova 2019) that are tested within games of security to govern mobility 
anywhere in time or space. This metaphor fits well with previous findings generated in the thesis 
regarding the spread of neoliberal risk-management practices and the concomitant shift in agency 
mandates, lack of officer training on anything other than “securitized interaction moments”, and 
the notion that officers are apparently ill-prepared for the “facilitation” side of border work as 
well as face-to-face social interactions (as evidenced by various instances of officer misconduct). 
As individuals are increasingly reconceived as digitized subjects contained in databases (which 
become the unit of analysis for BSOs to examine given they are supposedly scientific, perfect, 
and irrefutable measures of risk), embodied subject narratives and performativity at ports of 
entry become increasingly irrelevant to making determinations regarding border security and 
mobility. Within neoliberal risk-management schemes, most decisions regarding mobility have 
been reached well before individuals even reach physical borders given levels of risk have been 
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pre-calculated and encoded in digitized subjects. These digitized subjects are always accessible 
within databases that are mandatorily employed because of agency policies forcing officers to 
always scan identity documents and call forth digitized subjects from databases for every 
traveller crossing the border. It becomes nearly impossible for officers to remove the “lens” of 
risk, thus reconfiguring the BSO occupation as a form of “cyborg work” (Bogard 1996).  
While, as Villegas (2015) indicates, potential migrants mobilize particular strategies to 
negotiate performances of sovereignty (by the state) within spaces of security like ports of entry 
(i.e. carrying extra documents, passports, and visas to prove the validity of their travel to Canada; 
carrying an “adequate” amount of money to appear to be a tourist; avoiding “full confessions” or 
“full disclosure” with immigration authorities; and so forth), this thesis will point out the 
increasing futility of these performances in the face of digitized risk-management technologies 
employed at contemporary borders. Despite the fact Villegas (2015:2360) contends that such 
performances ultimately affect the outcomes of border encounters, this thesis will argue that 
while travellers may attempt to give performances at ports of entry in order to “game” the system 
or “fool” BSOs, they will ultimately be disappointed to find that the performativity of their 
embodied subjectivity is increasingly rendered effectively irrelevant in the face of technologies 
designed to grant BSOs pre-emptive knowledge of digitized subjects (taken as irrefutable 
betrayers of risk information). In other words, attempts by embodied subjects to project ‘truth’ 
by feigning reality is increasingly replaced with digitized technologies supplanting (falsifiable) 
personal narrative of travellers with risk-management technologies that seek to render truth 
infallibly. 
 Finally, findings generated in terms of neoliberal risk-management practices, simulated 
borders, and the generation of digitized subjects contained in databases are tested through data 
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generated as a result of aforementioned content and thematic analyses of transcripts derived from 
in-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted with BSOs and members of travelling publics. 
First, institutional discourses identified above (i.e. the prevalence of security-related training to 
the exclusion of other forms of interaction training) are combined with additional institutional 
discourses promoting the increased use of digitized technologies as functioning to: 1) improve 
efficiency at the border, 2) augment officer decision-making, and 3) enhance security provision. 
Second, such institutional knowledge is contrasted with knowledge gleaned from data generated 
as a result of content and thematic analyses and coding of interview transcripts detailing the 
phenomenological lived experiences of a sample of frontline official (BSOs) and non-official 
(travelling publics) populations. Ultimately, findings suggest there is much evidence to support 
claims made earlier in the thesis regarding the spread of neoliberal risk-based schemes, the 
simulation (Baudrillard 1981) of contemporary borders, and the reconfiguration of the BSO 
occupation as a form of cyborg work (Bogard 1996). Findings generated from interview data 
reveal that both frontline officials and non-officials experience a border where the personal 
narrative and performativity of travellers is increasingly irrelevant, with officer decision-making 
increasingly supplanted by information about digitized subjects contained in databases. This 
thesis also documents findings regarding the use of Automated Border Kiosks (ABCs) / Primary 
Inspection Kiosks (PIKs) – employed at major Canadian airports – as serving to make risk-based 
calculations and determinations regarding admission, refusal, or the necessity for further 
examination in advance of (and indeed superseding) any human-to-human social interaction 
between officers and travelling publics. Findings also explore various dangers associated with 
increased simulation and cyborg work, including database errors having demonstrable 
consequences on the mobility and rights of human beings; the colonization of the lifeworld of 
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BSOs by risk technologies ultimately rendering officers possibly incapable of asking questions, 
looking for indicators, and making informed decisions on the basis of anything other than 
digitized information contained in databases; and the associated human rights, privacy, and legal 
implications that are potentially wide-ranging and extremely troubling.  
 The Conclusion section of this thesis will combine together the findings from all four 
individual articles and will further explore modern developments in borders, frontline 
interactions, and technologization through the lens of neoliberal risk-management schemes as 































Border Officer Training in Canada: Identifying Organizational Governance Technologies11 
While recent scholarship has begun the difficult task of unpacking the sociology of 
frontline border policing, literature examining how officers are governed through 
their training and organizational governance technologies is sparse (particularly in 
terms of how officers are trained to interact with and form perspectives of the 
public they serve).  This article provides the first concrete examination of border 
officer training by conducting a content and discourse analysis of various officer 
training and other documents to determine the contours of organizational 
governance technologies and how they serve to guide border services officers 
(BSOs) employed by Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) in interacting with 
and perceiving of members of travelling publics. Findings indicate that the 
governance technologies include training documents, manuals, public policy, and a 
bifurcated agency governance hierarchy serving to enable, support, and constrain 
BSO frontline duties, public interactions, as well as potentially perceptions. 
Findings also reveal that officers receive very little training related to interacting 
with members of the travelling public on the frontline. Officers also receive very 
little instruction related to how they should prioritize their disparate duties related 
to interacting with travelling publics. Findings ultimately indicate that when 
training is present, governance technologies – alongside recent shifts in agency 
organizational governance – contain systematic biases that produce officer 
worldviews and social interactions that are rooted exclusively in security provision, 
while leaving BSOs without the tools necessary to handle other types of public 
interactions that regularly occur at the border. The implications of these findings 
are discussed through the lens of the spread of neoliberal risk-management 
practices characteristic of neoliberalism. 
Keywords: border security; governance; training; Canada Border Services Agency; 
border services officer 
                                                 
11 This chapter has been adapted from the following publication: Lalonde, Patrick C. 2019. “Border officer training 





While much research in the international literature has examined overarching frontline 
border security and migration-related practices as well as associated public policy (see for 
example Muller 2011; Aas 2012; Broeders and Hampshire 2013; Mutsaers 2014; Pickering 2014; 
Aas and Gundhus 2015; Bosworth and Turnbull 2015; Bosworth 2016; and Infantino 2016) very 
little research has considered how border officers are socialized through training and 
organizational governance technologies. Much of this research has also not considered how this 
socialization contributes to officer perceptions related to border security generally, and policing 
of members of the public specifically. This, in part, has led to calls within the interdisciplinary 
border literature for researchers to consider how border security is governed as an everyday 
practice by those appointed to carry out duties related to it (Côté-Boucher, Infantino, and Salter 
2014). Such research will necessarily involve an examination of the “stories, perspectives and 
practices” of the agents responsible for reproducing border culture and practices (Loftus 
2015:116).  
When border officer training is explored, anecdotal evidence gleaned from interviews 
with officers is primarily used in the absence of analysis of the training documents employed by 
border agencies to train frontline officers (see for example Côté-Boucher 2013). Identifying 
perceptions held by officers (especially those generated through training) becomes particularly 
salient considering these factors ultimately inform how officers wield considerable amounts of 
power that effects, among other things, the performance of national security, anti-terrorism, and 
other policing functions, as well as our rights and freedoms as private citizens and migrants. 
Examining how officers are socialized to interact with the travelling public is therefore essential 
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in beginning the work of “shedding light on contemporary problematizations of security” (Côté-
Boucher et al. 2014:197).  
In beginning to consider how border officers are socialized, this article may be 
differentiated from the bulk of the border literature that relies heavily on examinations of public 
policies, installed digitized technologies at borders, and geographies of exclusion that enable 
border officers to perform security functions (see for example Muller 2010b; Mountz 2011; 
Muller 2011; Broeders and Hampshire 2013; Salter and Mutlu 2013; Mountz 2015; Muller 2016; 
Topak, Bracken-Roche; Saulnier, and Lyon 2015; and Longo 2016), while remaining mostly 
silent in terms of considering how officers are actually trained to behave and interact with 
members of travelling publics in performing their duties. This article will therefore build on the 
work of Côté-Boucher (2013; 2014; 2016) and others dedicated to the sociology of frontline 
border work in providing the first examination of the full extent of governance technologies 
designed to mediate officer decisions and social interactions on the frontline of enforcement. 
This article accomplishes this by conducting content and discourse analyses on the previously 
unexamined Canada Border Services Agency BSO Port of Entry Recruitment Training (POERT) 
program, relevant modules from the more recent Officer Induction Training Program (OITP), 
manuals and other documents employed by officers on the frontline, and Canadian public policy 
to determine the following: 1) How might organizational governance and other shifts influence 
officer perceptions and interactions involving publics? 2) How does officer training govern 
interactions between BSOs and members of travelling publics on the frontline of enforcement? 
3) Given that BSOs are required to enforce over 90 domestic policies in addition to international 
law, how are BSOs instructed to prioritize their duties and then translate policy into enforcement 




Recent scholarship has begun the difficult task of unpacking the sociology of frontline 
border policing. For example, Bosworth, Fili, and Pickering (2016) use testimonies from 
detainees and staff at Athens’ Central Holding Centre for immigrants to uncover the extent to 
which transnational migration policy impacts the people effected by them. Others employ 
interviews with Frontex and other European border officers alongside examinations of public 
policy documents and official reports to examine the co-existence of security and humanitarian 
priorities at European borders (Aas and Gundhus 2015, Hadjimatheou and Lynch 2017). 
Pickering and Ham (2014) employ qualitative interviews with immigration officers in Australia 
to demonstrate how officers employ intelligence-led policing as well as local stereotypes about 
women and sex work in order to identify “indices of suspicion or ‘out of place or time events’” 
(O’Connor and de Lint 2009:40). A recent innovative ethnographic examination considers the 
extent to which increasing “ferocious architecture” at international borders and other spaces of 
security factor into the relationship between technology and security (Muller et al. 2016).  
Some notable Canadian examples of research exploring border officer perceptions 
include Bouchard and Carroll (2002) examining how immigration officers use discretion, Pratt 
and Thompson (2008) determining how race knowledge interacts with border officer 
discretionary practices, and Pratt (2010) exploring the reasons officers use to determine 
reasonable suspicion for searches at the border. Perhaps the most notable example in terms of 
frontline examinations of Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) has been accomplished in the 
dissertation and subsequent work of Côté-Boucher (2013; 2014; 2016). In reviewing the Agency 
and conducting interviews with frontline officers, Karine Côté-Boucher has done much to 
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advance Canadian literature in the fields of border security and the occupational culture of BSOs. 
Several of her findings will be explored within the article. 
While literature on police officer training, socialization, and organizational governance is 
robust, such examinations of border agencies are decidedly lacking. According to Chappell and 
Lanza-Kaduce (2010:189), law enforcement recruits are subjected to intense socialization during 
training designed to strip individuals of their personal characteristics and produce officers that 
embrace the ethos of rigid para-military style organizations. Police academies serve as “hot 
houses” serving to “grow a dense social network of ties within which recruits socialize one 
another to the identity of police officers” (Doreian and Conti 2017:96). Officers often receive 
training on high-risk, low-frequency events (i.e. self-defence tactics and weapons training) with 
far less time dedicated to teaching communication skills, de-escalation, and human behavioural 
science (Rahr and Rice 2015:5). In short, officers receive training that emphasizes their role as 
law enforcers within a highly militaristic and bureaucratic structure, while instruction in 
potentially more progressive roles (i.e. community policing, reducing racial barriers between 
officers, and so forth) are effectively ignored or do not translate to the frontline (Conti and Nolan 
2005, Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce 2010, Conti and Doreian 2014). This is reinforced through 
reintegrative shaming in which recruits are subjected to cycles of pride and shame, degraded for 
possessing “civilian characteristics,” and receive status elevation when these characteristics are 
ultimately discarded (Conti 2009).  
While law enforcement recruits are taught a state-designed training curriculum, the 
presence of a “police culture” (see Loftus 2010) – which begins to be inculcated in the police 
academy – can intervene in a variety of ways to question or challenge official lessons. Even 
within the academy, instructors (who are often former or retired officers) bring cynicism and 
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biases developed over the course of their careers into the classroom, serving to undermine 
curriculum through parables delivered in the form of war stories from the frontline (Ford 
2003:88). Additionally, there is ample evidence that hidden curricula exist within formal training 
to socialize recruits with certain unofficial values and techniques – masculinity, brotherhood, 
officer network formation, officer solidarity, and so forth - that may actually be more enduring 
than official lessons (see Prokos and Padavic 2002; Campeau 2015; Doreian and Conti 2017).  
When rookies complete training and begin their probation on the frontline, seasoned 
officers may inform them that it is necessary to forget what was learned in the academy in order 
to survive on the streets (Ford 2003:88). Such interactions with seasoned officers serve to 
reinforce stable patterns of police behaviour from generation to generation of officers (Van 
Maanen 1975:222). Frontline officers also reinforce unofficial ways of doing police work by 
sharing war stories throughout the length of their careers regarding effective behaviours for 
frontline work (see van Hulst 2013; Smith, Pedersen, and Burnett 2014; van Hulst 2017; 
Schaefer and Tewksbury 2017). As Loftus (2010:8) suggests, officers discover the realities of 
policing do not match up with prior conceptions (particularly those developed in training), and 
officers often develop a cynical and pessimistic view of their social world. Accordingly, officers 
tend to develop a “we versus they” mentality (Skogan 2008:26) in order to cope with the realities 
of their employment. In relation to the public, “Officers [come] to expect nothing but the worst 
in human behaviour and [see] themselves as a small minority in the large fight against crime…” 
(Loftus 2010:8). Even when well-intentioned reforms are introduced in training and elsewhere, 
they are often resisted by police managers, supervisors, unions, and rank-and-file officers for a 
variety of reasons (Skogan 2008). Included among these reasons is the belief among officers that 
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the academics, politicians, and community activists who design policy and implement 
programming cannot possibly understand the realities of frontline policing (Skogan 2008:26).  
Some evidence of an “us versus them” orientation and distinct police culture in terms of 
BSOs has already been identified by Côté-Boucher (2013). This is particularly evident in terms 
of rank-and-file opposition to policies developed by civilian policymakers in Ottawa (Côté-
Boucher 2013:166-170). Côté-Boucher (2013:253-263) also explores officer training in passing 
in her detailed dissertation work on CBSA, highlighting how officers experience status 
degradation and status elevation as part of the curriculum. However, Côté-Boucher ultimately 
relies on anecdotal evidence supplied by qualitative interviews with officers to provide a rough 
sketch of how BSOs experience training without exploring actual training programming. A much 
more detailed account of CBSA organizational structure and training technologies will be 
necessary in order to begin the work of understanding how officers are trained and socialized 
within the agency, and whether and to what extent a distinct policing culture (Paoline 2003) 
presents opposition to lessons provided in officer training.   
Methods 
Every month across Canada, BSOs working for CBSA at various ports of entry have 
millions of face-to-face interactions with members of travelling publics (Bridge and Lancaster 
2015). It stands to reason to assume that while many of these interactions may seem mundane or 
repetitious in nature, these social interactions and the perceptions formed by officers in relation 
to travellers are ultimately shaped and informed through a complex of governance technologies 
related to officer training, public policy, manuals, and memorandums provided by the 
Government of Canada. While examining the nature of face-to-face interactions at ports of entry 
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is ultimately beyond the scope of this article, such interactions should be considered in future 
research.12 
Purposive sampling was employed to obtain primary and secondary documents for 
analysis in this study. Purposive sampling is valuable in obtaining a sample of difficult-to-reach 
populations (Neuman 2006:222). Given various documents have “Protected” classifications (and 
are therefore not released) by the Government of Canada and given that additional information is 
often redacted from documents that are eventually released to researchers (see for example 
Luscombe and Walby 2015), purposive sampling must be used by researchers in identifying, 
obtaining, and subsequently analyzing government documents. In short, a “representative” or 
random sample of documents is not necessarily even theoretically possible given researchers are 
not even privy to the existence of large swaths of government documents (let alone able to access 
documents through ATIP requests). Nonetheless, knowledge gained from the researcher’s former 
employment as a student border services officer with Canada Border Services Agency allowed 
the researcher to inquire about, request, and also access documents previously unexamined in the 
literature.   
 Various primary and secondary documents were examined in answering the three 
aforementioned research questions. Sources included federal government websites; over 300 
pages of government reports; thirty-one training modules consisting of 1324 pages of material 
from a late-2000s intake of the CBSA Port of Entry Recruit Training (POERT) program; various 
documents partially released by CBSA under Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) requests 
filed by the researcher, including: 1274 pages of material from the CBSA Enforcement Manual, 
296 pages of material related to communicating with the public (mostly newer Officer Induction 
                                                 
12 The nature of interaction narrative knowledge generated through frontline social interactions between BSOs and 
travelling publics is considered in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 within this thesis. 
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Training Program documents), 471 pages of material from the CBSA People Processing Manual, 
and 100 pages of material from the CBSA Immigration Enforcement Manual and associated 
training documents; over 280 CBSA D Memoranda publicly available on the agency’s website; 
and various policies, including the Customs Act (1985), the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act (2001), and the Canada Border Services Agency Act (2005).  
 Given the lack of specific literature or theoretical perspectives pertaining to Canadian 
border services officer training and agency discourses related to frontline social interactions, a 
grounded or “emergent” approach to content analysis was used. According to Neuendorf 
(2002:103), when existing theory or literature does not give a complete picture of possible 
variables for analysis, the researcher can employ a grounded approach by self-immersion in a 
representative subset of the content to be examined. “In this way, variables emerge from the 
message pool, and the investigator is well grounded in the reality of the messages” (Neuendorf 
2002:107). The researcher first employed open coding to allow key variables to emerge from a 
sample of documents outlined above. These key variables were generated from the research 
questions and the research interests of the researcher (Neuman 2006:461). These variables were 
recorded in an initial codebook. Secondly, axial coding was then used to review initial codes 
generated from open coding in relation to all documents. Various codes were then amalgamated 
into larger categories where similarities between codes existed (Strauss and Corbin 2004:305). 
Given these codes and categories were formed through the lens of aforementioned research 
questions, emergent variables included (for example): “communication”, “interrogation”, 
“mandates”, “priorities” and so forth.  Finally, focused coding was employed to analyze all 
documents through the lens of key variables and categories, resulting in the enumeration of all 
individual instances contained in-text. Furthermore, focused coding resulted in the identification 
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of especially illustrative incidences of identified variables related to the research questions. Such 
findings are presented largely as non-inferential (or nonparametric) statistics within the findings. 
Again, this is because it is impossible to generalize results to all government documents given 
access and redaction challenges associated with ATIP requests. Therefore, findings are largely 
descriptive in nature and point to trends located in accessed documents (with no generalization to 
the entire population of government documents) (Neuendorf 2002:168). 
 A discourse analysis was subsequently used to identify technologies of governance 
employed to govern officer frontline behaviour and interactions and to reach conclusions 
regarding how to situate these findings within a broader power relations context. Discourse 
analysis is used to identify how language is employed to shape and reproduce social relations, 
identities, and ideas. As such, “language is viewed as a social practice which actively orders and 
shapes people’s relation to their social world” (Tonkiss 1998:249). Through discourse analysis, 
researchers can identify forms of governmentality – language and other signifying systems that 
are elements in forming and shaping realities and subjectivities, which in turn render reality 
governable (Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde 2006:89). In conducting a discourse analysis of 
findings generated from the content analysis identified above, this article moves beyond the 
“surface level” of enumeration to also consider the power relations behind officer perceptions 
and frontline interactions in relation to travelling publics. Employing this discourse analysis 
alongside the aforementioned content analysis allowed for a triangulation of methods to enhance 







CBSA Organizational Shifts 
 
 Canada Border Services Agency serves as an excellent microcosm of similar governance 
shifts experienced in other policing agencies over the course of the past two centuries. In the case 
of CBSA however, changes in organizational governance have occurred at an accelerated pace 
largely over the course of the past three decades. As such, CBSA serves as the perfect agency for 
exemplifying the importance of considering shifts in governance as a factor potentially 
influencing officers’ interactions with and perceptions of the public, as well as shifting 
enforcement priorities on the frontline.  
Côté-Boucher (2013:96-102) citing McIntosh (1984) provides an excellent examination 
of the early history of border security in Canada from the 19th century onward, charting a 
progression from British-appointed officials policing Canadian ports, the establishment of a 
customs department after Confederation in 1867, and the establishment of the Department of 
National Revenue in 1927 (which ultimately served as the forbearer of the short-lived Canada 
Customs and Revenue Agency in 1999). This article will focus primarily on the (comparatively) 
fast-pace changes of the past three decades.  
As a way of introduction, prior to 1992 and the signing of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), customs officers largely served revenue collection functions through 
enforcement of taxation on goods at the Canadian border. An audit of the Department of 
National Revenue performed in 1928 highlighted concerns surrounding commercial smuggling 
and tax and duty fraud, and indicated a troublesome start for the Department in terms of 
prevention in that:  
A considerable number of the officers appeared to be apathetic to individual 
smuggling, and made no serious effort to prevent same. Their conduct would 
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indicate that they had a misconception of their duties… [and] acted as if their sole 
duty was to receive entries and payment of duties by those willing to pay same’ 
(Royal Commission on Customs and Excise 1928:18).  
 
A government publication later on in the 20th Century indicates that officers eventually embraced 
a preventative role, and states that: 
[Officers] collect revenue, a traditional function that predates Confederation. 
They also protect the nation’s industry against injurious foreign competition. And, 
finally, they guard in many ways, its people’s health, welfare and environment, 
serving as a first line of defence in these matters on behalf of other government 
departments (Revenue Canada Customs and Excise 1978:2).  
 
While the document also mentions that officers intercept narcotics, most policing activities are 
defined in relation to protecting the marketplace against fraudulent goods, pornography, obscene 
publications, cars not meeting Canadian standards (Revenue Canada Customs and Excise 
1978:10), as well as “liquor, furs, electrical appliances, rings, watches, jewellery, firearms, golf 
equipment and riding tack… and commercial fraud” (1978:16).  
After the adoption of NAFTA and the subsequent diminished capacity of customs 
officers to collect revenue, it became more common for the Government of Canada to promote 
the border enforcement activities of officers as the “first line of defence against drugs, 
contraband, and illegal firearms” (Pratt 2005:191). Côté-Boucher (2013) points to the 1995 
Canada-United States Accord on Our Shared Borders as the first agreement in North America 
demonstrating a concrete link between liberalizing trade and the necessity to tighten “controls for 
illegitimate flows of commodities and persons smuggled through the same border” (p. 110). 
Accordingly, “The agreement portrayed the signatories as facing ‘external threats related to 
international terrorism, transnational crime, and drug and people smuggling’ and endeavoured to 
coordinate immigration, customs and intelligence agencies in order to confront those threats” 
(Côté-Boucher 2013:110). In May 1997, the passage of Bill C-18, An Act to Amend the Customs 
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Act and Criminal Code, designated customs officers for the first time as “peace officers”, 
allowing them to enforce the Criminal Code of Canada and to serve as the “first response” to 
criminal and dangerous people seeking entry into Canada (Pratt 2005:192).  
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 in the United States, the 2001 
Canada-US Smart Border Declaration further entrenched the border as a space of security 
(Foucault 1975), and border agencies as responsible for facilitating the free movement of low-
risk individuals and commodities while identifying and pre-empting potential security threats 
before they arrived in North America (Côté-Boucher 2013:111). In 2004, Bill C-24, The Canada 
Border Services Agency Act, established Canada Border Services Agency as a legal entity and 
transferred to it several additional powers from its three legacy agencies: the Canada Customs 
and Revenue Agency (CCRA), Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), and the Canadian 
Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) (Parliament of Canada 2004). Officers now called “border 
services officers” (BSOs) became responsible for enforcing over 90 domestic acts and 
regulations as well as international agreements governing travel and trade. BSOs were also 
provided with handcuffs, pepper spray, batons, protective vests, as well as use-of-force training 
(CBSA 2008a). In 2006 the Government of Canada announced that it would begin arming BSOs 
with firearms. The rationale provided was, “Armed officers are better prepared and trained to 
deal with a broader range of options when responding to potentially dangerous situations” 
(CBSA 2011b).  
Other agreements with the United States – including the (abandoned) 2006 Security and 
Prosperity Partnership and the 2011 US-Canada Beyond the Border Action Plan: A Shared 
Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness – further established the 
relationship between liberalized trade and the mandate of border security agencies to identify and 
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pre-empt potential security threats (Lalonde 2012; Côté-Boucher 2013:111). In 2007, the 
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, requiring all those travelling to the United States 
(including Canadians) to present passports or other secure documents, furthered this relationship 
tangentially in Canada. A CBSA publication from 2008 highlights a focus on security, 
emphasizing pre-approval (risk-based) programs for businesses and individuals (Customs Self 
Assessment, Free and Secure Trade, Partners in Protection, CANPASS Air), receiving advanced 
information to stop threats and facilitate “legitimate” travel and trade (Advanced Passenger 
Information / Passenger Name Record, Advanced Commercial Information, eManifest, 
Container Security Initiative), and developing intelligence and conducting risk analyses, and 
innovating the border for the future (biometrics, marine drones, vehicle x-ray equipment, 
spectrometry equipment, radiation detection technology, detector dogs, and so forth) (CBSA 
2008b). The document clearly illustrates that security is now promoted as the primary mandate 
of BSOs and CBSA, with “Trade and Revenue Administration” mentioned as a half-page 
afterthought at the conclusion of the 23-page document (a stark contrast with the aforementioned 
1928 audit and 1978 agency documents almost exclusively focused on trade and revenue).  
In the post-NAFTA era of border security (and particularly since 9/11) Canada has also 
experienced a diffusion of border security responsibilities. This shift has been well-documented 
in relation to Canadian, U.S., and European borders in the literature in terms of: 1) exploring 
“smart borders” (see Amoore, Marmura, and Salter 2008; Côté-Boucher 2008; Topak et al. 
2015), including examinations of travel documents (Lyon 2009; Salter 2011; McPhail et al. 
2012), the use of biometrics and other risk technologies (Amoore 2006; Broeders 2007; Epstein 
2007; Muller 2009; Muller 2010a; Rygiel 2010; Muller 2011; Bigo 2014), as well as databases 
and computerization more generally (Broeders and Hampshire 2013); 2) examinations of border 
79 
 
geospatiality (or lack thereof), including logics of ‘remote control’ (Broeders and Hampshire 
2013), deterritoralization (Mountz 2011; Salter and Mutlu 2013; Mountz and Loyd 2014), the 
border as ‘everywhere’ (Lyon 2005), the border as part of a continuum also including other 
enforcement locales (Vaughan-Williams 2010), and as a form of visual ‘security performance’ 
(Rumford 2006; deLint 2008) pushing security functions ‘beyond the border’ away from their 
traditional geographical limits. In terms of the Canadian experience, this shift has been 
accomplished via the deployment of a variety of government, law enforcement, and private 
security actors alongside CBSA in sharing responsibility for border security (Côté-Boucher 
2013:93). Additionally, CBSA has focused on employing “smart borders” in moving border 
governance beyond its traditional geographical limits, and using data collection methods such as 
trusted traveller and trading programs that shift responsibility for border security upstream to 
private actors including commercial carriers and individuals (Côté-Boucher 2013:93).     
 It is apparent that over time, CBSA has developed from a department that focused largely 
on tax collection and facilitating trade to an agency that deals (at least in principle) primarily in 
national security, criminal enforcement, and intelligence. During this time, and as a result of the 
aforementioned changes in organizational governance, officers have undoubtedly shifted their 
enforcement priorities and thus also their perceptions of the public. Over the span of three 
decades, officers potentially worked first as revenue collection agents within the context of 
borders primarily focused on governing and taxing international trade (pre-1992), secondly as 
“facilitator agents” at borders primarily focused on liberalized trade and the (relative) free 
movement of all people and goods (from 1992 until about 1997), and finally as peace officers 
employed at borders focused upon identifying, pre-empting, and interrupting potential and real 
security threats while permitting the movement of designated low-risk people and goods (after 
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1997 and accelerated after 2001). As officers were progressively equipped with the tools 
necessary to handle various “security moments” (defensive equipment, firearms, enabling 
legislation, digitized technologies, databases, and so forth) they were simultaneously also trained 
to deal with a travelling public increasingly characterized as dangerous, unpredictable, and 
requiring securitization. This undoubtedly contributed to a shift in officer “worldview” (Heyman 
1995) and lifeworld (Habermas 1981) over time, from one focused on enforcing a tax-paying 
public to one ultimately focused on enforcing a criminal and terroristic “public”.  
Identifying the BSO Training and Governance Assemblage 
 With aforementioned organizational shifts in mind, this article will provide an in-depth 
analysis of the actual training documents used by recruits at the CBSA training facility. 
Beginning in 1977, the Customs and Excise College opened in Ottawa to provide officers with a 
13-week course designed to train officers “in a variety of disciplines, [as] protectors of Canadian 
jobs and front-line guardians against harmful products, illegal practices and criminal elements, 
each of which poses a special threat of economics, health, welfare and environmental” (Revenue 
Canada Customs and Excise 1978:18). CBSA recruits (beginning in 2014) now complete a 5-
week online orientation learning component (phase one) followed by an 18-week intensive 
training program in Rigaud, Quebec (phase two). Now called the Officer Induction Training 
Program (OITP), recruits learn how to understand and apply relevant policies, procedures, and 
legislation pursuant to their job; identify appropriate systems for such policies, procedures, and 
legislation; develop information seeking techniques; perform primary and secondary inspection 
for immigration, food, plant and animal products, as well as other customs programs; 
demonstrate control and defensive (self-defence and use-of-force) tactics; demonstrate firearm 
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skills; and conduct arrests, seizures, detentions, and personal searches and provide grounds for 
such actions (CBSA 2016b).  
For the purposes of this article, obtained documents pertaining to the now-defunct Port of 
Entry Recruitment Training (POERT) program are still applicable for two primary reasons. 
Firstly, the new OITP is built on the foundation of POERT and adds the duty firearm training 
component on the foundation of POERT training while also incorporating applicable policy 
changes. Secondly, according to CBSA corporate documents, a vast majority of BSOs currently 
on the frontline were likely trained using iterations of the late-2000s POERT documents obtained 
by the researcher given that CBSA increased its frontline ranks from 4000 to 7200 officers from 
2006 to 2012 – representing an 80% increase overall – prior to the implementation of the new 
OITP in 2014 (CBSA 2008a; CBSA 2016d).13 In short, in addition to serving as training 
documents for the majority of current frontline BSOs, the POERT documents also provide a 
representative snapshot of the current OITP. Modules from the more recent OITP pertaining to 
how officers should or must interact or communicate with members of travelling publics were 
eventually made available (in part) to the researcher after filing an ATIP request with CBSA. 
These documents shed some additional light on how new recruits are trained. 
 POERT documents indicate that the majority of current frontline BSOs were specifically 
trained on 31 unique modules pertaining to the requirements of their employment, including (but 
not limited to) immigration categories and immigration enforcement; primary inspection; 
secondary inspection; indicators; firearms; customs and Criminal Code arrest, detention, and 
personal searches; and so forth. Depending on the module, BSOs are expected to acquire specific 
                                                 
13 Data gleaned from the 2013-2014 Annual Report to Parliament on the Privacy Act (CBSA 2014a) suggests that 
there are “over 7200” officers, and the 2016-2017 Departmental Performance Report (CBSA 2017b) states that there 
are 7240 full-time officers (suggesting slow retirement/replacement rates and growth since the introduction of the 
OITP).   
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combinations of eleven unique competencies, including: 1) client service orientation; 2) 
supporting CBSA values; 3) analytical thinking; 4) dealing with difficult situations; 5) effective 
interactive communication; 6) self-confidence; 7) information seeking skills; 8) legislation, 
policies, and procedures; 9) inspection techniques; 10) decisiveness; and 11) agency business 
systems. During training, officers are also referred to a variety of other documents to supplement 
information contained in POERT training documents, including the Customs Enforcement 
Manual, the Immigration Enforcement Manual, the CBSA People Processing Manual, the 
Customs Tariff, the Customs Act, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the 
Criminal Code of Canada, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and CBSA D 
Memoranda, as well as online CBSA intranet material regarding firearms. Together, these 
documents (and aforementioned POERT training) serve as governance technologies designed to 
regulate officer duties and activities on the frontline while purportedly providing officers with 
the eleven competencies mentioned above. 
 Interestingly, some governance technologies are prioritized over others. For instance, Part 
5 Chapter 3 of the Customs Enforcement Manual states: 
The primary responsibility of all customs officers remains the enforcement and 
application of the Customs Act and its regulations as well as the laws of other 
government departments (OGDs) for which it has responsibility. 
 
The Customs Act will take precedent over the Criminal Code in matters dealing 
with in personam offences concerning the importation, exportation, or possession 
of imported/exported goods (p. 2). 
 
While BSOs are to some extent both enabled and restricted as peace officers by provisions in the 
Criminal Code, the above passage highlights the fact that the Customs Act serves as the most 
important enabling legislation in terms of BSO duties. This notion is repeatedly reinforced in 
POERT documents with frequent references to sections of the Customs Act that enable officers in 
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certain duties. Secondly, POERT training documents make frequent reference to sections of 
IRPA, allowing officers to perform immigration-related duties and enforcement at the border. 
The Customs Act and IRPA are therefore the two most important sources governing the actions 
of BSOs on the frontline.  
Other sources mentioned above (Customs Enforcement Manual, Immigration 
Enforcement Manual, CBSA People Processing Manual, and CBSA D Memoranda) largely 
serve as “reference manuals” detailing policies and standard operating procedures enabled under 
the Customs Act and IRPA. These serve as secondary sources governing officer activities and 
reproduce much of the same material BSOs cover in POERT. Particularly, the Customs 
Enforcement Manual contains over thirty independent lists referencing officer duties pertaining 
to disparate enforcement activities ranging from illicit drugs to firearms to child pornography. 
Additionally, the Customs Tariff contains rules for classifying the importation of commercial and 
other goods based on the World Customs Organization's (WCO) Harmonized Commodity 
Description and Coding System, and governs officer activities only peripherally given this 
process is now largely automated and given the onus for proper reporting often falls on the 
importer (CBSA 2014b). BSOs, like all peace officers in Canada, are also governed by the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, necessitating officers perform duties while 
respecting rights related to unreasonable search and seizure (s. 8), arbitrary detention or 
imprisonment (s. 9), access to legal counsel (s. 10), and so forth. Rounding out the bottom of the 
hierarchy of governance documents, officers also draw on over 90 domestic policies in addition 
to international law, including for instance the Foreign Missions and International Organizations 
Act (1991), the Youth Criminal Justice Act (2002), the Anti-Terrorism Act (2001), and the Public 
Safety Act (2002).  
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Organizational Governance Hierarchy 
While it is true that officers operate with relative autonomy on the frontline of 
enforcement commensurate to their training as well as aforementioned enabling legislation, 
CBSA does maintain an organizational governance hierarchy that serves to govern its 
employees. CBSA is located within the Public Safety Canada portfolio. It is subject to Acts of 
Parliament and led by the Minister of Public Safety,14 the Deputy Minister of Public Safety, and 
the Associate Deputy Minister. Alongside CBSA, other policing and security departments 
governed within the Public Safety portfolio include the Canadian Security Intelligence Service 
(CSIS), Correctional Services Canada (CSC), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and 
the National Parole Board. CBSA is characterized by: 1) a strong, centralized, non-paramilitary 
national governance hierarchy that provides policies, programming, and operational support 
across Canada, and 2) a regional paramilitary-style governance hierarchy administering federal 
policies and programs while conducting frontline operations at ports of entry. 
CBSA is headed by an executive consisting of a president and executive vice president. 
The organization is made up of six branches and one group reporting directly to the president, 
including: 1) Comptrollership, 2) Corporate Affairs, 3) Human Resources, 4) Information, 
Science and Technology, 5) Operations, 6) Programs, and the Internal Audit and Program 
Evaluation group. Each branch is divided up into various divisions generally headed by directors 
of the organization. Divisions are broken down into sub-divisions or groups usually headed by a 
manager. 
                                                 
14 In 2018, the Trudeau Liberal Government established a new Minister of Border Security and Organized Crime. 
This portfolio “works to ensure that Canada’s borders are well managed in a way that promotes legitimate travel and 
trade while keeping Canadians safe. The Minister plays a key role in coordinating efforts to reduce gang violence 
and tackle organized crime” (Public Safety Canada 2018). This portfolio is contained within the Public Safety 
portfolio, meaning CBSA is also still answerable to the Minister of Public Safety. 
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The comptrollership and corporate affairs branches house the accounting, finance, and 
organizational functions of the agency. The daily lives of border services officers as public 
service employees are influenced in a greater way by subsequent branches. The Human 
Resources Branch, for instance, contains ten divisions and thirty-three sub-divisions concerned 
with human resourcing, labour relations, occupation health and safety, recruitment and 
professional development, employee learning, and administers the Employee Assistance 
Program (EAP), the Mental Health Program, the Internal Conflict Management System (ICMS), 
the Office of Values and Ethics, and the Arming Division.  
The Information, Science, and Technology Branch greatly influences the frontline 
activities of BSOs. The branch is composed of twenty-six divisions and 136 sub-divisions 
responsible for administering the information technology as well as scientific and other 
technological tools of the entire agency. This includes electronic systems and databases 
frequently used by officers on a daily basis, including eManifest, Accelerated Commercial 
Release Operations Support System (ACROSS), immigration systems, query systems, 
intelligence and investigation systems, and trusted traveler enrollment and passage systems 
(NEXUS, FAST, and so forth). This branch also administers technologies (such as ionizers) used 
by officers to swab and scan substances, surfaces, commodities, conveyances, and individuals for 
trace amounts of narcotics and explosives (CBSA 2015). 
Operations Branch consists of ten divisions and twenty-one sub-divisions, overseeing 
essentially every aspect of BSO frontline duties ranging from clearing commercial goods, 
processing travelers, seizing illicit or banned commodities, laying Customs Act and/or Criminal 
Code charges, issuing deportation orders, and so forth. Operations Branch also administers the 
Criminal Investigations Division, the Inland Enforcement Operations and Case Management 
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Division, the Intelligence Operations and Analysis Division, and the CBSA Warrant Response 
Centre, which all provide operational support, intelligence, and analysis to support frontline 
officers. Programs Branch similarly administers and supports various core pre-border, at-border, 
and post-border programs administered by the agency. This includes, for instance, advanced 
commercial processing, postal processing, and trusted traveller and trader programs (including 
airline compliance, stakeholder engagement and outreach, and traveller compliance).  
In total, the CBSA national governance structure consists of (at least) 97 total divisions 
and 347 sub-divisions, led by 92 directors and 287 managers and staffed by a variety of 
employees including (but not limited to): policy analysts, team leaders, financial officers, web 
developers, ATIP processing officers, human resources analysts, learning specialists, forensic 
chemists, legal counsellors, and program officers. In short, CBSA consists of a strong, 
centralized, non-paramilitary-style, nationalized governance structure that greatly influences 
policies, procedures, and technologies governing officers on the frontline. 
CBSA also consists of a localized governance structure divided into seven regions across 
Canada. These include the Atlantic Region, Greater Toronto Area Region, Northern Ontario 
Region, Pacific Region, Prairie Region, Quebec Region, and the Southern Ontario Region. 
Regions are generally headed by a combination of a regional director general, an executive 
director, and director(s). Regional governance structures are generally divided into a local office 
(or offices) within particular regions providing regional support for national policies and 
programs provided by the national governance structure outlined above. Regions are then 
divided into various ports of entry or groups of ports of entry. Ports of entry include land, 
marine, and air ports where BSOs process travellers on a daily basis. Port operations are 
governed by more traditional para-military style policing structures. Ports are generally headed 
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by combinations of directors and chiefs of operations. Superintendents serve as middle-
management supervising frontline officers and ensuring day-to-day operations reflect national 
policy. Trainers also exist regionally to provide regional training functions to frontline officers. 
At the bottom of the hierarchy is frontline staff. This includes border services officers, hearings 
advisors, hearings officers, inland enforcement officers, intelligence officers, and investigators. 
It may be concluded that a combination of officer training, legislation, standard operating 
procedures found in manuals, a centralised national bureaucratic governance structure, and a 
paramilitary-style regional governance hierarchy featuring numerous actors and operational 
divisions serve to enable, support, and constrain BSO frontline duties and activities. Future 
research will need to consider how and the extent to which this unique bifurcated governance 
structure serves to influence officers on the frontline. Initial research by Côté-Boucher 
(2013:166–167) suggests a palpable tension between officers on the frontline and the (perceived) 
bureaucrats of the national governance structure (Ottawa). Such findings are consistent with 
findings from the policing literature regarding the presence of an ‘us versus them’ mentality, 
including resistance to the policy work of politicians, academics, and so forth (Skogan 2008). 
Further analysis and qualitative interviews with officers will also need to consider the extent to 
which officers are able to form collective perceptions and behaviour independent of the 
governance efforts (namely how training differs from practice).  
Identifying Frontline Priorities 
 Given that BSOs are required to enforce over 90 domestic policies in addition to 
international law, how are BSOs instructed through the training and other governance 
technologies highlighted above to prioritize duties and then translate policy into enforcement of 
members of the travelling public? An analysis of POERT documents resulted in seven instances 
88 
 
of prioritization for BSOs within the thirty-one training modules. This primarily included text 
identifying a certain duty as “important” in the introduction to a training module. For instance, 
the introduction to the Controlled Drugs and Substances module indicates, “One of the top 
priorities of CBSA is the interdiction of controlled drugs and substances” (p. v). Similarly, a 
module on Inadmissible Categories states in the introduction, “Knowing which foreign nations 
and which permanent residents are inadmissible is central to the role of a border services officer” 
(p. 1). In addition to these modules, the Temporary Residents, People at Risk, Examination of 
Goods, Duties and Taxes, and Refugee Determination System modules are also prioritized in 
training.  
The Canada Border Services Agency Act (2005) enables Canada Border Services Agency 
as a department of the Government of Canada and sets out priorities in s. 5(1) by stating: 
The Agency is responsible for providing integrated border services that support 
national security and public safety priorities and facilitate the free flow of persons 
and goods, including animals and plants that meet all requirements under the 
program legislation… (p. 2). 
 
This section establishes CBSA as the primary agency responsible for policing Canadian borders 
and assigns national security, public safety, and human and cargo mobility governance mandates. 
Part 1 Chapter 1 of the Customs Enforcement Manual similarly discusses enforcement priorities, 
stating:  
In order to make effective use of our enforcement resources, the focus of our 
enforcement activity is directed at prohibited goods (i.e. narcotics, pornography, 
weapons), counter-terrorism, export control, commercial fraud, and other 
identified areas of high risk (p. 3). 
  
This section specifically highlights several specific “high risk” areas that CBSA and its BSOs are 
tasked with enforcing as part of their national security and public safety mandates. Additionally, 
Part 2 Chapter 3 regarding Firearms and Weapons indicates, “Firearms and weapons are high-
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risk commodities and their interdiction is therefore a CBSA enforcement priority” (p. 4). 
Similarly, Part 2 Chapter 6 entitled “Drugs and Precursor Chemicals” states, “Drugs are a high-
risk commodity and the interdiction of illegal drugs is therefore a CBSA enforcement priority” 
(p. 6). Part 2 Chapter 14 entitled “Child Pornography” makes a distinction between obscene 
material and child pornography, mandating that in cases where officers find both that BSOs give 
priority to dealing with the child pornography first given that possession is a serious Criminal 
Code offense (p. 12).  
 It can therefore be concluded that prioritization ultimately serves to “securitize” certain 
aspects of BSO duties, including duties primarily related to banned commodities and goods, 
immigration enforcement, criminal activities, and, to a lesser extent, the payment of duties and 
taxes, representing only a small fraction of all possible duties enabled through the multitude of 
policies and laws enforced by CBSA. It is not without coincidence that the prioritized duties are 
largely enabled by identified primary legislation, namely the Customs Act, IRPA, and to a lesser 
extent the Criminal Code.  
It can also be concluded from this analysis that officers receive very few instructions in 
their training or within manuals and public policy regarding what specifically should be 
prioritized in practice, meaning officers are likely to cope with vague instruction by identifying 
and forming collective perceptions regarding what constitutes a priority on the job. As the 
aforementioned policing literature has shown, priorities are likely negotiated through officer 
socialization in terms of informal training mechanisms, recruit and officer social networks 
formed during training, and continuing officer socialization and network formation throughout 
the course of a career (including information transmitted through war stories and other 
mediums). Indeed, previous findings indicate officers often employ discretion as a response to 
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new complexities generated by automation (Côté-Boucher 2013:178-182).  Côté-Boucher (2016) 
explores how officer decision-making is impacted by organizational change, particularly in terms 
of risk-based targeting technologies. Additionally, Côté-Boucher 2013:366) demonstrates how 
officers can shape border control priorities through their use of discretion as well as unions, 
lobbying efforts, and through the media. However, future research involving qualitative 
interviews with BSOs should seek to determine how officers generate enforcement priorities at 
the frontline, how these prioritizations developed, and, most importantly, whether and to what 
extent these priorities differ from or pose a challenge to those priorities identified in training and 
other identified governance technologies. 
Training and Governance of Social Interactions and Perceptions 
 Given that a significant portion of BSO duties involve face-to-face interactions with 
travellers, it may be alarming to discover that officer training provides very little direct 
instruction on social interactions. Despite “effective interactive communication” being the fourth 
most popular competency (listed 21 times) across POERT modules (and following only 
legislation, policies, and procedures – 29 times – analytical thinking – 28 times – and 
information seeking skills – 28 times), content analysis identified tangible examples of such 
instruction in just four of the twenty-one modules: People at Risk, Customs/Criminal Code 
Arrest/Detention and Personal Search, Search and Seizure under IRPA, and primarily in the 
Secondary Questioning module. When instruction is provided, information is largely procedural 
and designed almost exclusively for enforcement or intelligence-gathering purposes. For 
example, s. 1.5 subsection 9 of the Secondary Questioning module emphasizes that: 
The interviewer must be able to prepare and present written and oral reports in a 
clear, complete, concise, and accurate manner. Often an interview is not an end 
itself. Its full value may only be realized with the timely dissemination of the 
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obtained information, in a usable form, to the appropriate people or agencies (p. 
11). 
 
In this sense, “strong communication skills” are emphasized only to the extent that they may be 
used for the purpose of report writing for court and intelligence gathering specifically. 
Even in terms of discussing what officers should avoid in terms of communications (i.e. 
inappropriate word choice, lack of objectivity, loss of self-control, stereotyping, and 
partisanship), BSOs are instructed to follow the guidelines because they facilitate greater access 
to information and allow officers to gauge the truthfulness of travellers. For example, s. 1.6.5 
“Emotional Factors” in the Secondary Questioning POERT training module states: 
Your emotional state can impact the effectiveness of an interview. 
 
We all have days when we are upset, tired, annoyed, or are affected by any number of 
other emotions…. 
 
Be aware of your state of mind and do your best to put aside your personal problems 
so that you can focus on the task at hand.  
  
Our goal is to: 
 
- Project a sympathetic, friendly, and compassionate personality image. 
- Win the subject’s trust and create a conversational rapport. 
- Create a psychological atmosphere that will facilitate confessing, not one that 
would discourage a confession (p. 25). 
 
Therefore, maintaining a professional image is only promoted insofar as it is designed to create 
the type of atmosphere that is conducive to inducing a confession from an individual during an 
interview. Similarly, s. 5.4.10 “Systematic approach for disrobement of persons” in the 
Customs/Criminal Code Arrest / Detention and Personal Search POERT training module 
requires officers to act professionally and with courtesy during personal searches (otherwise 
known as “strip searches”), showing empathy, answering questions politely, and refraining from 
making any “unnecessary comments or attempting humour with the traveller” (p. 76-77). Such 
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requirements are made mostly to facilitate completion of the search and avoid combative 
reactions from subjects.   
Additionally, effective interaction is almost always couched as being natural or innate. 
For instance, s. 1.5 “Qualities of an effective interviewer” of the Secondary Questioning POERT 
module states: 
A good interviewer should have an interest in human nature and a personality that 
enables them to gain the co-operation of the subject. These qualities, and the 
following desirable character traits, are natural in some interviewers, but where 
there is a deficiency it can usually be corrected if the interviewer is willing to 
devote enough time to study and practice (p. 9).  
 
It is generally unclear, however, when trainees would have time to refine any “personality 
deficiencies” and gain an interest in human nature given such instruction is not provided by 
CBSA. Other sections of the Secondary Questioning module contain instruction on 
communicating with what could be called “special populations”. For example, s. 3.2 discusses 
“guidelines to follow when interviewing a child”, including: 
Adopt a less formal line of questioning in order to avoid frightening or 
intimidating a child by using language the child can understand… Try to speak at 
the child’s level. Avoid talking down to them… End your interview with a child 
on a positive and supportive note and with an explanation of why you asked the 
questions (p. 25).  
 
These guidelines are, generally speaking, vague and do not provide specific instructions or 
examples of how to achieve stated goals (the ability to speak to a child in the proposed way is 
assumed to be natural).  In terms of s. 5.2 regarding “communicating with people who have 
disabilities”, the module states: 
If you wish to talk to a person with a hearing disability, touch his or her shoulder 
or arm lightly or wave your hand. This is the equivalent of ‘Excuse me’. Always 
communicate directly with the person with a hearing disability, even when he or 
she is accompanied by an interpreter. When the individual is not accompanied by 




Again, instructions provided are fairly vague and a “toolkit” for communication is largely not 
provided to the BSO in the training module, leaving it up to the BSO to discover on the frontline 
how to best facilitate communication with a person with a hearing disability in the absence of a 
translator. The training module regarding People at Risk similarly instructs officers to be 
“sensitive to the personal situation of suspected [trafficking in persons] victims… proceed with 
extreme tact and sensitivity” (p. 8-11). Again, a toolkit of communication with specific 
instructions and examples is not provided. Rather, it is assumed that officers innately understand 
how to be tactful and show the appropriate level of sensitivity to victims. Interestingly, such 
communication considerations are never made for refugee claimants who may similarly be 
struggling with emotional and psychological distress as a result of persecution, danger, or war in 
their home countries, perhaps establishing a dichotomy (in training at least) between those 
victims deserving of compassion (trafficked persons) and “others” undeserving of empathy 
(refugees seeking asylum).  
 Lastly, a training module entitled “Overview of Secondary” makes reference to a vague 
“educative role” BSOs should play in relation to the public. However, details are not provided 
regarding when or how BSOs should act as educators or gain skills necessary to become 
effective teachers. Details are also not provided regarding the most effective techniques for 
educating members of the public, and such activity is (again) assumed to be an innate ability in 
the training documents. 
While more recent OITP training documents contain additional interaction training, 
effective interaction and communication are still largely couched in terms of CBSA’s 
enforcement and intelligence-gathering mandate. Such communication training is mostly found 
in two modules: 1) Interviewing Techniques and 2) Client Service. The former contains 
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instruction on how officers should interview members of the public, how active listening 
techniques can aide in amassing information, how officers can best detect deception in answers 
through both verbal and non-verbal indicators, and how methods of communication and 
questioning can lead to compliant and receptive interviewees. In the latter “Client Service” 
module, good client service (via communication) is necessitated as a way of making BSO duties 
easier given travellers will be “calm” and “cooperative”, allowing the officer to avoid court 
challenges based on their perceived behaviour, and facilitating the flow of travellers such that the 
officer may “concentrate on high-risk persons or goods” (p. 7).  
 While the examined legislation, D Memoranda, and Immigration Enforcement Manual 
contain no information regarding interacting with travellers specifically, the CBSA Customs 
Enforcement Manual makes fifteen such references. Again, such instructions are largely 
constructed in terms of fulfilling an enforcement role. For instance, Part 2 Chapter 3 Firearms 
and Weapons states: 
29. To establish this knowledge fact, the CBSA officer, as part of the primary 
examination will specifically ask the traveller if he/she is carrying any weapon 
such as pepper spray, mace or knives and advise them of the prohibited status of 
such weapons. In many instances, travellers may not realize that certain items are 
prohibited and they are not intentionally trying to smuggle them into Canada (p. 
5). 
 
In this sense, choice of language is identified as important in terms of interdicting goods given 
that travellers may not understand what vague terms like “weapons” mean without specific 
examples, which may ultimately negatively impact interdiction, enforcement, and subsequent 
convictions. Even in terms of communicating with victims of trafficking in persons (VTIPs), 
effective communication is defined in terms of conducting an interview in order to establish 
criminality of the trafficker: 
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Engage in as little questioning as possible, and conduct your interaction with the 
individual in a non-confrontational manner. Use non-threatening body language. 
Listen to the VTIP’s story and realize that the truth may take some time to surface 
as these victims and their families are threatened with violence in the event that 
they cooperate with the police. Should the officer encounter resistance, 
questioning should be put on hold (Part 2 Chapter 15, p. 2).  
 
This focus on communication for the purposes of enforcement and intelligence-gathering is 
confirmed in the POERT module Secondary Questioning, which states, “The reason we 
interview is to obtain and/or confirm information to make accurate decisions on people and 
goods” (p. 2). The document subsequently clarifies just what an “interview” entails, stating, “An 
interview occurs anytime a BSO interacts with a traveller” (p. 2). In essence then, according to 
CBSA training documents and manuals, potentially any and all interactions between BSOs and 
members of the travelling public are understood as “interviews” designed to elicit information 
necessary to make enforcement and admissibility decisions.  
 Sections of the People Processing Manual related to communication include: Part 1 
Chapter 3 Diffusion Techniques, Part 1 Chapter 4 Awareness Issues, Part 2 Chapter 1 Primary 
Questioning and Immigration Referrals, and Part 2 Chapter 2 Our Missing Children Program. 
Once again, communication is largely understood in enforcement terms. For example, a section 
in Part 1 Chapter 3 states: “Communication techniques used to reduce the anger and hostility of 
an individual are known as defusion (sic) techniques. The objective is not to change the other 
person, but to calm the person to a level where the border services officer can perform his or her 
job” (p. 10). Training similar to this is also provided in officer use of force modules. Another 
section in Part 2 Chapter 1 reads: “In conducting the primary interview in the highway mode, the 
officer at [the primary inspection line] must ensure that every person is given an opportunity to 
make a full and complete declaration. Questioning styles such as ‘Anything back?’ for returning 
residents or ‘Where to today?’ for non-residents are to be avoided” (p. 52).  
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It is interesting to note that most of the information contained in manuals on interacting 
with members of the public is also found elsewhere (i.e. training documents) and therefore is not 
necessarily original or unique. Nonetheless, specific communication instructions for BSOs are 
provided in only four of the sixty-seven chapters of the People Processing Manual (6% of 
chapters) or about 15 total pages of specific instruction on how to communicate with members of 
travelling publics over 471 pages (3% of all material covered). Eight of the fifteen pages deal 
specifically with communicating under “special” circumstances, mostly related to 
communicating with people with disabilities (6 pages) and questioning suspected abducted 
children (2 pages). The rest of the People Processing Manual is reserved for identifying how 
officers should process travellers in different modes (land, sea, air), the CANPASS program, 
personal importations, classification of goods, tariffs, the importation of vehicles, and various 
other topics not pertaining directly to communication with travellers. In short, the People 
Processing Manual is more concerned with (as its title suggests) “processing” than it is about 
interacting with members of travelling publics. 
 In fact, of all the training and other documents examined (over 3700 pages of 
information), only about 26 pages (less than 1% of all information covered) include “how to 
communicate” or “how to interact” guides for officers not specifically related to gaining 
compliance of travellers or administering the enforcement or intelligence-gathering mandates of 
the agency. Eleven of these pages were located in the new “Client Service” OITP module under 
fourteen sub-headings, including: 2.4 Courtesy, 3.1 How Communication Works, 3.2 Your 
Communication Style, 3.3 Communication Barriers, 4.1 What is a Difficult Situation, 4.2 
Communicating in Difficult Situations, 4.3.1 Dealing with Emotional Travellers or Situations, 
and 4.3.2 Dealing with Travellers who Oppose, Provoke or Challenge You. Therefore, most 
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officers currently on the frontline did not receive this instruction as part of POERT. Interestingly, 
while the “Client Service” OITP module is the primary interaction lesson provided to BSOs, 
CBSA projects the lesson will take just 4 hours and 30 minutes of the 18 weeks recruits are being 
trained and tested at the CBSA College in Rigaud, Quebec (i.e. about 0.6% of all time spent 
training). As mentioned above, an additional fifteen pages of communication guidelines were 
located in the People Processing Manual. Even when including enforcement or intelligence-
gathering interaction instruction with the above findings, a grand total of about 95 pages of 
information (2.6% of all information examined) contain any interaction or communication 
content whatsoever.  
Regardless of which metric above you choose to consider, a very small fraction of all 
BSO training, frontline manuals, public policy, and other documents prepare BSOs in any way 
for interacting with travelling publics as an officer on the frontline. This stands in stark contrast 
with the vast amount of time (likely the majority of their careers) BSOs will spend interacting 
with members of travelling publics within an inordinately social occupation. Furthermore, 
POERT modules (and presumably OITP modules as well) display a systematic bias towards 
considering communication and social interaction as tools CBSA officers may use in order to 
elicit confessions, gathering intelligence, and ultimately produce enforcement actions. In this 
way, officer training falls into the same trap as much of the literature in universally portraying 
border interactions as “security moments” designed to fulfill a security mandate. This reflects 
much of the aforementioned findings from the policing literature, namely, officers receive 
training that emphasizes their role as law enforcers within a highly militaristic and bureaucratic 
structure, while instruction in potentially more progressive roles (i.e. community policing, 
reducing racial barriers, and so forth) are effectively ignored or do not translate to the frontline 
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(Conti and Nolan 2005; Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce 2010; Conti and Doreian 2014). While the 
securitization of border activities and interactions is, of course, palpable and inescapable at the 
physical border, it is likely the case that the vast majority of interactions between BSOs and 
members of travelling publics are inherently mundane in nature and ultimately do not elicit 
confessions or information designed to fulfill an intelligence or enforcement mandate. In fact, we 
know the vast majority of interactions at the border do not lead to enforcement or intelligence-
gathering activities at all. In the 2013-2014 fiscal year, only 2.97% of all examined individuals 
were inadmissible for customs or immigration reasons (CBSA 2014c:36). Additionally, out of 
the over 100 million travellers and 14 million commercial importations BSOs processed in that 
year (CBSA 2014c:1) only about 1.3% of all individuals and 3.17% of all commercial goods 
examined resulted in customs infractions or enforcement actions (CBSA 2014c:36).  
Furthermore, trusted traveller programs like NEXUS in North America create 
comparatively relaxed border social interactions that can hardly be referred to as “security 
moments” designed to elicit information or lead to enforcement actions. In programs such as 
NEXUS, the vast majority of information is provided upstream by the traveller at the time of the 
application process, and subsequent interactions at the physical border can only be described as a 
“formality” rather than as an “interview”. Indeed, in 2013-2014, 98.78% of all trusted traveller 
members were found to be in compliance with border legislation (CBSA 2014:31). In short, 
while officer training, manuals, and other documents conjure up an image of a “wild west” of 
frontline border security for border services officers and recruits, in actuality security moments 
may in fact be few and far between amidst a vast ocean of routine social interactions between 
BSOs and travellers.  
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While (perhaps) preparing BSOs adequately for their enforcement and intelligence duties, 
CBSA training and other documents leave officers without the tools necessary for the non-
securitized or “facilitation” (CBSA 2018e:8) side of border work, such as the “humanitarian 
border” identified by Walters (2011) or the vague “educative” role promoted by the Agency 
itself. Findings in this article indicate that BSOs are arguably undertrained and therefore ill-
prepared to interact with any number of humanitarian crisis cases, asylum seekers, victims of 
trafficking, abducted children, people with disabilities, travellers requiring instruction on a 
variety of border-related topics, travellers simply importing goods and paying taxes, emotional or 
angry travellers not requiring use of force options, and other equally important duties and 
scenarios beyond security and intelligence. As such, BSO training effectively ignores the fact the 
BSO occupation is a form of “emotional labour’” in which officers are responsible for projecting 
a standardized affect (confidence, knowledgeability, even-temper, professionalism, and so forth) 
while simultaneously managing the emotions of travellers they interact with (see Hochschild 
1983). Such findings also reflect findings from the policing literature that police training 
academies often focus on high-risk, low-probability training (i.e. use of force training) while 
simultaneously neglecting the facilitative side of police work (i.e. communication, de-escalation, 
community engagement, and so forth) (Conti and Nolan 2005; Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce 
2010; Conti and Doreian 2014; Rahr and Rice 2015).  
Finally, such findings can be used to situate how CBSA governance technologies are 
(en)folded into existing frontline governance structures, namely, the “zone of frontier 
government” (O’Connor and de Lint 2009:40) characterized by the exercise of sovereignty as 
well as strategies of control, surveillance, and risk management as overarching border 
frameworks. These strategies can also be situated within broader socioeconomic power trends 
100 
 
related to the spread of neoliberal and risk-management logics of governance. Various 
uncertainties emerge as a consequence of modernity and free market economics. Neoliberalism 
embraces uncertainty (as a feature of innovation) but wishes also to tame associated threats and 
insecurities of various kinds. Risk emerges as a ‘scientific’ way to harness uncertainties and 
produce ‘security’ by obtaining data and knowledge towards predicting the future (rendering 
uncertainties “knowable” and thus controllable). Ericson (2007) documents the spread of risk 
logics to government departments, policing agencies, corporations, and even to individuals as 
self-governing neoliberal consumers of risk. The spread of risk logics to agencies responsible for 
border and immigration enforcement has been well-documented in the literature (see for example 
Amoore and Hall 2009; Amoore 2011; Amoore 2013; Broeders and Hampshire 2013; Amoore 
and Raley 2017). Much of the work of Muller (2010a; 2010b; 2011; 2013) also considers this 
trend. Subsequent shifts in agency mandates (highlighted above in this study in the case of 
CBSA) increasingly reconceptualizes a generally law-abiding public as a potentially dangerous, 
criminal, and terroristic public as surveillance mechanisms proliferate to “know” individuals; 
collect, collate, and analyze data; and govern mobility according to risk.  
In addition to failing to adequately prepare frontline BSOs for the ‘facilitative’ side of 
border work, identified training and other documents display a systematic bias toward 
intelligence and interrogation work that can be read as being symptomatic of broader trends 
associated with neoliberalism, risk, and the diffusion of surveillance technologies away from 
traditional sovereign border sites (see for example Walters 2006b; Johnson et al. 2011). As 
CBSA continues to shift from legacy agency mandates to mandates associated with 
securitization, risk, and pre-emption of threats as a result of broader neoliberal risk-based 
practices and technologies, the nature of border work (as well as officer perceptions and frontline 
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interactions) is also systematically changing to reflect these trends. Discourses surrounding 
potential additional mandates, including (for example) communication, de-escalation, 
community engagement, educating the public, managing personal and traveller emotions, 
managing the boredom associated with routine work, dealing with sick or disabled travellers, and 
handling English as a Second Language (ESL) travellers, are incompatible with forms of 
governance (and associated technologies) employing neoliberal risk-management modes of 
power. Such considerations simply do not factor into the “calculus” of risk and are therefore 
irrelevant to contemporary border work. Such ‘facilitation’ (CBSA 2018e:8) border work is 
enveloped and indeed consumed by security and intelligence-related surveillance and risk-
management technologies and practices designed to render travellers (read: “threats”) knowable.  
Future research should consider how increased automation and pre-emption of border 
governance practices – as a result of neoliberal risk-management practices – further intensifies 
this gulf in the ability for BSOs to successfully interact with the travelling public in both 
securitized and non-securitized moments.15 
Conclusion 
While much research has focused on examining overarching frontline border security and 
migration-related practices as well as associated public policy, very little research has considered 
how border officers are socialized through training and organizational governance technologies. 
While the policing literature is rife with examinations of police officer socialization, the border 
literature has much work to do in this regard. Border research has also not considered how 
socialization contributes to officer perceptions related to border security generally, and policing 
                                                 
15 Please see Chapter 5 “Cyborg Work: Borders as Simulation” and Chapter 6 “Examining Frontline Official and 
Non-Official Interaction Narratives Concerning Digitized Risk Technologies Employed at the Canadian Border” for 
an examination of increased technologization. 
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and interacting with members of the public specifically. This article ultimately adds to the 
literature by carrying forward the work of Karine Côté-Boucher and others in examining the 
sociology of frontline border work. The article accomplished this by providing the first 
examination of the full extent of governance technologies designed to mediate officer decisions 
and social interactions on the frontline of enforcement. This was achieved by conducting content 
and discourse analyses of the previously unexamined CBSA BSO POERT programme, relevant 
modules from the more recent OITP, manuals and other documents employed by officers on the 
frontline, as well as Canadian public policy in considering CBSA organizational shifts, how 
officers are instructed to interact with the public, and the prioritization of duties related to the 
public. 
 Findings indicate that organizational governance shifts over the course of the last three 
decades within CBSA have shifted priorities from tax and duty collection to an agency that deals 
(at least in principle) primarily in national security, criminal enforcement, and intelligence. 
These shifts have resulted in a concomitant shift in officer duties and officer worldview in that 
conceptualizations have undoubtedly shifted from policing a taxpaying public to dealing with a 
travelling public increasingly characterized as dangerous, unpredictable, and requiring 
securitization. Findings also identified the training and governance assemblage designed to 
manage frontline BSOs, and indicated that a combination of training documents, manuals, public 
policy, and a paramilitary-style governance hierarchy serves to enable, support, and constrain 
BSO frontline duties, public interactions, as well as potentially perceptions.  
Additional findings indicate that the Customs Act and IRPA are prioritized as the two 
most important parts of the assemblage governing the actions of BSOs on the frontline of 
enforcement. Furthermore, prioritization of duties ultimately unfolds across training documents, 
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manuals, and public policy to “securitize” certain aspects of BSO duties, including duties 
primarily related to banned commodities and goods, immigration enforcement, banned criminal 
activities, and, to a lesser extent, the payment of duties and taxes. Due to the lack of 
prioritization information offered to officers, it is possible that BSOs also develop collective 
prioritizations through interacting with the travelling public on the frontline of enforcement (as 
the policing literature also suggests in terms of public police officers). This theory will require 
testing in future research.  
Finally, content and discourse analyses of officer training, manuals, and other documents 
revealed that BSOs receive very little training related to interacting with members of travelling 
publics on the frontline. When such training is infrequently provided, officers largely receive 
instructions only insofar as they serve to support officers in gathering information and collecting 
intelligence necessary to complete enforcement actions. Collectively, such systematic bias 
towards portraying the border as the “wild west of frontline security” vis-à-vis CBSA 
governance shifts, the training and technologies, as well as in other manuals and documents 
ultimately produces officer worldviews and social interactions that are rooted exclusively in 
security provision while leaving BSOs largely unable to handle other “facilitative” types of 
public interactions that regularly occur at the border. This reflects prior research in the policing 
literature and also suggests the BSO occupation is not framed as a form of ‘emotional labour’ 
(Hochschild 1983) in training. In addition, such inadequacies can be read as being symptomatic 
of broader socioeconomic power trends associated with neoliberalism, risk, and the diffusion of 
surveillance technologies away from traditional sovereign border sites in that the ‘facilitation’ 
side of border work is incompatible with (and irrelevant to) risk-management modes of power.  
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 This article is inherently limited in terms of the researcher not being allowed direct access 
from CBSA to examine how social interactions between BSOs and members of travelling 
publics actually unfold at the border, as well as whether and to what extent officers develop 
collective enforcement priorities and styles of social interaction irreducible to officer training and 
standard operating procedures found in manuals. As the policing literature suggests, officer 
socialization continues throughout the length of a career, and long after training has ended. In 
turn, it is also possible that official lessons provided to BSOs do not always translate directly into 
frontline border practices. 
Directions for future research include comparing the findings from the content and 
discourse analyses above to results from qualitative interviews with frontline officers and 
members of travelling publics to examine whether and to what extent BSOs employ their training 
at the border, how priorities are (in)formed by frontline activities and social interactions with 
travelling publics, and whether and to what extent governance technologies actually influence 
social interactions as well as perceptions held by officers in relation to publics. Such findings can 
be contrasted with findings identified in this article to test whether and to what extent securitized 
perceptions produced by various governance technologies are actually translated into social 
interactions occurring at the frontline.16 Finally, given that securing access to government 
documents is a slow and tedious process, the results from this project will be updated as 
additional documents become available through ATIP requests that either confirm or lead to a 
revision of current findings.  
- END OF ARTICLE - 
  
                                                 
16 Please see Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 for results of qualitative interviews related to officer governance and 




“From Seat to Street”: Questioning Canadian Border Practices Through Official and Non-
Official Interaction Narrative Knowledge  
This article combines findings concerning institutional discourses and officer 
governance (generated from Lalonde 2019) with interaction narrative knowledge 
produced by frontline officials and non-officials gleaned from qualitative 
interviews designed to elicit perceptions regarding past frontline interactions at 
borders, officer training in relation to frontline interactions, as well as the existence 
of borderlands potentially informed by geographical proximity to ports of entry. 
When combined, official and non-official interaction narrative knowledge 
generated through the circulation of BSOs and members of travelling publics within 
ports of entry confirm many of the findings of Lalonde (2019), including: 1) a 
severe lack of officer frontline interaction training, 2) the necessity of and dangers 
associated with officers learning best-practices on the frontline; 3) the notion that 
officers are ill-trained in terms of handling the “facilitation”, humanitarian, non-
enforcement side of frontline border interactions; and 4) existing Agency and 
government policies providing few details in terms of frontline social interactions 
and how they should or must unfold. Other findings suggest the existence of: 1) 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms human rights violations in terms of 
officers posing secondary intrusive questions as a matter of routine, 2) perceptions 
generated by travelling publics that BSOs are potentially complacent or lazy, 3) 
negative interactions involving officer abuse of authority related to: a) aggressive or 
unnecessary questioning, b) generally rude or unfriendly demeanour, and c) 
harassing travellers about purchases made abroad; and 4) the existence of local 
borderland realities and differences that call into question CBSA’s uniform national 
training model for officers. These findings are discussed in relation to being 
symptomatic of broader socioeconomic power trends employing neoliberal risk-
management forms of governance. 





Much of the interdisciplinary border literature can be said to focus its lens on official or 
institutional discourses. As such, the literature has largely examined public policy construction, 
state governance efforts, and the deployment of various technologies at borders (see for example 
Muller 2010b; Muller 2011; Broeders and Hampshire 2013; Bosworth and Turnbull 2015; 
Bosworth 2016); the governance of global migration (see Mountz 2011; Aas 2012; Salter and 
Mutlu 2013; Mountz and Loyd 2014; Mountz 2015); and, to a lesser extent, the perceptions of 
border and immigration officers tasked with frontline border enforcement (see for example Côté-
Boucher 2013; Pickering 2014; Pickering and Ham 2014; Aas and Gundhus 2015; Côté-Boucher 
2016; Côté-Boucher 2018). While official knowledge – and particularly interviews with officers 
– provide important knowledge on the unfolding of frontline border governance (Loftus 2015), 
such knowledge is ultimately limited in that it largely ignores the perceptions of the political 
subjects of (in)security (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2016:43). By privileging institutional 
and official knowledge, such research ultimately ignores forms of subjugated knowledge 
(Foucault 1972), the role of diverse publics in shaping the field of (in)security, and makes 
invisible the presence of (in)security in everyday life (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2016:43). 
To these points, this article would also argue that such research favours a uniform view of 
borders and security practices, examining public policy and governance technologies as “one-
size-fits-all” approaches and ultimately ignoring potential local realties and differences in terms 
of governing ports of entry.  
 As such, this article will examine borders by utilizing a 360-degree lens employed by 
contrasting non-official knowledge and perceptions with official knowledge to consider how 
borders – as spaces of security (Foucault 1978) – are actually understood by the social agents 
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circulating within them. First, this article will build on the work of Lalonde (2019)17 by 
considering prior findings concerning border services officer (BSO) training and governance 
practices employed by Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) in light of new findings 
regarding official and non-official interaction narrative knowledge generated through perceptions 
of past social interactions supplied by social actors (BSOs and members of travelling publics) 
regularly circulating through ports of entry. Second, this article will analyze the results of content 
and thematic analyses performed on coded transcripts generated from in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews conducted with ten BSOs currently or formerly employed at ports of entry in 
Windsor, Ontario. Third, this article will provide the results of content and thematic analyses 
performed on coded transcripts generated from thirty in-depth, semi-structured interviews 
conducted with members of travelling publics, the majority of whom were current or former 
residents of the Windsor-Essex County region at the time interviews were conducted. This article 
will specifically address three key research questions: 1) How do BSOs and members of 
travelling publics perceive of and understand the frontline social interactions that occur at ports 
of entry in Windsor? 2) How does official and non-official interaction narrative knowledge 
generated through the circulation of BSOs and publics through ports of entry compare to 
institutional agency discourses? 3) How does geographical proximity to specific ports of entry 
potentially inform localized knowledge related to the nature of borders? This article will also 
discuss how findings related to these research questions might inform future policy debates 
concerning CBSA, the training of BSOs, and the protection of rights, freedoms, and privacy at 
ports of entry.  
 
 
                                                 
17 This article is reproduced as Chapter 3 “Border Officer Training in Canada: Identifying Organizational 







 Much previous interdisciplinary border research has focused its lens almost exclusively 
on official knowledge. Such analyses tend to examine public policy construction, state 
governance efforts, and the deployment of various technologies at borders (see for example 
Muller 2010b; Muller 2011; Broeders and Hampshire 2013; Bosworth and Turnbull 2015; 
Bosworth 2016); the governance of global migration (see Mountz 2011; Aas 2012; Salter and 
Mutlu 2013; Mountz and Loyd 2014; Mountz 2015); and, to a lesser extent, the perceptions of 
customs and immigration officers tasked with frontline border enforcement (see for example 
Côté-Boucher 2013; Pickering 2014; Pickering and Ham 2014; Aas and Gundhus 2015; Côté-
Boucher 2016; Côté-Boucher 2018). Research analyzing official knowledge has generated 
important findings in terms of tracing how governments and agents of the state “see” (Scott 
1998) modern borders. In terms of the Canadian context, Bouchard and Carroll (2002) examine 
how immigration officers use both “professional” and “personal” forms of discretion in 
performing their duties. Officers are often left to make discretionary decisions given various 
ambiguities associated with existing immigration policies. Pratt and Thompson (2008) determine 
how race knowledge functions to influence frontline officer discretionary practices. Ambiguities 
surrounding the meaning of “racial profiling” and an associated slippage between “race” and 
“nationality” allows officers to officially deny participating in racial profiling while continuing 
to employ racialized risk knowledges at the border. Pratt (2010) explores how legal and other 
knowledge informs the “moment of decision” when frontline officers determine reasonable 
suspicion for searches at the border. Officer decision-making is shielded from serious scrutiny 
because the supposed objective nature of employed risk language serves to obscure other 
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knowledges also at play. Côté-Boucher (2013) queried frontline BSOs regarding various aspects 
of their employment with Canada Border Services Agency, generating key findings regarding 
how frontline officers negotiate shifts within the governing logics of CBSA mandates from a 
focus on tax collection to a new emphasis on security, anti-terrorism, intelligence, and so forth. 
Côté-Boucher’s subsequent research continues with this important work, documenting officer 
use of discretion within the “new CBSA” (Côté-Boucher 2016) and also “generational 
borderwork”, whereby officers rely on generational categorizations to negotiate change in their 
workplace (Côté-Boucher 2018). 
 While, as discussed above, institutional discourses have generated key findings 
surrounding the nature of border work, non-official knowledge is noticeably absent from 
aforementioned analyses. As Newman (2006) argues:  
Borders should be studied not only from a top-down perspective, but also from 
the bottom up, with a focus on the individual border narratives and experiences, 
reflecting the ways in which borders impact upon the daily life practices of people 
living in and around the borderland and transboundary transition zones (p. 143).  
 
Such analysis would serve to challenge official discourses through the lens of the lived 
experiences of individuals (and publics) who circulate within borderlands. Such arguments are 
echoed by Vaughan-Williams and Stevens (2016:43), in that while official or institutional 
discourses inform important findings on the unfolding of frontline border governance (Loftus 
2015), such knowledge is ultimately limited in that it effectively ignores the perceptions of 
political subjects of (in)security. By privileging institutional and official knowledge, such 
research ultimately ignores forms of subjugated knowledge (Foucault 1972), the role of diverse 
publics in shaping the field of (in)security, and makes invisible the presence of (in)security in 
everyday life (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2016: 43). To these points, this article also argues 
that such research favours a uniform view of borders as well as security and mobility governance 
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practices as employing “one-size-fits-all” universal technologies, ultimately ignoring potential 
localized realities and differences in terms of governing ports of entry within specific 
borderlands.  
Limited research in North America has examined non-official knowledge within the 
context of local borderlands. In the Canadian context, Helleiner (2010) examines non-official 
border knowledge within the context of the Niagara region of Ontario. Specifically, Helleiner’s 
(2010) analysis draws upon interviews conducted with 40 Niagara residents between September 
2001 and August 2004 in considering how participants experienced changes in border 
securitization post-9/11. Helleiner’s (2010) findings ultimately demonstrate a need for the 
literature to contrast non-official knowledge with official knowledge in order to identify points 
of divergence between official state narratives and community experiences concerning border 
security. In the U.S. context, Bjelland (2016) conducted interviews with ten families living along 
the Point Roberts, Washington border. Findings demonstrate that Point Roberts is defined by its 
international border as a hybrid borderland: “a privileged exurb for U.S. citizens working in 
Vancouver, a U.S. service center for Canadians, and a seaside retirement community with 
pockets of isolation and neglect” (Bjelland 2016:516). Various additional studies in the Canadian 
context have examined the lived experiences of migrants transiting across international borders, 
including Somerville (2015) examining how decisions to migrate to Canada are informed by 
(and in turn shape) migrant networks, with “migrant pioneers” deliberately settling in countries 
in which their families are not yet located in an attempt to expand their migrant network 
globally; and Horgan and Liinamaa (2017) analyzing interviews with former Seasonal 
Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP) participants to determine how uncertainty regarding 
legal, immigration, and employment status is personally experienced by migrants. McLaughlin 
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(2009) similarly examines the SAWP program through the lens of migrants in the Niagara 
Region of Ontario, exploring how legal precariousness contributes to non-citizens being 
effectively excluded from many of rights guaranteed to all residents of Canada (including, for 
instance, healthcare).  
Building on the work of Helleiner (2010) and Bjelland (2016) examining non-official 
borderland knowledge, studies concerning the lived experiences of migrants, as well as studies 
considering official border officer knowledge, this article will contrast the institutional 
discourses of CBSA with the frontline official knowledge of localized border services officers 
and the non-official knowledge of borderland residents and travellers to address the three 
aforementioned key research questions. 
Methods 
 
 Windsor was selected as the primary region of study for several key reasons. First, 
Windsor is unique to Canada in that it is home to five ports of entry – the Ambassador Bridge, 
the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel, Windsor International Airport (YQG), the Detroit-Windsor Truck 
Ferry, and a commercial train tunnel.18 Second, Windsor ports of entry are among the busiest 
along the Canada-United States border in terms of total volume. The Ambassador Bridge ranks 
second for total traveller volumes entering Canada and is number one for commercial vehicle 
volumes (CBSA 2018b). The Detroit-Windsor Tunnel is also unique in that it is the only 
underwater international tunnel for automobile traffic in the world, processing about 12,000 
vehicles per day and over four million vehicles per year (Detroit-Windsor Tunnel 2018). The 
Tunnel is also unique in that it directly links the downtown cores of two major North American 
                                                 
18 Canada Border Services Agency also administers two “off-site” locations in Windsor, including the Ambassador 




cities – Windsor, Ontario and Detroit, Michigan. As such, the Tunnel is an important gateway for 
the approximately 6,700 Windsor-Essex County residents who commute across the border daily 
to work in Detroit (Wilhelm and Reindl 2018). The Tunnel also provides an important gateway 
for Windsor-Essex County residents attending cultural and sports events in Downtown Detroit 19 
and also shopping in Detroit’s suburbs. In short, the daily lives of Windsor-Essex County 
residents are inextricably linked to the Canada-United States border, the Windsor region itself 
serves as one of the highest-volume borderlands in North America, and given residents 
frequently travel across local borders, they therefore have a large sample of frontline social 
interactions with BSOs to draw from in participating in this study.  
Semi-structured, face-to-face, in-depth interviews unfolded with two samples generated 
from the Windsor-Essex County region to answer the three key research questions: 1) How do 
BSOs and members of travelling publics perceive of and understand the frontline social 
interactions that occur at ports of entry in Windsor? 2) How does official and non-official 
interaction narrative knowledge generated from perceptions of past frontline interactions 
occurring between BSOs and publics circulating through ports of entry compare to institutional 
agency discourses? 3) How does geographical proximity to specific ports of entry potentially 
inform localized knowledge related to the nature of borders? All interviews were audio recorded, 
transcribed, and coded, with coding “driven by the researcher’s theoretical or analytical interest” 
(Braun and Clarke 2006:84). Content analysis, or a method for analyzing the frequency of 
information or symbols contained in text, was employed in developing codes (Neuman 2006:44). 
Given previous literature has largely not examined (theoretically or empirically) the key research 
questions highlighted above, a grounded process of variable identification was employed. This 
                                                 
19  Windsor residents travel to Downtown Detroit so often that Windsor Transit operates a special Tunnel Bus that 
shuttles Canadians across the border and back throughout the day, seven days per week. 
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allowed the researcher to analyze a subset of interviews and identify variables emerging from the 
message pool (Neuendorf 2002:103). Once a variety of codes were initially identified, the entire 
sample of transcribed interviews were subsequently analyzed first through a process of open 
coding and second using focused coding (Emerson et al. 1995).   
For the first sample, in-depth interviews of approximately one hour to one and a half 
hours in length were conducted with ten BSOs currently or formerly employed at ports of entry 
in Windsor. As obtaining access to BSOs was challenging,20 convenience sampling was 
employed for this study (Weiss 1994:25). Former colleagues of the researcher were interviewed 
first, as rapport had already been pre-established.21 Subsequently, this study employed chain-
referral sampling to gain access to other potential participants. The chain-referral sampling 
technique enables the identification and tracing of social networks using a small number of initial 
contacts who, in turn, provide researchers with an ever-expanding set of potential contacts 
(Spreen 1992; Thomson 1997; Kuzel 1999). Following standard recruiting practices in recent 
policing literature, purposive sampling was employed to ensure that only individuals who are 
currently or were formerly frontline BSOs were included in the sample (see for example Regehr 
et al. 2003; Reynolds and Hicks 2015; Galovic et al. 2016). In total, the researcher forwarded 
twenty-five invitations to participate in this study and ultimately successfully recruited ten 
participants – seven current BSOs, two retired officers, and one former officer now employed 
outside of CBSA.22 Generally, in policing studies involving in-depth and inductive qualitative 
                                                 
20 Gaining access to BSOs was further complicated by CBSA twice refusing to assist the researcher with recruiting 
candidates or officially endorse the study. 
21 The researcher worked as a student border services officer through the Government of Canada’s Federal Student 
Work Experience Program from 2008-2009. 
22 It is likely that current officers were hesitant to participate in the project given CBSA did not give its formal 
approval for the study and given the researcher’s institutional research ethics board mandated the use of strong 




interviews with officers, 10 to 25 interviews are recommended to obtain saturation (Reynolds, 
Fitzgerald, and Hicks 2018). Various policing studies employing in-depth interviews with 
officers fall within the 10 to 20 interviewee range (see for example Regehr et al. 2003; Aarons, 
Powell, and Browne 2004; Beletsky, Macalino, and Burris 2005; Olivia and Compton 2010; 
Spalek 2010; Evans, Pistrang, and Billings 2013). In a similar recent investigation, Broll and 
Huey (2015) conducted in-depth interviews with 12 police officers from three municipal police 
departments in Southwestern Ontario to gauge officer perspectives on cyberbullying.  
Interview questions were posed to BSOs on subject matter related to the key research 
questions of the study, including questions regarding: 1) frontline interactions with members of 
travelling publics; 2) training received from CBSA and the Government of Canada related to 
frontline social interactions; 3) CBSA and Government of Canada policies, standard operating 
procedures, and other documents designed to guide frontline interactions with publics; 4) 
deviations from training and policy in interacting with publics; 5) whether and to what extent 
officers prioritize their disparate duties; and 6) how BSOs understand and define “the border”. 
 In-depth interviews were also conducted with thirty members of travelling publics 
familiar with crossing the border and interacting with BSOs. Key informants known to the 
researcher were interviewed first to initially access key groups of frequent border travellers (i.e. 
nurses, accountants, and lawyers living in Windsor-Essex County and employed in the United 
States). Subsequently, chain-referral sampling was employed to gain access to other potential 
participants (including colleagues and acquaintances of initial participants). Purposive sampling 
was employed to access a variety of individual participants, ranging widely in terms of 
occupation, age group, and gender. Previous studies have employed similar sample sizes (see 
Helleiner 2010; Bjelland 2016) and recruitment methods (see Horgan and Liinamaa 2017) in 
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interviewing non-official borderland populations. The researcher continued conducting 
interviews until saturation - the point at which collecting additional data provided no new 
information (Glaser and Strauss 1967).  
The majority of interviews lasted about 30-45 minutes and were conducted in-person or 
via Skype. Participants had to be at least 18-years-old to participate in the study. The vast 
majority of participants (24) were current residents of Windsor Essex-County at the time 
interviews were conducted. Four additional participants were residents of other Ontario 
municipalities – Kitchener (2), Toronto (1), and London (1) – and two additional participants 
were residents of Bangkok, Thailand and Charlotte, North Carolina (respectively). The 
participants from Toronto, London, Bangkok, and Charlotte were all formerly long-term 
residents of Windsor who subsequently moved elsewhere for employment (all within the past 5 
years). One Kitchener resident had not lived in Windsor, but regularly crossed borders in 
Windsor when visiting friends in the Windsor Essex-County region and in Michigan. The final 
resident of Kitchener had little experience travelling through Windsor, but had ample experience 
travelling through Pearson International Airport in Toronto after returning to Canada from 
abroad (and was referred to the researcher by another participant). Ultimately the researcher sent 
thirty-three invitations to participate in the study and successfully recruited thirty participants. 
Questions posed to members of travelling publics were related to the key research questions of 
this study, including questions regarding: 1) frequency of border crossing, 2) frontline 
interactions with BSOs, 3) the demeanor of BSOs, 4) membership in trusted traveller programs 
like NEXUS and FAST, 5) perceptions regarding the extent of training BSOs receive related to 




Additional findings highlighted throughout the article were gleaned as a result of a 
thematic analysis performed on interview data as well as various primary and secondary 
documents obtained by the researcher. Thematic analysis of interview and other data is common 
practice in a variety of contemporary policing research studies (see for example Muller, 
Maclean, and Biggs 2009; Broll and Huey 2015; Powell et al. 2015; Broll 2016). Analyzed 
documents included federal government websites; over 300 pages of government reports; 31 
training modules consisting of 1324 pages of material from a late-2000s intake of the CBSA Port 
of Entry Recruit Training (POERT) program; various documents partially released by CBSA 
under Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) requests filed by the researcher, including: 
1274 pages of material from the CBSA Enforcement Manual, 296 pages of material related to 
communicating with the public (mostly newer OITP documents), 471 pages of material from the 
CBSA People Processing Manual, and 100 pages of material from the CBSA Immigration 
Enforcement Manual and associated training documents. Following the example of Broll and 
Huey (2015), Braun and Clarke’s (2006) method of thematic analysis was employed in reading 
through a sample of documents and identifying initial promising themes emerging from the text. 
Next, open coding was employed to identify initial descriptive and analytic themes. Focused 
coding was then used to collapse themes into overarching categories until a “story” of the 
research emerged (Broll and Huey 2015:163). Thematic analysis was guided by the research 
questions and an inductive approach was used to allow key themes (and subsequent categories) 
to “emerge” from the data (Strauss and Corbin 2004). Themes at the manifest (directly 
observable in the text) and latent (underlying the text) levels were considered and identified 









 While institutional documents, policies, and procedures contain little information 
regarding how officers should or must interact with members of travelling publics and generally 
focus on communication as a tool in expediting enforcement and intelligence-gathering duties 
(see Lalonde 2019), some documents do provide details regarding how officers should behave 
(generally) on the frontline. For example, s. 1.6.5 “Emotional Factors” in the Secondary 
Questioning POERT training module states: “Our goal is to: 1) Project a sympathetic, friendly, 
and compassionate personality image” (p. 25). Similarly, an excerpt from the “Communication” 
lesson delivered as part of the Control and Defense Tactics (self-defence) course outlines: “1) 
Always use an appropriate tone of voice. 2) Be professional. 3) Keep language simple, 
understandable, and precise. 4) Empathize with the client and be respectful.”23 The more recent 
Officer Induction Training Program (OITP)24 contains further details regarding frontline 
interactions. A “Job Aid: Officer’s Skills” handout included within OITP modules outlines 
appropriate behaviours for interviewers in s. 1.1.7 Professional Appearance and Demeanor: “A 
firm, deliberate and business-like manner of speech and attitude will create a proper environment 
for the conduct of a successful interview…” (p. 2). The same handout outlines in s. 1.1.9 that 
                                                 
23 This information was contained on a PowerPoint slide excerpt released by CBSA as part of ATIP request A-2016-
01232 filed by the researcher. This information is publicly available through the Government of Canada’s ATIP 
website. 
24 The vast majority of BSOs currently on the frontline were likely trained using iterations of the late-2000s POERT 
documents obtained by the researcher given that CBSA increased its frontline ranks from 4000 to 7200 officers from 
2006 to 2012 – representing an 80% increase overall – prior to the implementation of the new OITP in 2014 (CBSA 
2008a, CBSA 2016d).Data gleaned from the 2013-2014 Annual Report to Parliament on the Privacy Act (CBSA 
2014a) suggests that there are “over 7200” officers, and the 2016-2017 Departmental Performance Report (CBSA 
2017b) states that there are 7240 full-time officers (suggesting slow retirement/replacement rates and growth since 
the introduction of the OITP).   
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officers should be self-controlled”: “The interviewer requires an exceptional degree of self-
control to avoid displays of genuine anger, irritation or weariness…” (p. 20). The “Client 
Service” OITP module provides further direction, including mandating “Service at the CBSA”: 
“People that cross the border expect and deserve the same level of service that you would expect 
from a service provider, whether it be a government official, a retail salesperson or a flight 
attendant” (p. 9). The same module outlines expectations for officers in terms of listing various 
strategies to demonstrate courtesy to travellers:  
Treat travellers in a respectful, professional and considerate manner… Be 
sensitive and responsive to cultural differences… Be aware of the traveller’s 
reactions and emotions and adapt your communication style, mode and tone 
accordingly. Greet traveller in both languages. Actively listen to travellers when 
they are speaking and do not interrupt. Do not act judgmental or make 
assumptions (especially based on stereotypes). Show empathy when the travellers 
is frustrated or concerned… Provide a conclusion – advise the traveller of your 
decision and thank him” (p. 14). 
 
Further guidelines in this module provide information on how officers should behave in difficult 
situations, including (but not limited to): “4. Be patient… 5. Manager your own anger, 
annoyance and stress. Don’t become part of the problem… 6. Don’t make provocative 
statements… 7. Respect the traveller…” (p. 23).  
While institutional discourses provided to officers in formative training demand that 
officers act within the laws of Canada and the mandate of the agency, and that officers act as 
service providers to “clients”, maintain professionalism, manage personal emotions, and so forth, 
only by examining frontline official (BSO) and non-official (traveller) knowledges related to 
frontline social interactions can this article continue the work of Lalonde (2019)25 in examining 
                                                 
25 This article is reproduced as Chapter 3 “Border Officer Training in Canada: Identifying Organizational 
Governance Technologies” within this thesis. 
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the relationship between officer training, agency governance efforts, and how border work 
actually unfolds at localized ports of entry.  
Travelling Public Interaction Narratives  
 
 The majority of members of travelling publics interviewed characterized frontline 
interactions with officers (primarily at Windsor ports of entry) as overwhelmingly pleasant, 
professional, routine, and even mundane. Participants often (unprompted) contrasted their 
experiences with BSOs with interactions with U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers, 
which they tended to characterize as rude, militant, excessive, and even abusive. For some 
participants, the mundane nature of interactions with Canadian officers was presented as a 
positive in terms of crossing the border. Situations in which travellers had quick interactions with 
officers and were only asked a few short questions were similarly portrayed as positive. For other 
participants, mundane – and at times nearly non-existent – social interactions with Canadian 
officers were indicative of complacency, boredom, or lack of effort on the part of BSOs. For 
example, Victoria – a 30-year-old consultant in the medical marijuana industry – stated: 
I commuted from Windsor to Detroit when I [went to school] for two years [in 
Michigan] and then I lived there for the rest of the time. But there were times I 
would come [back to Canada] at night and the guy slides open his window, he’s 
got chewing tobacco and he’s reading a book, ‘You got anything? Alright.’ And 
then closes [the window]. Your interactions are less than a minute every time, and 
sometimes less than 15 seconds <laughs>. And I’m like, ‘Ok, yeah, I have a big 
car load of weed or something.’ Right? Like you have no idea. So I don’t know if 
it’s laziness or complacency or what. 
 
For Victoria, short interviews featuring just one question posed by the BSOs she interacted with 
were indicative of laziness, complacency, and potentially a security threat to Canada. Jessica, a 




They’re mostly apathetic to my existence once they see me… I pull up, they take 
my passport, and they ask me what I was doing in the States. How long I was [in 
the United States]. And then I drive through and that’s that. And I’ve only ever 
been stopped once.  
 
Much like Victoria, Jessica finds the lack of questioning and secondary examination by officers 
to be indicative of officer apathethy in terms of processing her as a traveller. Olivia, a 22-year-
old hospital records clerk, noted a similarly quick experience at the Canadian border:  
“Usually they say, ‘Where did you go?’ And then you say, ‘Target.’ And then 
they say, ‘How much did you spend?’ And then you say, ‘One hundred and fifty 
[US Dollars].’ And he says, ‘Alright, have a nice day.’”  
 
The vast majority of participants noted a similar experience – that officers in Windsor typically 
ask between two to five questions before releasing travellers into Canada.  
Various other participants also reported that officers at Windsor ports of entry regularly 
ask travellers where they travelled while outside of Canada. When describing an average 
interaction with officers, Aliya, a 29-year-old fast food restaurant manager and executive 
assistant at a local property management company, said, “It’s not overly-friendly, just kind of 
like, ‘Hi, how’s it going? Where were you?’” Beverly, a 60-year-old teacher with a local school 
board, explained, “The young lady [BSO] we had yesterday, she was – we thought for sure when 
we got up there that she was going to be horrible – but she was smiling at us and laughing at us 
when she found out where we were. She was pleasant.” Much like Beverly, other participants 
also considered this line of questioning friendly and assumed that officers were simply 
expressing interest in their travels. For example, Pam, a 60-year old retired teacher, stated, “Like 
when we came back from vacation; they were friendly – they asked us questions about where we 
were.” In this sense, participants often did not consider questions regarding traveller mobility 
abroad to be characteristic of an interrogation effort by the officer, but rather simply resulting 
from an organic and friendly conversational interest on the part of the BSO. 
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 The above findings are important for two primary reasons. First, the perception among 
some participants that officers are potentially complacent or lazy is troubling given officer 
training documents (specifically the Primary Questioning module of the POERT program) state: 
“There are several mandatory questions, each related to one or more of the legacy organizations 
within the CBSA that must be asked of every person seeking to come into Canada” (p. 1, 
emphasis added). While the exact wording of questions is considered Protected information by 
the Government of Canada, there are ten mandatory questions officers must ask residents of 
Canada at primary inspection. Knowledge provided by members of travelling publics suggests 
that officers working at Windsor ports of entry are ignoring this directive, instead focusing on 
just two to five questions (on average) during frontline border interactions. This may be of 
concern to CBSA and the Government of Canada given certain criminal convictions and 
subsequent court cases may hinge on officers performing a full and complete primary inspection 
(something that is apparently not a matter of routine at Windsor ports of entry).  
Second, and perhaps most concerning, mobility rights guaranteed to all Canadian 
residents in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms designate that BSOs (according to 
Chapter 3, Part 3 – Reporting, Questioning, and Referral of the CBSA Enforcement Manual) 
should not be asking Canadian residents questions such as, “Where were you?” or “What were 
you doing in the United States?” as a matter of routine. According to the Enforcement Manual, 
officers are only enabled to ask such questions when suspicions arise after they have already 
posed mandatory primary questions. Knowledge generated by members of travelling publics 
suggests that BSOs are routinely employing this question alongside two or three mandatory 
primary questions. This is troubling from a human rights perspective given, as Chapter 3 Part 3 
of the Enforcement Manual indicates: “Individuals are not obligated, however, under any 
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circumstances, to answer any questions that do not relate to their immigration status, to the goods 
in their possession, or to the lawful duties of the BSO” (p. 4). Given participants from Windsor-
Essex County did not state any objections regarding this line of questioning, seemed to consider 
questions about location abroad a routine and legal line of questioning, and, indeed, appear to 
readily provide answers to these questions, it is doubtful that Canadian residents are even aware 
that their Charter rights are potentially being violated by officers. This is another finding that 
should be of interest to CBSA given Charter violations often contribute to dismissals in criminal 
court cases in Canada. Such findings also potentially suggest that border-related law and human 
rights legislation have not been properly promulgated to Canadian residents in the Windsor 
borderland. 
 While members of travelling publics overwhelmingly stated the majority of their 
interactions with BSOs at ports of entry in Windsor were positive and professional, participants 
considered several types of interactions to be negative. These negative interactions fell into a 
number of distinct categories: 1) aggressive or unnecessary questioning by officers, 2) officers 
presenting a rude or unfriendly demeanor, 3) harassment by officers about purchases made 
abroad, 4) officers unfairly or incorrectly applying policies, 5) being subjected to unnecessary 
examinations, and 6) enforcement actions resulting in the seizure of purchased goods. 
Complaints regarding unnecessary questioning by officers were usually attributed to officers 
“just having a bad day”, and as aberrations in an otherwise smooth border-crossing experience. 
For example, Charles, a 30-year-old accountant, stated: 
Some officers – when they have bad days – will be short and ask for things that 
they may not need. Or have extra-long questioning. Or search your vehicle even 
though you said you didn’t purchase anything. I can’t think of a very specific 
example because I don’t cross all that much anymore and it hasn’t happened in a 
long while. Just they have a general attitude sometimes of, ‘I’m in charge, don’t 
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fuck with me!’ You know, ‘You’re going to do what I say!’ And they don’t do 
anything to make you feel at ease. 
 
According to Charles, the majority of negative interactions with officers can be excused by the 
assumption that the officer is simply having a bad day on the job (and is taking out frustrations 
on travellers). In this sense, negative interactions are not necessarily the result of, for instance, 
inadequate training or lack of proper supervision, but rather are simply one-off outliers explained 
completely through the lens of officer personal psychology. Complaints regarding officers 
presenting a rude or unfriendly demeanor were usually minor, ranging from officers not giving 
greetings, not comforting anxious first-time travellers, refusing to explain to travellers the 
customs process, and confronting travellers in an aggressive manner when performing vehicle 
searches. One traveller, Jennifer – a 58-year-old self-employed bookkeeper – recounted a 
particularly negative experience at length in which she and her boyfriend were stopped at 
primary inspection, accused of being intoxicated, were accused of questioning the BSO’s 
authority and knowledge whenever they attempted to defend themselves, were subsequently 
swarmed by officers with hands on their firearm holsters as well as a CBSA port vehicle with 
amber lights flashing, and her boyfriend (the driver) was subjected to a demand for a 
breathalyzer test for alcohol (which ultimately registered far below the legal limit).26 Jennifer 
(the passenger) was also accused of being intoxicated despite not operating the vehicle. Jennifer 
emphasized the rude demeanor of the primary officer and other officers involved. After her 
boyfriend ultimately passed the approved screening device (breathalyzer) test, the officer 
inquired further about purchases the couple had made, leading to a further negative encounter:  
                                                 
26 It is important to note this incident occurred prior to changes in the Criminal Code of Canada in 2019 allowing 
Canadian peace officers to conduct demands for breath samples without the necessity for indicators of intoxication 
and also reasonable and probable grounds. At the time this incident occurred, the Criminal Code and case law 




And the other thing is that we had $40 worth of groceries. And [my boyfriend] 
admitted, ‘We have $40 worth of groceries and half a case of beer.’ And then the 
guy yelled, ‘Next time – leave the alcohol over there!’ And slammed the window. 
And [my boyfriend] is like, ‘How can he tell me what to buy and what not to 
buy?’ Like it was just a nightmare. 
 
In addition to performing a questionable demand for breath sample, Jennifer was also disturbed 
by the fact the officer overstepped his official duties in lecturing the couple about purchases they 
had made abroad. While most complaints about officer demeanor were minor in nature, 
Jennifer’s case was an extreme and traumatizing example that she stated has subsequently caused 
her boyfriend to avoid travelling outside of Canada (in fear of what will happen when he 
returns). 
Interestingly, other travellers also reported negative interactions in the form of officers 
lecturing them about purchases made abroad. Such interactions typically involved a BSO 
overstepping their official taxation and inspection duties by lecturing members of travelling 
publics about where they should and should not be shopping (in addition to stating personal 
economic beliefs). For instance, Peter, a 30-year-old teacher, stated: 
I went shopping in Detroit with some friends for groceries. And we were coming 
back with like $120 of groceries total in the car. And the officer starts asking us 
questions and then after we told him about the groceries he started lecturing us 
about how we should be buying groceries in Canada and supporting the Canadian 
economy rather than buying in the US. And I got really pissed off. I was driving 
the car and I had to bite my tongue not to tell him back, ‘That’s none of your 
business!’  
 
Peter ultimately found statements related to his groceries made by the BSO to be a violation of 
his privacy rights and potentially an overstep of officer official duties. Rodger, a 37-year-old 
pastor, similarly reported an instance in which an officer lectured him about not making 
purchases from the Ambassador Bridge Duty Free Store given the officer involved did not 
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support the viewpoints and activities of the owner of the Bridge and the Store.27 Ultimately, 
Rodger recounted that the officer: “…basically told me not to purchase stuff at the Duty Free – 
like get it somewhere else in Detroit. Don’t support the business there.” Rodger’s retelling of the 
incident was particularly disturbing given his story involved a Canadian federal officer 
attempting to intervene directly in free enterprise occurring completely outside of the BSO’s 
jurisdiction (in this case, on the American side of the Ambassador Bridge) and in reaction to 
personal prejudices. Such findings should also cause alarm to CBSA given one major BSO duty 
and agency mandate is to: “facilitate the free flow of persons and goods… that meet all 
requirements under the program legislation” (CBSA 2011a). Analysis of BSO training 
documents, CBSA manuals, online corporate documentation, and other documents examined as 
part of the content and thematic analyses associated with this study revealed no mention of any 
enabling legislation or mandate permitting officers to state personal, editorial, economic and 
social beliefs or to criticize Canadian residents for their economic practices or purchases made 
abroad. 
 When members of travelling publics were asked in interviews to estimate how much 
training (of about 900 total hours of initial training) officers receive regarding interacting or 
communicating with the public, the vast majority of participants (over 70%) made estimates of 
between 50 and 450 or greater hours (with the mode between 50 and 100 hours of training). Few 
made estimates of under 10 hours (6%). About 24% of participants stated they either believed 
                                                 
27 Manuel (“Matty”) Moroun is the billionaire owner of the Ambassador Bridge Company, which owns Ambassador 
Bridge as well as Duty Free stores located on Bridge property. His company has critiqued CBSA and US CBP in the 
past for what they deem to be improper officer staffing levels causing traffic backups on the Bridge. The company 
has also criticized the US and Canadian governments for delaying its plans to build a twin span next to Ambassador 
Bridge. For more details, please see Joann Muller’s (2012) Financial Post column entitled “Why one rich man 




communicating with the public to be an intrinsic skill or that officers likely learn public 
interaction skills on the frontline. When participants were subsequently presented with findings 
from Lalonde (2017:14)28 that less than 1% of all BSO formative training focuses on 
communication and interactions, most participants (predictably) expressed shock and confusion 
over the low total, often asking the researcher to explain what information is therefore included 
in training. One participant – Amelia, a 51-year-old government employee in an agency outside 
of CBSA – was particularly confused:  
I mean, [I work] for the government. We were specifically trained on how to – we 
had six weeks of training on this is how you deal with people. We’re not customer 
service. But we also had to learn the laws and everything as well. But they 
literally trained us on how to say things to people, because you’re not customer 
service. You have certain ways you have to say stuff, and it’s not an easy 
approach to call people up and say, [quote redacted to protect identity of 
participant]. So they trained us how to do it. I would think it would be the same 
idea with border officers, but apparently not. 
 
Amelia proceeded to indicate to the researcher that the vast majority of her public service 
training was related to interacting with members of publics. Such findings suggest that training 
levels related to interaction training vary widely between individual government agencies in 
regular contact with publics. Given knowledge supplied by residents of the Windsor-Essex 
County region identifies various negative interactions with officers, the apparent violation of 
Canadian residents’ Charter rights through improper questioning techniques, and perceptions of 
officers as potentially complacent or lazy in their lack of questioning and examination of 
travellers, it is perhaps time CBSA considers expanding interaction training to reaffirm agency 
mandates and address gaps between federal policy and localized officer practices on the 
frontline. This will be explored further below. 
 
                                                 
28 This article is reproduced as Chapter 3 “Border Officer Training in Canada: Identifying Organizational 





BSO Interaction Narratives 
 
Interviews with BSOs currently or formerly employed at ports of entry in Windsor tended 
to reinforce much of the knowledge generated from interviews with Windsor-Essex County 
publics. Much like members of travelling publics, BSOs stated that the majority of frontline 
interactions are professional and polite in nature. BSOs regularly noted in interviews that they 
did not recall receiving any specific formative training on interacting with the public. Officers 
occasionally mentioned that they did receive training on “de-escalating” potentially combative 
travellers as well as training on interrogation and questioning, but indicated such sessions did not 
contain specific information on social interactions generally. BSO 001 provided an explanation 
for lack of training: 
They don’t really teach you how to deal with the public, if that makes sense? I 
think they rely on the fact that you should be mature and you should have enough 
common sense that you should be personable enough to talk to people and be able 
to figure it out… I think the [agency’s] reliance on your own self-learning to 
figure shit out and how to talk to people is also problematic. It is. I mean, I don’t 
know a great way to train someone how to diffuse a difficult situation, but a lot of 
it’s kind of put on the person like, ‘Strap on a pair and see what you can do!’ 
 
In this sense, BSO 001 summarizes lack of officer training on social interactions as being related 
to CBSA’s assumption that such interactions are simply common sense and that BSOs should be 
able to figure out their own methods for interacting with publics. Most officers also reinforced 
assumptions made by Lalonde (2019)29 that officers are expected to learn best practices on the 
frontline of enforcement. Additionally, while officers confirmed that the two major manuals 
controlling officer behaviour are the CBSA Code of Conduct and the CBSA People Processing 
Manual, BSOs further confirmed findings from Lalonde (2019) that these documents contain 
                                                 
29 This article is reproduced as Chapter 3 “Border Officer Training in Canada: Identifying Organizational 
Governance Technologies” within this thesis. 
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little actual information on how officers should interact with travellers. BSO 007 stated he was 
asked to familiarize himself with the People Processing Manual during his formative training, 
however: “There’s not so much by way of guidelines on what to say and how to say it – in so 
much as this is the expectations for people dealing with CBSA. So it’s not very explicit.” BSO 
002 similarly concluded: “There are guidelines in terms of how to process documentation or 
process previous seizures or whatever. There are guidelines about programs. That’s basically 
what they are entirely focused on – programs. It isn’t about people or dealing with people at all.” 
According to interviewed BSOs, CBSA manuals and procedures are almost entirely focused on 
“how to” guides for enforcement actions, with little information provided on expectations for 
frontline social interactions. 
Findings from Lalonde (2017:14) indicated that of the approximately 900 hours of 
formative training BSOs received as part of Port of Entry Recruitment Training program (and the 
newer OITP), only about 4.5 hours (0.6% of all training) are spent instructing officers on how to 
interact with members of travelling publics. The majority of this training was found to be 
concerned with “special cases”, including processing travellers with disabilities, victims of 
trafficking, and suspected abducted children (Lalonde 2019:14). BSO 003 echoed findings 
reached in Lalonde (2017:15) that current BSO interaction training focuses almost exclusively on 
intelligence-gathering and enforcement-related activities, and therefore leaves officers ill-
prepared for the “facilitation” (CBSA 2018e:8), non-enforcement, humanitarian side of border 
work: 
Especially with our new kids – that’s why they need mentoring from veteran 
officers… ‘Oh, you have dog food in the car. CFIA says you must have your pet 
with you. I’m sending you back’… What’s the big deal? What’s the important 
part of enforcement there? Is education better? You know, instead you can go, ‘If 
you come through you are supposed to have your pet with you. Ok? Alright. Have 
a nice day’… We still get people, you know, ‘Mom just got brought into the 
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hospital.’ And they’re coming back to deal with them. Do you really need to hold 
those people up and ask them how much currency they’re carrying? No. ‘Good 
luck with your mom. I hope everything works out for you.’ ‘I’m sorry for your 
loss.’ You know? It’s just the simple touches. And because our newer people are 
drilled in Rigaud, you know, ‘You have ten minutes to do a primary and you must 
ask these questions’ – they forget that there are human beings coming through the 
border and how to treat them as such. 
 
In addition to highlighting agency priorities surrounding interrogation and enforcement and 
subsequent lack of training on humanitarian interactions, this answer also illustrates that veteran 
officers have learned to not conduct full primary inspections (contrary to CBSA policies and 
procedures) at their own discretion in compassion-related situations. This suggests that, as 
Lalonde (2019) indicates, officers may be developing their own collective priorities and methods 
for interacting with the public on the frontline that are irreducible (and incompatible) with 
lessons learned in formative training. An account provided by BSO 002 detailed a disturbing 
incident involving witnessing a supervisor mistreating a refugee claimant at a port of entry, 
providing evidence that even veteran officers may also be ill-trained and unprepared in terms of 
handling the humanitarian, non-enforcement side of frontline border interactions: 
When we went to the supervisor and said we both had to work the claimant… she 
was all pissed off because she was losing two officers who needed to go work 
[primary inspection] lines the next hour. And the supervisor… started yelling and 
screaming and pointing at this poor guy and asking, ‘You think you can come to 
my fucking country and steal all our fucking jobs and benefits?’ And the more she 
yelled the more this guy just cowered in fear. She broke him down as a man. And 
we cried for him (myself and the other officer). We literally cried for him. I mean, 
this guy thought he was coming to Canada to start a new life, and was fleeing 
whatever persecution or danger or whatever in his home country. And this is how 
he is greeted to Canada? I always keep that in the back of my mind now when 
dealing with people. I felt so bad for that guy. It wasn’t right at all. 
 
The fact that BSO 002 was so disturbed and was brought to tears by this particular incident 
reveals how gross and inhumane the actions of the supervisor were in terms of handling a 
refugee claimant potentially requiring extra sensitivity and care (rather than accusation and 
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condemnation). Rather surprisingly to the researcher, a few of the officers who participated in 
this study also expressed similar frustrations to those identified by travellers in terms of personal 
interactions they have had when crossing the border as civilians (outside of their uniform) and 
interacting with fellow officers (i.e. their co-workers) at primary inspection. For instance, BSO 
005 recounted an interaction in which her freedom of mobility and freedom of association 
Charter rights were violated by a fellow officer: 
[New officers] are really bad with, ‘What was the purpose of your trip?’ [And I 
respond] ‘business’ or ‘pleasure’. That’s the only answer you have to give them. 
And they’re not picking up on those cues. They’re not picking up that somebody 
knows their rights when they respond, ‘Pleasure’. And that was the [problem] I 
had with this girl. Because she asked me and I said, ‘Pleasure.’ And she said, 
‘Well where did you go?’ ‘Well that’s none of your business.’ And she lost it. She 
freaked out on me. And that’s what I said to her – you should have been satisfied 
with my answer that I was away for pleasure. She goes, ‘Well I need to know 
where you went so I can know if you bought anything.’ And I said, ‘Well you 
didn’t even ask me if I bought anything’… And so after all that everybody had 
calmed down and her next question was, ‘Who did you meet?’ Again, none of 
your business. She was such a witch.  
 
While BSO 005 knew that CBSA policies and Charter rights dictate that officers must only ask 
secondary intrusive questions after gaining suspicions following mandatory primary questions 
(and BSO 005 could articulate this to the officer involved), findings from above indicate that 
members of travelling publics are generally unaware of these restrictions and often answer 
invasive questions without protest. Again, such findings should be troubling to CBSA given 
criminal court cases could be dismissed in instances where Charter rights have been violated. 
The quote above should provide particular cause for concern for CBSA given findings generated 
through interviews with members of publics concerning Charter right violations were 
corroborated by BSOs in recounting interactions with their own colleagues. 
 Finally, several BSO participants in this study pointed out the potential dangers in terms 
of officers not learning interaction skills during formative training and instead exclusively 
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learning best practices on the frontline. BSO 007 articulated these dangers to the researcher in 
what the participant referred to as “parroting”. When a new officer arrives at a port of entry and 
has not been provided with education concerning best practices during formative training in 
Rigaud, Quebec, the officer can be susceptible to emulating the behaviours of just one officer. 
Rather than participating in critical analysis (which could potentially be informed by formative 
training, if it existed) and watching, listening to, and learning best practices from a variety of 
veteran officers, new recruits have the tendency to strictly learn how to interact with travellers 
from just one or two officers. This is particularly a problem, according to BSO 007, when new 
officers are paired by CBSA with just one or two “shadow” officers who supervise and guide 
their activities when they initially arrive at their assigned port of entry. BSO 007 stated: 
What I would always say to people is try very hard to work with different people 
when you start out. You’re going to be drawn to people that, you know, they 
appear captivating or I really like how that person carries themselves. Regardless 
of those temptations, force yourself to work with different people. That’s number 
one. Number two, and related to the first piece of advice, is don’t try to emulate 
one person and say, you know, Patrick is a really good officer so I’d really like to 
work exactly like Pat. Try really hard to take the things you like about Pat, the 
things you like about Bob, the things you like about Mark, and make your own 
style. Try not to parrot, but try to develop your own style based on the best things 
you see and the worst things you see… What we’re seeing out of some (not all) 
new recruits is that they [receive] this basic set of in-service training from just one 
or two people… Well that whole group of people who just started work is at the 
mercy of this one person’s individual style… [And] when you’re coming in on 
your first day, you’re sitting there saying, ‘Wow, this is the person that [the 
agency] thought to put as their face. There must be some credibility here.’ And 
[recruits] take that too literally (in my opinion). 
 
According to the participant, rookie officers mistakenly believe their shadows are the 
face of the agency and are therefore teaching them best practices. This is particularly a 
danger when officers are only paired with one or two examples out of the entire pool of 
officers working at a port of entry (with differing levels of training, frontline experience, 
and so forth). 
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In short, officers participating in this study provided official frontline knowledge that 
confirmed much of the non-official knowledge supplied by members of travelling publics in the 
Windsor borderland. In turn, official and non-official frontline knowledge provides a serious 
challenge to the official and institutional discourses located in CBSA training modules, policies, 
manuals, and corporate documents in terms of officers acting within the laws of Canada and the 
mandate of the agency while also acting as service providers to “clients”, maintaining 
professionalism, managing personal emotions, and so forth. Frontline official and non-official 
knowledge gleaned from interview data suggests several activities – officers not conducting full 
primary inspections, violating freedom of mobility Charter rights, lecturing travellers about 
goods purchased abroad, instances of officers not managing personal emotions and yelling at 
travellers (and, in one case, a refugee claimant) – that are irreducible to institutional discourses 
regarding frontline interactions identified above. Frontline knowledge suggests that serious legal, 
human rights, and policy deviations are occurring in the Windsor borderland, and further 
suggests that a substantial gap exists within CBSA between its nationalized formative training 
model and the localized frontline practices of officers.  
While one might be tempted to “see” aforementioned findings as simple aberrations, 
instead such instances may actually be considered symptomatic of broader power trends in terms 
of the spread of neoliberal risk-management forms of governance. The present neoliberal 
socioeconomic order seeks to tame various uncertainties (generated as a result of modernity) in 
order to spur innovation and economic development. In order to tame uncertainties, data must be 
collected and analyzed toward predicting the future (Aradau and van Munster 2007). In terms of 
the problem of securitization and mobility governance, various surveillance technologies 
proliferate to collect information on individuals, collate information and databases, and analyze 
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information toward predicting riskiness and pre-empting potential threats (Ericson 2007). As risk 
logics spread through government departments, private corporations, and other organizations, 
risk-management schemes also spread in order to manage uncertainty and pre-empt threats. Such 
trends have been well-documented in the interdisciplinary border literature (see for example 
Amoore 2011; Amoore 2013; Amoore and Hall 2009; Amoore and Raley 2017; Broeders and 
Hampshire 2013). These trends have also been well-documented in the work of Muller (2010a; 
2010b; 2011; 2013). Subsequent shifts in agency mandates (highlighted in Lalonde 2019 in the 
case of CBSA) increasingly reconceptualizes a generally law-abiding public as a potentially 
dangerous, criminal, and terroristic public as surveillance mechanisms proliferate to “know” 
individuals; collect, collate, and analyze data; and govern their mobility according to risk. 
In terms of border and mobility governance, risk-management schemes push surveillance 
technologies away from the border to an ever-increasing variety of unofficial (non-government) 
sites. Risks are pre-empted and prevented from becoming mobile at sites far in advance of the 
sovereign limits of states (see for example Walters 2006b; Johnson et al. 2011). Those who do 
reach the limits of the sovereign state (i.e. traditional sovereign borders) are increasingly 
governed through pre-emptive risk information contained in databases. As such, digitized risk 
information becomes the dominant method through which officers police the mobility of subjects 
of governance. Securitization, intelligence, and risk become dominant features of border work to 
support the neoliberal control of migration governance efforts. Other considerations – issues 
related to lack of officer training in terms of frontline social interactions, instances of officer 
abuse of powers, instances of human rights violations in officer questioning, and lack of training 
in the “facilitation” side of border work (i.e. communication, de-escalation, community 
engagement, educating the public, dealing with sick or disabled travellers, and so forth) – are 
134 
 
incompatible with (and irrelevant to) modes of governance (and associated technologies) utilized 
as part of neoliberal risk-management practices. As such, these “aberrations” may actually be 
understood as part of a larger trend shifting border work from human-to-human interviews to a 
form of “cyborg work” (Bogard 1996) predicated on digitized, pre-emptive risk information 
contained in electronic databases and utilized by officers in making determinations. It is no 
wonder then that a slippage exists between institutional discourses and frontline practices given 
the increased emphasis on pre-emptively policing a public increasingly conceptualized as risky, 
dangerous, and threatening under neoliberal risk-management schemes. 
2. The Local Nature of Borders and Borderlands  
As recent research suggests, borders are anything but uniform spaces of security. 
Increasingly, evidence suggests that borders have broken through their former physical locations 
at the geographical limits of the sovereign state and have since metastasized to an ever-
increasing swath of social life. Institutional discourses within CBSA promote additional pre-
emptive measures designed to push risk assessments away from physical borders, allowing the 
agency to identify and intercept risks in advance of ports of entry, subsequently allowing officers 
to focus attention on a decreased number of high-risk cases arriving at physical borders (see for 
example CBSA 2016f:19). When participants were asked how they define “the border”, 
members of travelling publics regularly presented borders in one of three ways: 1) as a 
geographical line separating nations (particularly the United States and Canada), 2) as specific 
ports of entry, and 3) as a metaphysical division between Canadian and American ideologies. 
Knowledge of borders as geographical lines and also as specific ports of entry was found to be 
heavily influenced by the borderland in which participants live and work. For instance, 
participants frequently mentioned the Ambassador Bridge and Detroit-Windsor Tunnel ports 
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specifically in their definitions. A few participants also mentioned other geographically close 
ports of entry, including the Blue Water Bridge between Sarnia, Ontario and Port Huron, 
Michigan, and the Peace Bridge between Fort Erie, Ontario and Buffalo, New York. Participants 
rarely mentioned international airports in definitions of borders as ports of entry, instead citing 
land ports of entry the majority of the time. Such definitions are likely informed by the fact 
Windsor residents regularly travel across land borders to use the Detroit Metropolitan Wayne 
County Airport (DTW) to travel abroad rather than the nearest major Canadian international 
airport, namely Pearson International Airport (YYZ) in Toronto. 30  
 Border services officers participating in this study offered similar knowledge concerning 
the nature of borders. Generally, definitions provided identified borders as: 1) a geographical line 
separating Canada and the United States, 2) non-specific ports of entry, and 3) also including the 
vast expanse between official ports of entry. Officers were far less likely than travellers to name 
specific ports of entry, instead pointing out various types of crossings (i.e. land, air, and sea) as 
well as large expanses where ports do not exist. This is likely due to the fact that official 
knowledge (gleaned from formative training, ongoing training, communications from CBSA, 
and interactions with other officers across Canada) supersedes any potential geographical bias 
officers might have. For instance, BSO 003 stated: 
It hurts me to say this but “the border” in a customs and immigration CBSA realm 
is the individual permanent border crossing stations manned by CBSA and US 
CBP on the opposite side. That huge expanse in between official border points - 
doesn’t exist to us. It’s not our purview. It’s not our concern. Even though – from 
my marine [enforcement] time – knowing that illegal immigration is taking place 
there. Smuggling is taking place – of people and goods. I know that CBSA’s order 
is that the port of entry is the border. Everything else doesn’t exist. 
 
                                                 
30 DTW is 36km away, which is a short 30-minute drive from the Canada/US border. YYZ (352km away and a 
comparatively longer 3.5-hour drive) likely rarely entered definitions as a port of entry due to lack of geographical 
proximity and use by Windsor residents. 
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BSO 003 demonstrates a more nuanced understanding of the nature of borders when compared to 
members of travelling publics by also highlighting largely unpoliced spaces between official 
ports of entry. Indeed, the Customs and Immigration Union (CIU) – the union that represents all 
BSOs in Canada – recently called on the Government of Canada and CBSA to expand the duties 
of officers to also include patrols of the land between official ports of entry (see CBC News 
2018)31. Other officers highlighted that Windsor ports of entry are treated as “special cases” 
within CBSA given the uniquely high volume of travellers and commercial goods officers must 
process daily within the region. Relatedly, BSO 002 challenged current training practices as not 
reflective of local realities: 
Now [training is] basically ‘from seat to street’. They go straight from Rigaud to 
the frontline. And what I learned during my integration period (and what they 
don’t learn now) is that there is a big difference between port policies and federal 
policy. Port policies are what you use on a daily basis. I would tell [rookies] to 
forget all the shit they tell you in Rigaud and just listen to and watch senior 
officers. People in Ottawa designing federal policies haven’t ever even worked 
line / curb so they have no idea what they’re talking about. 32 
 
According to BSO 002, federal policies are often out-of-touch in terms of comprehending and 
reflecting the localized realities of specific ports of entry. The fact this BSO recommends rookie 
officers should simply disregard all information they learned in Rigaud highlights the extreme 
nature of the gap BSOs perceive between federal policy and local realities. Several other officers 
also emphasized the local realities of border work as deviating substantially from institutional 
discourses gleaned from training, policies, and manuals developed at the national level. BSO 005 
challenged national policies regarding maintaining a “client-service” orientation on the frontline: 
                                                 
31 This duty is currently performed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. 
32 “Line / curb” is a colloquial term used by officers to describe working on the frontline and rotating between 
primary inspection (“line”) and secondary inspection (“curb”) every hour. Curb is derived from the notion that 
secondary inspection areas have sidewalks (featuring curbs) that members of travelling publics stand on while their 
vehicles are being examined.  
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[Ottawa is still] about very kind service without looking at where we’ve gone. 
And it might work at other border crossings – it might work at other ports. Port 
policy was a big thing when I went to Rigaud. It was, ‘Everybody does it this way 
except for you guys in Windsor.’ Because we were a bigger port – we did things 
differently. And we still do. And national policy doesn’t always work. And I think 
we still have a lot of old-school managers who still are from the old days and still 
believe in ‘the customer is always right’ mentality. We’re not Home Depot! 
<laughs>. 
 
In this sense, national policies related to social interactions with members of travelling publics 
(the “customer is always right” mentality) may be incompatible with the high-volume localized 
realities of Windsor ports of entry handling millions of travellers every year. BSO 010 even 
suggested that his social interactions with travellers are informed more by local borderland 
demographics than the national, uniform model of interactions provided by CBSA policymakers:  
One thing I would say is that our training basically assumes everyone is the same. 
Like, ‘Ok sir / mam, I understand you are upset. Let me explain why this is 
happening.’ Well, that’s not going to work with everyone, you know? Some 
people you have to speak at their level, you know? Especially in Windsor – we 
have a lot of inner-city people crossing. And when you’re trying to be all 
officious with them, it just doesn’t resonate… Sometimes you have to adapt the 
language to fit the situation and to build rapport with the client. And that 
sometimes means if I notice the guy is dropping an F-bomb every four words 
(because that’s normal to them), then I’d drop a couple F-bombs too… But 
obviously the agency wouldn’t really support us swearing around clients because 
it’s not ‘professional’ or whatever. Well, acting ‘professionally’ doesn’t always 
work, you know? And it isn’t applicable to every port – the demographics of 
Windsor is different than like the East Coast or BC or whatever. 
 
Accordingly, it is apparent that the social interaction “toolbox” provided to officers by 
CBSA is also incompatible with the demographic and socioeconomic realities of the 
Windsor borderland, thus presenting potential language and comprehension problems 
between BSOs and the local publics they serve. Again, such findings indicate that 
Lalonde (2019) is correct in assuming that officers likely develop their own collective 
methods (irreducible to formative training) for processing members of travelling publics 
at ports of entry. 
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 Together, geographically-specific definitions offered by members of travelling publics 
and geographically non-specific definitions provided by officers illustrates a gulf between non-
official and official knowledge in terms of the nature of borders. If officer definitions are any 
indication of how CBSA “sees” borders, there is a vast difference between the abstracted and 
non-geographically specific ports of entry and vast borderless “wastelands” of the agency and 
the geographically specific and named ports of entry as understood by travellers. Such findings 
could potentially inform how CBSA and the Government of Canada articulate border security, 
customs and immigration policy changes, and other related concerns to the public. Offering 
region-specific information rather than simply articulating information using a one-size-fits-all 
Canada-wide approach may be beneficial in terms of relating with borderland publics.  
Additionally, findings generated from interviews with officers in this study reflect 
findings from Côté-Boucher (2013) in terms of BSOs perceiving a substantial gap between the 
institutional discourses located in agency training, policies, manuals, and corporate documents, 
and the official frontline knowledge of officers charged with enforcing agency mandates at ports 
of entry. Such findings illustrate a need for CBSA to seriously consider how it will address local 
borderland realities and differences in terms of providing formative training designed to prepare 
officers for frontline work. When combined with frontline knowledge suggesting that serious 
legal, human rights, and policy deviations are occurring in the Windsor borderland, one can 
readily see there exists a substantial gap within CBSA between its nationalized, one-size-fits all 






Conclusion and Discussion 
While this study has limitations in that its convenience samples are not representative of 
the entire population of officers or members of various travelling publics in the Windsor-Essex 
County region, and also in terms of the researcher not having direct access to analyze actual 
frontline interactions occurring between officers and publics on the frontline, the findings 
nonetheless demonstrate how non-official knowledge can be used to call into question 
institutional discourses, programs, policies, and technologies of governance promulgated by state 
knowledge-makers. In conducting in-depth interviews with members of travelling publics and 
BSOs in the Windsor-Essex County region and examining interaction narrative knowledge 
generated through perceptions on past social interactions occurring between BSOs and publics 
circulating through ports of entry, the findings of this study point to several troubling realities 
within the Windsor borderland that demarcate a substantial gulf between institutional knowledge 
and frontline official and non-official knowledge. In totality, the findings presented above 
confirm many of the findings from Lalonde’s (2017) examination of CBSA training documents, 
manuals, and other documents, including, for example: 1) a severe lack of officer frontline social 
interaction training; 2) the necessity of and dangers associated with officers learning best-
practices on the frontline rather than in the classroom; 3) the notion that officers are almost 
exclusively trained in interactions designed to facilitate eliciting confessions, gathering 
intelligence, and completing enforcement duties, and are ill-trained in terms of handling the 
“facilitative”, humanitarian, non-enforcement, and non-securitized side of frontline border 
interactions; and 4) existing agency and government policies provide few details in terms of how 
officers should or must interact with travellers in performing their frontline duties. 
Aforementioned findings have also indicated new areas for research as well as CBSA and 
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Government of Canada attention in terms of: 1) Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
violations in terms of officers posing secondary intrusive questions as a matter of routine before 
they have posed mandatory primary questions or gained suspicions as a result of answers made 
by travellers, 2) the perception that BSOs are potentially complacent or lazy as evidenced by 
interactions in which officers do not perform a complete primary inspection and then release the 
traveller, 3) negative interactions involving officer abuse of authority related to: a) aggressive or 
unnecessary questioning, b) generally rude or unfriendly demeanor, and c) harassing travellers 
about purchases made abroad (including issuing editorial comments outside of the scope of BSO 
duties), and 4) the existence of local borderland realities and differences. Aforementioned 
findings should be particularly important to Canadian citizens and residents in light of the 
Trudeau Liberal Government’s promise to form an external-review body for Canada Border 
Services Agency, and in light of The Canadian Press recently publishing a series of articles 
highlighting the variety of complaints filed by travellers against BSOs and CBSA (see Tutton 
2018). 
Findings ultimately suggest that additional or remedial training regarding interactions 
with members of travelling publics may be necessary in order for CBSA and the Government of 
Canada to ensure officers are completing their duties within the mandates of the agency and 
according to the laws of Canada (particularly pertaining to the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms). Additionally, findings suggest that various officer misconduct issues and human 
rights abuses may be symptomatic of broader socioeconomic trends and governance models 
based on neoliberal risk-management schemes. As such, officers are increasingly tasked with 
using pre-emptive risk information derived from a variety of sources and collated in databases in 
policing the mobility of publics increasingly constructed as risky, dangerous, and threatening 
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within neoliberal risk-management forms of governance. When risk is propelled to the forefront 
of officer work and decision-making, significant slippage can occur in terms of officer conduct 
and also the maintenance of human rights (which become irrelevant concerns under risk-
management forms of governance). Additionally, when combined with findings concerning the 
local realities of the Windsor borderland, the aforementioned results suggest that CBSA should 
explore including some local, port-specific formative training within its Officer Induction 
Training Program rather than attempting to strictly administer all training using a national, 
uniform, one-size-fits-all approach at the CBSA College in Rigaud, Quebec. Given regional 
differences in the nature of social life as well as unique demographics and complexities 
surrounding individual ports of entry across Canada, it is doubtful that the current incarnation of 
the national training program captures the intricate realities of individual and geographically 
disparate borderlands. As such, it is also doubtful frontline officers are provided with a complete 
toolkit for handling the range of social realities and social interactions found at individual ports 
of entry, ultimately leaving it up to BSOs to learn and develop their own best practices over time. 
Informal frontline learning strategies are questionable given knowledge concerning frontline 
abuses of power and human rights violations presented in this study. Future research should 
continue the work of considering how non-official and official frontline knowledge and the 
intricacies of local borderlands call into question institutional discourses and current governance 
practices related to borders, border security, and mobility governance. Additional research 
should also consider how institutional discourses surrounding increased technologization of 
border governance practices differ from localized official and non-official frontline knowledge, 
as well as potentially further intensifying the apparent gulf (identified by Lalonde 2019 and in 
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this study) in the ability of BSOs to successfully interact with travelling publics in both 
securitized and non-securitized moments on the frontline. 33 
 



































                                                 





Cyborg Work: Borders as Simulation34 
Much recent research has focused on examining various binary contradictions and 
employing metaphors pertaining to border security. Ultimately, this article argues 
that existing debates and metaphors are inadequate in describing what is understood 
and agreed upon in the literature in terms of borders. This article proposes a 
refinement of existing theory for contemporary borders, employing Baudrillard 
(1981) concept of ‘simulation’. The metaphor of the ‘simulated border’ functions to 
avoid debates surrounding geospatiality while also incorporating aspects of risk 
society and control in concluding that borders are anything but organic security 
environments, with the ‘stretched screens’ (Lyon 2009) of border agents serving to 
produce digitized subjects (Goriunova 2019) that are tested within games of 
security to govern mobility anywhere in time or space. 












                                                 
34 This chapter is derived from an article previously published as: Lalonde, Patrick C. 2018. “Cyborg Work: Borders 




Much of the contemporary literature in the interdisciplinary field of border studies has 
focused attention on the changing nature of borders from several contexts. These shifts have 
been well-documented in relation to the Canadian, United States, and European literature in 
terms of: 1) the development of ‘smart borders’ (see Amoore, Marmura, and Salter 2008; Côté-
Boucher 2008), including examinations of travel documents (Salter 2004; Salter 2006; Sparke 
2006; Lyon 2009; Muller 2009; Salter 2011; McPhail et al. 2012) and the use of biometrics and 
other risk technologies (Amoore 2006; Broeders 2007; Muller 2009; Muller 2010a; and Muller 
2011); 2) examinations of border geospatiality (or lack thereof), including employment of logics 
of “remote control” (Broeders and Hampshire 2013), deterritoralization (Muller 2010a; Mountz 
2011; and Salter and Mutlu 2013), the border as ‘everywhere’ (Lyon 2005), the border as part of 
a continuum also including other enforcement locales (Vaughan-Williams 2010), and as a form 
of visual ‘security performance’ (Rumford 2006; de Lint 2008) pushing security functions 
“beyond the border” away from their traditional geographical limits; and 3) the securitization of 
refugees, irregular migrants, and citizenship (see for example Bigo 2002; Coutin 2005; Coutin 
2010; Dauvergne 2007; Mountz 2008; Salter 2008; Duffield 2010; and McNevin 2010). 
 Various binary debates as well as metaphors have been employed in the literature to 
attempt to explore borders theoretically while also incorporating the aforementioned disparate 
findings. Such metaphors have conceptualized borders as “filters” (Muller 2011) and as 
“firewalls” (Walters 2006a). This article will argue these metaphors have varying levels of 
success in avoiding pitfalls associated with the aforementioned literature, namely being unable to 
reconcile debates in the literature surrounding binary border mandates as well as opposing 
geographical imaginaries. Border binaries also fail in incorporating previous findings related to a 
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harmonized security-economy nexus, notions of risk, and also fall into a “territorial trap” 
(Agnew 1994) that only serves to obscure other research. 
This article ultimately proposes a revised theory and metaphor for contemporary border 
governance toward producing a representation more consistent with what is presently known 
(and agreed upon) in the field of borders and border security. The works of Baudrillard (1981) on 
simulation and Bogard (1996) on the simulation of surveillance will be especially instructive. By 
performing a content analysis of border training documents and manuals obtained via Access to 
Information and Privacy (ATIP) requests filed with Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), 
this article will carry forward the argument that borders proceed as simulations, reducing 
personal narrative to binary data that allows for the governance of mobility and flows via risk 
within societies of control (Deleuze 1995), while also making borders transmutable anywhere 
social life is securitized irrespective of considerations of time and/or space.  
Literature Review 
Border Binaries 
As Newman (2006:176) indicates, notions of difference and “othering” in the form of 
binary pairings (inside versus outside, here versus there, and so forth) characterize much of the 
contemporary border discourse. Many of these binary distinctions have been brought about, as 
Rumford (2006:155) contends, by a renewed theoretical focus on the changing nature of borders 
originating from many of the themes central to contemporary social theory, including 
globalization, cosmopolitanism, networked communities, mobilities, and flows. Parker and 
Vaughan-Williams (2009:584) in citing Derrida (1976) locate the seduction of binaries in their 
ability to produce a sense of security and certainty (pure imaginaries). 
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 Such debates unfold in several zero-sum arguments related to governing borders, 
including: 1) security versus economy, 2) open borders versus closed borders, 3) separating a 
coherent inside from a chaotic outside, and 4) borders as geospatially specific versus borders as 
virtual or diffused. The first three binaries fall apart for two primary reasons. Firstly, recent 
literature suggests that border policies have moved toward coupling security and economic 
concerns not in opposition but rather as a mutually reinforcing (and indistinguishable) pair in the 
form of the security-economy nexus (see for example Coleman 2005; Sparke 2006; Lalonde 
2012; Ashby 2014; and Leese 2016). Secondly, and relatedly, the nearly universal acceptance in 
border literature that risk has come to dominate border policing and mobility governance efforts 
(see for example Muller 2010a; Muller 2011; Aas 2012; Amoore 2013; Broeders and Hampshire 
2013), means binaries as well as distinctions like “open” versus “closed” are replaced by the 
governance of flows via data, which presupposes circulation.  
 The fourth binary requires closer examination. The assertion that borders have moved 
beyond the territorial limits of the sovereign state is well-supported in the literature (i.e. Mountz 
2011; Broeders and Hampshire 2013; Salter and Mutlu 2013). For instance, Broeders and 
Hampshire (2013) discuss the contemporary digitization of the border as a refinement of the 
logic of “remote control”, in which “states project their immigration control measures overseas 
so that they identify and process would-be immigrants well before they arrive at the territorial 
border” (p. 1202). Through such digitization, associated security and control technologies as 
forms of governance have spread away from physical borders, and borders are said to experience 
a concomitant shift from territorial boundaries of states to a potentially infinite number of sites 
(Broeders and Hampshire 2013:1207).  
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The debate surrounding deterritorialization of borders is ultimately an uneasy one. While 
Lyon (2005) (in)famously declares “the border is everywhere”, Vaughan-Williams (2010), for 
instance, concludes that the “offshoring” of borders and security does not necessarily eradicate 
“commonsensical geographical notions about the location of borders” (p. 1074). Vaughan-
Williams demonstrates this by exploring the UK’s configuration of the border as part of a 
“security continuum” that accommodates the continued use of physical borders alongside other 
enforcement locales. Others (Rumford 2006; de Lint 2008) point to the physical border as an 
important site of “security performances” for states wishing to display to their citizenry that they 
have control over the flow of people and goods into and out of a state. In essence then, this 
literature contends that physical borders serve at the very least as sites for “security theatre” 
(Schneier 2006:38 as cited in Zedner 2009:22) in the form of ritualistic shows (or acts) of 
security.  
 Ultimately, it can be concluded that the interdisciplinary study of borders falls into what 
Agnew (1994) refers to as the “territorial trap”, or “the set of geographical assumptions that have 
combined to obscure the historicity and mutability of political space and territory” (Walters 
2006a:141). In other words, the interdisciplinary obsession with border geospatiality has served 
to obscure research focused on other aspects of borders and security. 
Border Metaphors 
Walters (2006b) cites Balibar’s (2002) notion of the “ubiquity of borders” in suggesting 
that rather than disappearing, borders are actually proliferating and becoming: “‘a grid ranging 
over the new social space’ rather than a line separating it from outside” (Balibar 2002:84-85 as 
cited in Walters 2006b:199). Walters (2006a) develops the firewall metaphor as a possible 
alternative that avoids fixation with notions of geography. Firewalls basically function to identify 
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“risky” (or black-listed) data and subsequently, “Malicious packages are blocked, returned or 
perhaps ‘quarantined’” (Walters 2006a:152). Simultaneously, firewalls allow “green-listed” data 
to move about the network. The firewall also has the ability to examine “grey-listed” (or 
unknown) data and compare it against black-listed data for similarities, making decisions about 
whether to allow or deny the data based on risk. Thus the firewall metaphor allows moving 
beyond notions of borders as “walls” to instead employing a filter logic in which borders 
ultimately aspire not to simply arrest movement, but rather “to produce and distribute both 
mobility and immobility” (Walters 2006a:152).  
Unfortunately, this metaphor only partially explains contemporary borders. Remote 
control implies that risky subjects and commodities are often intercepted by visa offices, airlines, 
commercial carriers, and so forth before they reach physical borders. Firewalls do not function 
via remote control to block packets before they leave their “source location”. Rather, firewalls 
block packets of data at the back end – the gateway of the network – much like physical borders. 
Additionally, the firewall is completely “responsible” for blocking risky data, and third parties 
such as ISPs, businesses, or individuals are largely uninvolved in protecting other third-party 
networks. Furthermore, while borders use databases to analyze risk associated with mostly 
known individuals (developed further below), firewalls must analyze disguised data packets 
against security cases the firewall (or other firewalls) have documented in the past. In short, 
unlike borders, firewalls are largely “flying blind”, without third-party assistance, as they combat 
risks at the gateway of the network exclusively. In trying to avoid issues of geography, Walters 
(2006a) ultimately ends up describing traditional sovereign borders exclusively. 
Muller (2011:104) argues that as governance efforts shift from governing migration 
toward instead governing mobility under neoliberal risk-management strategies, borders should 
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be imagined more as filters rather than as limits. As voluntary risk-management programs such 
as NEXUS in North America become more prevalent, the border begins to act as a filter, 
separating mobilities based on membership rights in what Muller (2010b:80) calls “multi-speed 
citizenship”. The border identifies “safe citizenship” and serves to sort or filter according to an 
individual’s digitized citizenship, or “netizenship” (Muller 2010b:83).  
While the filter metaphor arguably avoids binary oppositions and geographical arguments 
while also adequately representing how trusted trader and traveler programs function, this 
metaphor also only partially explores how borders function to govern mobility. Filters are 
generally designed as membranes used to govern the flow of substances. They act to separate 
unwanted particles that are dissimilar to the desired substance. Other particles are confined 
within the membrane while the desired substance is permitted to flow through to its final 
destination. Filters work to separate different physical properties from each other. They do so by 
being able to interrupt dissimilar particles. Unlike borders, which tend to allow the movement of 
certain levels of risk, filters are low-tech in that they are generally not “programmed” to discern 
between different levels of potentially “risky” particles – they simply act to block all potentially 
risky particles (regardless of their actual risk). When water is filtered, a particle of dirt that poses 
little threat to human health will be blocked just as often as a deadly toxin like lead. Also, similar 
to the firewall metaphor, filters only work where installed and tend to protect a certain reservoir 
or space (inside) from exterior particles (outside), which ignores the use of modern technologies 
of remote control to arrest flows before they can reach filters. 
Risk, Control, and Contemporary Borders 
Beck (1992) noted that society may increasingly be characterized as a “risk society”. Risk 
is defined as “a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced 
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by modernization itself” (Beck 1992:21). While Beck’s analysis is limited to ecological, 
economic, and terroristic threats, Aradau and van Munster (2007) expand on risk society by 
identifying a “dispositif of risk” that “creates a specific relation to the future, which requires the 
monitoring of the future, the attempt to calculate what the future can offer and the necessity to 
control and minimize its potentially harmful effects” (p. 97-98). Risk logics therefore serve to 
link a continuum of a variety of everyday and extraordinary risks ranging from petty crime to 
terrorism, in turn encapsulating large swaths of social life under the umbrella of calculability, 
prediction, and pre-emption (Aradau and van Munster 2007:98). As Ericson (2007) further notes, 
the modern neoliberal economic order is predicated on managing various uncertainties produced 
as a consequence of modernity itself. Risk emerges as a ‘scientific’ way to manage uncertainties 
and produce ‘security' by ascertaining data and knowledge (of various kinds) towards predicting 
the future (and therefore making uncertainties ‘knowable’, controllable, and preventable). As 
Ericson (2007) points out, however, security is a liberal imaginary that can never be perfected. 
Accordingly, “Efforts to convert uncertainty into risk expose the limits of knowledge and extent 
of uncertainty. As a result, security is never an end-state but always a fragile process” (Ericson 
2007:217). This produces forms of counter law I – laws that erode existing laws (i.e. the US 
Patriot Act) – and counter law II – surveillant assemblages – in an effort to constantly enhance 
data collection capabilities, render uncertainties knowable, and calculate risk toward predicting 
the future (Ericson 2007:24). Ericson and Haggerty (1997:117) describe this as an “amplifying 
spiral” of surveillance. Surveillance intrudes previously ‘private’ spaces in order to render 
subjects knowable and calculable in terms of risk. The more surveillance encompasses an ever-
increasing swath of social life, the more uncertainties and insecurities are identified, which only 
produces further need for surveillance to penetrate deeper into social life to manage these 
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additional uncertainties. This process will only continue in an amplifying spiral given that perfect 
security (life without uncertainty) is simply an imaginary and is impossible to achieve – 
particularly in neoliberal societies predicated on uncertainty for economic entrepreneurship and 
risk-taking endeavors.  
Risk logics, according to Ericson (2007) have spread to government departments, police 
agencies, corporations, and even to individuals as self-governing neoliberal consumers of risk 
and risk products. The spread of pre-emptive risk logics in relation to disaster preparedness 
scenarios (for instance) has been well-documented in the literature (see for example Collier 
2008). The spread of risk logics to agencies responsible for border and immigration enforcement 
has also been well-documented in the literature (see for example Amoore and Hall 2009; 
Amoore 2011; Amoore 2013; Broeders and Hampshire 2013; and Amoore and Raley 2017). This 
trend has also been well-documened in the work of Muller (2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2013). 
Similarly, the concept of societies of control (Deleuze 1992) has been well-linked to risk society 
and dispositifs of risk within the interdisciplinary security literature (see for example Adey 2009; 
Hallsworth and Lea 2011; Salter 2013; Lyon 2014; Kaufmann 2016; Hagmann 2017). Walters 
(2006b) specifically links logics of risk employed at modern borders to Deleuze’s (1992) notion 
of control societies (elaborated further below). Disciplinary societies (as described by Foucault 
1975) featured institutional control, employing the prison, the classroom, and the hospital ward 
(for example) as spaces for disciplining the behaviours of individuals and groups. Conversely, 
societies of control govern behaviour in a much more fluid, non-spatio-temporal way. It 
abandons the institutional and spatial governance efforts of disciplinary societies in favour of a 
form of power operating through a ‘digital order’ (Walters 2006b:190). Furthermore, control 
societies abandon the human subject of governance (the individual and the mass) in favour of a 
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digitized and abstract subject – the ‘dividual’ (Walters 2006b:191). Control also effectively 
abandons the ‘soul-training’ of individuals and masses characteristic of disciplinary governance 
in favour of surveillance, data collection and storage, and the construction of the dividual. 
According to Walters, features of control society are readily identifiable in terms of modern 
borders. For instance, efforts to collect pre-emptive data and govern risk have led to the 
‘displacement’ or ‘remote control’ of borders away from the geographical limits of the sovereign 
state to a variety of other places (Walters 2006b:193-194). Additionally, various technologies 
like NEXUS, photo-ID and biometric ‘proximity cards’, and so forth combine to form a control 
assemblage that employs “concepts (e.g. risk), materials which it comprehends as ‘flow’, 
scanners, codes, passwords, security professionals, gateways and databanks” (Walters 
2006b:197). As migrants are reconfigured as coded flows (dividuals), the “border appears [less] 
as threshold or gateway into a nation/society so much as one among many sorting points, nodes 
within a wider, albeit thinner social space” (Walters 2006b:199). Johnson et al. (2011) further 
this notion, documenting how control logics replace disciplinary logics in terms of border 
security, “finitely grading and risk scoring forms of movement” (p. 64). Algorithmic risk models 
designed by mathematicians, software engineers, and computer scientists produce alerts on 
screens of analysts and border officers. “Understood in this way, the writing of the border via 
data and risk scores does not aspire to a virtual border at all, but rather to the capacity to reduce 
the multiplicity and uncertainty of a life to an actionable and realizable security decision” 
(Johnson et al. 2011:64). Risk and control logics are inextricably tied together as features of 





Revising Border Theory 
 Any revised metaphor for borders should be able to accommodate for existing knowledge 
of contemporary borders agreed upon in the interdisciplinary borders and security literature. This 
includes: 1) the work of bordering and related border technologies unfolds at an increasing 
variety of official state sites in addition to unofficial public and private non-state sites (both 
within individual nation states and around the world); 2) traditional physical, sovereign, and 
geographic borders persist and continue to perform various governance functions (regardless of 
the aforementioned developments); 3) borders and mobility are governed by and through the 
calculation and analysis of risk vis-à-vis information contained in databases; 4) borders operate 
by responsibilizing third parties (individuals, airlines, commercial carriers, and so forth) in 
collecting and reporting data on behalf of the state; 5) vis-à-vis the use of databases and 
information in governing risk, borders are inherently part of security continua, working alongside 
other policing and intelligence agencies, enforcement locales, private actors, and so forth in 
producing “security” (however currently conceived); and 6) borders continue to provide the 
function of securitizing and governing various mobilities and flows (of people, financial 
instruments, commercial goods, and so forth).  
 In addition, this revised metaphor must also consider borders within the context of 
governance. The literature has undoubtedly established borders as technologies of governance 
(see for example O’Connor and de Lint 2009; Pratt 2010; Aas 2012; Rygiel 2012a) including as 
tools in biopolitical governance (Rygiel 2010; Vaughan-Williams 2010). Governmentality 
analyses consider just what rationalities – styles of thinking and ways of rendering reality 
thinkable – and technologies – assemblages of persons, techniques, and institutions – are 
employed for the purposes of governing conduct (Miller and Rose 2008:16). In terms of 
154 
 
biopolitics – or the governance of life itself – borders function not by simply isolating and 
enclosing individuals to execute disciplinary power over them, but rather function to permit 
circulation, flow, and movement while identifying and cancelling out dangerous circulations 
(Vaughan-Williams 2010:1078). As such, biopolitical borders are seen as conforming to 
characteristics of Deleuze’s (1995) control society, in which governance is no longer confined to 
institutions (as was characteristic of disciplinary societies) but rather is increasingly “more 
supple, dispersed, and nebulous” (Walters 2002:574).  
Social Simulacra 
While early social interactionists like Erving Goffman posited that social interaction and 
indeed social life unfolds within “theatres” as if one is examining actors on a stage, Baudrillard 
(1981) argues instead that the theatre has been displaced by what he calls “the satellization of the 
real” (Baudrillard 1981:149). Whereas theatre is employed to feign or dissimilate reality, 
simulation instead serves to employ logics of control alongside abandoning distinctions between 
“real” and “fake” in “an operation [designed] to deter every real process by its operational 
double, a metastable, programmatic, perfect descriptive machine which provides all the signs of 
the real and short-circuits all its vicissitudes” (Baudrillard 1981:4). The real never has to be 
feigned again given simulation is opposed to representation, employing the “sign” not as an 
equivalent but rather as the negation or replacement of every reference (Baudrillard 1981:11). 
The sign does not simply stand in for the “real”, rather, it removes the real and becomes 
indistinguishable from it.  
Simulations in the realm of security unfold as a planned model of infallibility 
characteristic of maximal security and deterrence (Baudrillard 1981:65). The object of the game 
of security is the simulation of certain risks, threats, and events becoming real (prevention), 
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adapting to their hypothetical inevitability (resilience), and ultimately pre-empting them from 
becoming real. According to Bogard (1996), surveillance has also entered the realm of 
simulation, with technologies like computer profiling serving to simulate surveillance “in the 
sense that they precede and redouble a means of observation” and produce “surveillance in 
advance of surveillance, a technology of ‘observation before the fact’” (p. 27). And ultimately, 
simulations come to govern “the social” in its entirety: “This is the true nuclear fallout: the 
meticulous operation of technology serves as a model for the meticulous operation of the social. 
Here, too, nothing will be left to chance” (Baudrillard 1981:63, emphasis original).  
The simulation of security in relation to borders is explored by de Lint (2008). He 
concludes that a sovereign may employ simulation to generate “monsters” that do not exist in 
reality (de Lint 2008:177). In terms of borders specifically, de Lint employs a Foucauldian 
perspective in concluding that the border is a site of performance whereby the sovereign (vis-à-
vis petty sovereigns) can stage political violence alongside the frugality associated with 
liberalism in producing logics of exclusion (de Lint 2008:180). The border is a stage serving to 
“cut down abject others or to manipulate subjects / individuals / cohorts with shocking 
discretionary displays” (de Lint 2008:180).  However, de Lint conceptualizes simulation (and 
thus also borders) within the context of the theatre of early social interactionism, as a way of 
“acting out” and producing metastable border logics elsewhere (de Lint 2008:181). He neglects 
to consider that simulation does not simply work to produce a stage to screen the performance of 
the sovereign for all to see, but rather simulation (as Baudrillard would contend) serves to 
remove the stage completely and replace it with something else entirely, namely an abstraction.  
Simulation is also employed by Vaughan-Williams (2010) in examining the virtuality of 
the sovereign ban characteristic of the biopolitics of border security. As the sovereign shifts from 
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governing via discipline to instead “regularizing” life through biopower, security begins to 
function not by arresting movement but rather by permitting circulation and flow (Vaughan-
Williams 2010: 1078). Accordingly, border policies have shifted from an “old border” mentality 
characterized exclusively by governing mobility at physical borders to a “biopolotical apparatus 
of security in its mobility and enhancement of liberal subjects' movement” (Vaughan-Williams 
2010:1078). Borders become characterized within the context of a continuum, spreading to a 
variety of sites away from traditional physical borders in attempting to govern mobility. Border 
security is therefore explained within the context of Baudrillard’s (1981) simulation, with 
neoliberal subjects made virtual (and thus manageable) through technologies of pre-emption, 
including, for instance, “algorithmic models of risk management based on the profiling of 
populations” (Vaughan-Williams 2010:1080).  
Vaughan-Williams’ discussion of simulation is limited to the extent it does not provide a 
concrete explanation of how simulation has served to replace the “reality” of border security with 
signs. His metaphor hinges on several taken-for-granted conclusions that require closer 
examination. For instance, Vaughan-Williams never makes clear how the virtuality of identity is 
used by border agents within the continuum to produce the sovereign ban (other than vague 
conclusions that pre-emption and risk are somehow involved). Vaughan-Williams (2010:1077) 
also employs Walters’ (2006a) problematic conception of the firewall as a metaphor for how 
border security continua function. Lastly, Vaughan-Williams seems to default to a panoptic 
understanding of the simulation of borders despite his reliance on biopolitics to frame his 





The Simulation of Surveillance 
It is through this conceptualization that contemporary borders are best explored – not as 
sites par excellence for security performances, but rather as part of the simulation of security and 
surveillance whereby there is no longer a distinction between “reality” and “fantasy”. According 
to Bogard (1996:9), simulations allow the gap between virtual control and actual control to 
disappear. What Bogard refers to as telematics societies (societies that perform governance 
functions “at a distance”) employ simulation technologies toward cutting the time of the 
transmission of data to zero (Bogard 1996:9). Accordingly: 
This, for Baudrillard, is our own era, where the circulation of sign-images 
dominate, but rather than being ‘false’ images, now have the function of 
concealing the fact that reality itself is absent behind its representation (Bogard 
1996:11). 
 
Bogard refers to this as panoptic imagery whereby the architecture of control and orders of space 
and time characteristic of institutions (see Foucault 1975) are replaced by “cyberachitectures” as 
well as coding designed to produce images onscreen anywhere and anytime (Bogard 1996:19). 
Reality becomes whatever is programmed within the simulation, with images (or signs) in the 
simulation serving not as copies of “the real”, but rather as replacements for “the real” (Bogard 
1996:20). Derrida (1972) discusses the importance of signs in that: “The sign represents the 
present in its absence… The sign, in this sense, is deferred presence” (p. 9). 
Signs are ultimately coded and stored in databases as data doubles or dividuals (Deleuze 
1992). Indeed, as Dijstelbloem and Broeders (2015) indicate, the inclusion / exclusion dichotomy 
is no longer useful in terms of describing border control technologies. Rather, in terms of 
migration, “the insider–outsider distinction is being replaced by a much more heterogeneous 




To the authorities at least, [the signs] would become in some ways more real than 
our real selves, because they would stand in for and verify the reality of those 
selves in ways that are, or have the potential to be, absolutely certain… 
Simulation, in fact, would in such cases carry surveillance, the unmasking of 
reality, to its logical limit and conclusion – perfect information on individuals, 
perfect exposure, and perfect discipline (Bogard 1996:21). 
 
As such, security and surveillance has shifted from governing corporeal bodies (individuals) to 
instead governing digitized simulations (dividuals) that promise perfect knowledge and control 
of the individuals they are associated with (by abstraction). According to Bogard, dividuals are 
reproduced like a photocopy through a Xerox (photocopier) machine in that “Any original only 
exists, for the Xerox, to copy, and thus, for all it cares, as a copy” (Bogard 1996:45). The clone 
of the original serves as a perfect repetition of the original such that it is understood to 
(irrefutably) stand in for the original. However, as Goriunova (2019) argues, there is a “distance” 
or gulf that exists between the embodied subject that appears in reality and the “digitized 
subject” that is derived from databases. This distance does not permit the duplication of perfect 
digital subjects as personal “shadows” or precise mappings of embodied subjects. Rather: 
The story is made of patterns, similarities, models, and clusters, which are sorted, 
re-arranged, stored, and sold. Therefore, we write ourselves by generating data 
that is worked upon and then produced as digital subjects, which are inconsistent 
and not very coherent, and serve different purposes: advertisement, secret 
services, or consumption. These digital subjects do not coincide with any 
originating ‘we’. They are rather at a distance. Yet… there continues to be a legal, 
industrial, and techno-scientific pull to map computed digital subjects onto human 
beings… After all, an identifiable person can be assigned debt or a prison 
sentence (Goriunova 2019:12).  
 
Accordingly, through linking digitized subjects held by officials as dividuals directly linked with 
embodied subjects (individuals), the supposedly irrefutably identified person can therefore be 
governed, confined, and incapacitated through various technologies of control within the 
criminal justice system, immigration enforcement, social welfare administration, and social life 
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generally. As such, digitized subjects (which are nothing more than aggregated and analyzed 
data) are processed as if they are dividuals, and ultimately become understood (by authorities of 
various kinds) as the replicated identity of embodied subjects. Databases proliferate to handle 
incessant collection of data and refine digitized subjects as necessary. These technologies serve 
to simulate surveillance in that they generate a single profile (a digitized subject) from 
infinitesimal data points derived from various sources (Bogard 1996:27). Such virtual systems, 
according to Bogard (1996:23) are indifferent to human history and personal narrative. The 
image of the digitized subject becomes the undisputed “history in advance” for authorities to 
review (Bogard 1996:23). According to Bogard (1996:44) all this promises full front-end control 
by infallibly guaranteeing certain flows in advance while abandoning the need for strategies of 
monitoring and security performances. Simulated technologies of surveillance ultimately attempt 
to produce “the transcendence of limits of time, space, life and death, and the body” (Bogard 
1996:51). As such they are transmutable – anyone can plug into such databases anywhere and 
immediately call forth digitized subjects and manage flows with or without the presence of 
individuals. 
Border Simulacrum and Control 
Borders as Simulacrum 
 Borders proceed exactly in the way Bogard (1996) demonstrates that surveillance is 
simulated. According to the principles outlined above: 1) the work of bordering and related 
border technologies unfold at an increasing variety of sites, and 2) traditional physical borders 
persist and continue to perform various functions. States increasingly perform mobility and 
border governance at a distance, employing visa offices overseas, international policing agencies, 
third-party commercial carriers, airlines, academic institutions, social welfare agencies, and a 
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variety of other actors in both policing mobility and assisting in information collection on 
individuals, corporations, and commodities. Such diffusion, as Ericson (2007:4) contends, 
develops in an attempt to reconcile the fact that “security” is very much an imaginary given it 
requires knowledge of a future that is ultimately unknowable. Such reliance on telematic policing 
means states must solve the problem of governing mobilities and flows in advance of and also at 
physical borders. To this end, as Bogard (1996:9) illustrates, surveillance (and indeed policing 
functions) related to borders can be simulated to eliminate the gap between virtual and physical 
control and cut the time of the transmission of data to zero. 
 Such simulation is perfected by the third principle of modern borders, namely, borders 
and mobility are governed by and through the calculation and analysis of risk. As Ericson 
(2007:6) argues, one way societies attempt to control the future is through “scientific” measures 
of risk. Data collection proliferates in an attempt to harness risk-management practices in 
governing the future. Risk unfolds as a neoliberal technology of governance, with individuals 
and other entities responsibilized in self-governing personal behavior to ensure their own 
security and prosperity (Ericson 2007:6). In terms of borders (and following the fourth principle 
outlined above), states responsibilize a variety of third parties (visa offices, passport agencies, 
international policing agencies, third-party commercial carriers, airlines, private citizens, and so 
forth) in providing data collection functions in advance of physical borders. Accordingly, 
technologies of governance such as carrier sanctions redesign such spaces as “semi-formal 
spaces of migration control…” (Walters 2006b:194). These third parties ultimately become part 
of border security assemblages – in the style of Haggerty and Ericson’s (2000) surveillant 
assemblage – and, by extension, security continua that rely (in part) on borders (the fifth 
principle outlined above). Such data collection contributes to the formation of digitized subjects 
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in databases. These images (or signs) as part of simulation are considered by authorities to be 
dividuals that serve not as copies of ‘the real’, but rather as replacements for ‘the real’ (Bogard 
1996:20).  
Whenever someone enters the border security assemblage (when attempting to obtain a 
visa, when checking in at the airport, when arriving at a physical border, and so forth), their body 
and personal narrative no longer serve as an identity for analysis. Rather, much like the Xerox 
machine, the original exists only insofar as it brings forth its supposed replacement (the digitized 
subject) onto the “stretched screens” (Lyon 2009) of border agents. Personal narrative and 
embodied subject performativity are rendered increasingly irrelevant as agents already have what 
is perceived to be a “history in advance” (Bogard 1996:23), which is used to govern mobility via 
risk. 
Long before individuals reach physical borders, they have already become part of the 
border security assemblage, the simulation of security, and have been coded as digitized subjects. 
They have (in many ways) been pre-selected prior to arrival. Consider travelers intending to 
travel to another country via an airport. Even before they are permitted to board an airplane, 
individuals are already rendered as digitized subjects. This process begins when individuals 
attempt to obtain travel documents (i.e. passports), serving the function of creating digitized 
subjects in databases and also cross-referencing new digitized subjects with established profiles 
contained in existing databases.  In many cases, individuals must also secure a visa prior to 
departure in order to travel to their destination country. This part of the border assemblage allows 
agents to further cross-reference (now established) digitized subjects with various databases to 
assess risk, allows for the collection of biometrics for positive identification on the front end (at 
the visa office) and eventually on the back end (at the physical border), and tracks the movement 
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(including failed attempts) of digitized subjects. Lastly, responsibilized private agents working 
for airlines at international airports collect data that serves to further establish identity at check-in 
and adds this information to databases for border officials to examine prior to and during arrival, 
and also further cross-references the digitized subject with prior established international and 
nation-specific databases such as no-fly lists.  
The aforementioned methods serve to digitize and ultimately limit (and exclude) mobility 
in a variety of ways. Passport and visa controls enforced by petty sovereign (Butler 2004) state 
actors serve to exclude: 1) risky others, for example, certain classes of criminals and those 
suspected of terrorism who are banned from obtaining a passport from their country of origin or 
a visa from their destination country, 2) those without the ability to establish prior identity (i.e. 
those without birth records and other required identity documents), 3) those (primarily) in the 
global south too poor to afford a passport or visa processing and/or unable to access passport and 
visa offices, and 4) individuals from certain “banned” countries unable to obtain a visa. Private 
agents working for airlines (and other carriers) also function as private petty sovereigns (see 
Amoore and de Goede 2005, de Goede 2007), working to provide security functions on behalf of 
the state to further exclude: 1) individuals too impoverished to afford tickets or without access to 
an international airport, 2) individuals without a valid visa or identity document, 3) anyone 
carrying weapons and/or dangerous goods at security checkpoints, 4) unlimited travel based on 
carrier routing, 5) those digitized subjects deemed too risky to fly (i.e. on a no-fly list), and 6) 
cases of mistaken identity wherein digitized subjects share certain data points (i.e. name, date of 
birth, and so forth) with other banned individual(s).  
In short, before reaching a physical border, travelers transiting through airports – 
depending on their citizenship and visa requirements of the destination country – may be 
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subjected to no fewer than three identity verifications, one biometric data collection, three 
identity cross-references with pre-established databases to assess risk, and a multitude of ways to 
be excluded from travel before even boarding an airplane. International arrivals customs and 
immigration checkpoints at airports are therefore only receiving a very small and pre-coded 
fraction of travelers out of all possible travelers in the world. According to Duffield (2010), it is 
through such mechanisms that the policing of migration alongside global development 
governance can be seen as complicit in producing a “planetary order” confining large swaths of 
the global (south) population in situ. In essence, the vast majority of airport arrivals are “ideal” 
types of pre-coded and known (digitized) flows that pass all checks and balances and comply 
with risk-management technologies. They hold the proper passwords necessary for mobility 
within the simulation (explored below). While those arriving at land borders are theoretically 
subject to less prior scrutiny, the potential “flood” of mobility is still controlled in a variety of 
ways via producing digitized subjects and within simulated borders. This process is enhanced by 
policies such as the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative that mandate the use of passports at 
borders, serving to construct digitized subjects regionally in advance of travel. 
Borders as Control 
As borders unfold at an increasing variety of sites and risk is employed to accomplish 
telematic mobility governance and attempt prediction, borders as technologies of governance 
effectively abandon exclusive reliance on back-end disciplinary governance in favour instead of 
front-end control. As Deleuze (1992) contends, there exists two poles in disciplinary societies: 
“the signature that designates the individual, and the number or administrative numeration that 
indicates his or her position within a mass” (p. 5). Power in disciplinary societies is exercised 
through the individual and the mass via institutions. Conversely, in societies of control, the 
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signature or number is replaced by “a code: the code is a password… The numerical language of 
control is made of codes that mark access… We no longer find ourselves dealing with the 
mass/individual pair. Individuals have become ‘dividuals,’ and masses, samples, data, markets, 
or ‘banks’ (Deleuze 1992:5). Individuals are replaced in border simulations by digitized subjects 
generated in databases through aggregating bits of data. Digitized subjects come to form 
“passwords” (Deleuze 1992) for the purpose of governing mobility. Passwords can be considered 
as clusters of bits of data that reveal, conceal, and represent nothing but that serve as signs that 
mark access – they are pure simulation. To agents responsible for border governance, such 
passwords become “more real than our real selves” (Bogard 1996:21) and are ultimately 
mistaken as irrefutable first-order simulations (or copies) of the individual. However, such 
passwords are, in reality, not reflections of the individual, but rather are nothing more than 
aggregated data derived from prior movements, passages, exchanges, transactions, and 
associations. In other words, digitized subjects are nothing more than the aggregate of past 
actions and behaviours that are coded as relevant to risk-management practices. Accordingly, a 
society must code in order to control flows. Non-coded flows represent a threat in that they may 
not be controlled, and therefore serve as “the flood, the deleuge which is the flow that breaks 
through the barriers of codes” (Deleuze 1971). Risk societies rely on the imaginary of perfect 
knowledge of flows to attempt to control them and regulate mobility and access. 
Baudrillard (1981) makes the connection between simulation and societies of control 
abundantly clear through his examination of an early reality TV program focused on the Loud 
family. While portrayed as an organic and “raw” examination of the American family simply 
going about life as if cameras were not present (something Baudrilliard sees as simple utopian 
fantasy), Baudrillard (1981:51) indicates that the family was already hyperreal in their very 
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selection for filming. The family was not randomly selected but rather represented a statistical 
aggregation of the “ideal American family”. Much like border subjects, in many ways, the family 
was “known” and pre-selected as ideal subjects. They represented (through aggregated data) the 
characteristic “profile” of the American family.  
Baudrillard demonstrates how the “truth” regarding the life of the family was ultimately 
replaced by the “truth” of the TV. In short, the TV (much like the stretched screens of border 
agents) serves to render truth (Baudrillard 1981:51-52). This, to Baudrillard, represents the end 
of the panoptic gaze and its replacement by “the manipulative truth of the test which probes and 
interrogates, of the laser that touches and then pierces, of computer cards that retain your 
punched-out sequences…” (p. 52). Much like the governance of borders through risk, it is no 
longer the historical narrative of the individual that matters, but rather the pre-coded and value-
laden assumptions within simulations that test perceived infallible data located in the profile of 
the digitized subject. This, according to Baudrillard (1981:52) represents the end of the panoptic 
system that relied on a despotic gaze within a defined social space, and its replacement by a 
society of control that abandons attempts to render individuals transparent in favour of rending 
them predictable.  
As simulations shift governing efforts toward digitized subjects, it is no longer necessary 
for individuals to be always seen, heard, and recorded. Rather, it becomes necessary to develop a 
“system of mapping” whereby the collection of data contributes to controlling mobility vis-à-vis 
digitized subjects. The data characterizing digitized subjects comes to replace the panoptic image 
of the individual as the focal point of control. The individual does not need to be actively 
surveilled at physical borders to produce decisions regarding mobility. Rather, infinitesimal data 
points can be collected (including by non-state, third-party actors) indefinitely to ascertain the 
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risk of the digitized subjects and govern mobility with or without the physical presence of the 
individual. The population is no longer governed via the violence and surveillance of the state 
against individuals characteristic of disciplinary institutions. Rather, biopolitical post-panoptic 
governance unfolds as a system of deterrence designed to control the mobility of digitized 
subjects within simulations (Baudrillard 1981:53-54). Submission of the individual is no longer 
necessary, as individuals are instead deterred from participating in ‘risky’ behaviours that have 
the potentiality of producing data points that could generate a risky digitized subject with a 
password excluding mobility.  
Identifying Simulations and Cyborg Work 
As Côté-Boucher, Infantino, and Salter (2014) argue, there is a need for the literature to 
consider how border security is governed as an everyday practice by those appointed to carry out 
duties related to it. The strength of theoretical perspectives (like the simulation of borders) can 
only be derived by considering how they function in relation to the everyday practice of 
“bordering”. Recent analyses have examined how border officers in Canada employ risk toward 
reaching determinations. This has included employing risk through advanced commercial 
information (Côté-Boucher 2013:155-158) as well as surveillance technologies used to produce 
advanced identification of individuals (Côté-Boucher 2008). A content analysis of training 
documents and manuals obtained by the researcher through ATIP requests filed with CBSA was 
performed to further test the simulation metaphor. According to the “Indicators” CBSA Port of 
Entry Recruitment Training (POERT)35 program module:  
                                                 
35 Obtained POERT documents are still applicable for two reasons. First, the new OITP is built on the foundation of 
POERT. Second, according to CBSA corporate documents, the vast majority of BSOs currently on the frontline 
were trained using iterations of the late-2000s POERT documents obtained by the researcher given that CBSA 
increased its frontline ranks from 4000 to 7200 officers from 2006 to 2012 – representing an 80% increase overall – 
prior to the implementation of OITP in 2014. 
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One of the main purposes of indicators is to distinguish high-risk travelers from 
low-risk travelers. Through the use of questioning, document examination, 
lookouts, enforcement bulletins, intelligence bulletins, database results, and 
contraband detection tools, [officers] will be able to identify multiple indicators 
which will allow [them] to determine which travelers pose the highest risk (p. 1).  
 
When identity documents are scanned by officers into CBSA Integrated Primary Inspection Line 
(IPIL) computer systems, databases present officers with digitized subjects in return. Risk 
information is provided about digitized subjects that automatically leads to further customs 
and/or immigration processing and searches (irrespective of questions posed by the officer). 
Various alerts concerning the digitized subject – lookouts based on intelligence information 
gathered, previous customs seizures, previous immigration matters, outstanding arrest warrants, 
or lost or stolen identity documents – produce a level of risk that mandates further processing 
(CBSA 2015:20-22). This is confirmed in the “Referrals” POERT module, which states, “A 
mandatory referral is a referral that a BSO must make for further documentation or examination 
by Customs… or on behalf of other government departments” (p. 23). The module then lists 
several types of mandatory customs referrals, including: 1) documentation/permit requirements, 
2) payment of duties and taxes, 3) inability of the officer to reach the point of finality with a 
traveler (including issues surrounding identity), and 4) when a lookout exists on a vehicle license 
plate or traveler name (p. 23). This module also lists categories for individuals requiring a 
mandatory referral for immigration secondary, including (but not limited to): people included in 
inadmissible classes in sections 34 to 42 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act for 
reasons of security, violating human rights, serious criminality, general criminality, organized 
crime, health, financial risk, and so forth (p. 3-7). By employing telematics, CBSA officers are 
able to reduce the transmission of data to zero. Digitized subjects (particularly in the case of 
lookouts) are produced in advance, including through aggregated risk information gleaned from 
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third-party data collection, other agency intelligence information, and private citizen “tips”. 
Officers scan identity documents into databases and obtain histories in advance in the form of 
digitized subjects in return. The officer essentially has no choice in terms of action with 
mandatory referrals – the narrative and performativity of the embodied subject is rendered 
effectively irrelevant by the risky digitized subject (and incompatible password) visible on the 
officer’s screen.  
When border officers ask individuals questions related to their travel and associated 
declarations, agents are not asking questions to the individual (the body) to provide a narrative 
toward making a determination regarding mobility. Instead, officers are asking questions to the 
individual to essentially test the risk level of the digitized subject. Even if the individual provides 
low-risk answers to queries, the high-risk digitized subject identified by IPIL databases mandates 
a referral with the assumption that the person is deceiving the agent and is not being 
forthcoming. As such, a high-risk digitized subject with a “hit” in the database (as outlined 
above) will always result in a referral for further processing (regardless of how the individual 
answers questions) (CBSA 2015:20-22). Conversely, if an individual provides high-risk answers 
despite their digitized subject presenting as a low or unknown risk, they are also highly likely to 
be referred by the agent to test (and refine if necessary) the information contained in their digital 
profile. Basically, the only way an individual is allowed to proceed without further scrutiny is if 
the low-risk answers they provide to questions confirm their low-risk digitized subject. 
Subsequent secondary customs and immigration searches and questioning serve to further “test” 
and refine (as necessary) the digitized subject. In short, the “fate” of travellers has been coded in 
databases and is largely determined before they reach physical borders or answer questions 
posed by officers.  
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Additionally, most of the interactions occurring between border agents and individuals 
are coded and pre-determined in many ways. Officers ask a variety of pre-determined, 
mandatory questions designed (as stated above) to test the level of risk generated by the digitized 
subject. The social interactions that ensue cannot be described as ‘organic’ in any way. Travelers 
are limited in how they may answer these questions and ultimately personal narratives – which 
may serve to “clarify” the individual – are excluded in favor of concise answers from which the 
officer may glean whether the individual presents the same level of risk posed by their digitized 
subject. If an individual refuses to present their digitized subject or answer questions and 
participate in the “test”, the traveler is automatically deemed risky and referred for further 
examination (and potentially detained or excluded). What may appear to the casual observer as 
an organic information-seeking exercise is actually a highly coded and simulated interaction 
within a space of security.  
It is through such simulations based on advanced information and risk that border agents 
can be seen as participating in “cyborg work” (Bogard 1992: 115) whereby perceived 
inefficiencies and problems associated with officer decision-making are designed out by 
governing officers from inside the simulation – namely by coding the simulation to produce 
automated responses to digitized subjects without allowing for officer discretion. Despite the fact 
CBSA officers indicate distrust for risk technologies and insist that they ultimately make 
determinations by asking questions (Côté-Boucher 2013: 172-179), it is without doubt that the 
lifeworlds (Habermas 1981) of border agents have been colonized by risk to the extent that it is 
virtually impossible for officers to reach common understandings regarding mobility without 
reference to the digitized subjects.  
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Recently, CBSA installed machines at borders in Canada that read RFID-enabled identity 
documents (and call forth digitized subjects) at a distance before individuals reach primary 
inspection (CBSA 2014c:37). Such technologies thrust risk calculations to the forefront of the 
primary inspection process and provide officers with tailor-made risk-based decisions in advance 
of questioning. Where RFID readers are absent, agency policies mandate the manual scanning of 
identity documents and collection of data pertaining to “Name (first, middle, last), Date of Birth, 
Nationality/Citizenship, Gender, Document information (type, number and country of issuance)” 
as well as “Biographic Entry Data” for every individual officers process (CBSA 2016e). 
According to Chapter One Part Two “Primary Processing” in the CBSA People Processing 
Manual, “All persons entering Canada at a site equipped with the IPIL system must be queried in 
IPIL. The officers must query each person by capturing the information from a machine-
readable travel document or by manually keying the person’s information” (p. 31, emphasis 
original). Furthermore, the introduction of Automated Border Clearance (ABC) kiosks36 at 
Canada’s busiest international airports in Vancouver (2009), Montreal (2012), and Toronto 
(2013) further indicate how Canadian borders and officer decision-making are governed via 
simulations and risk. According to Chapter 10 Part 2 “Primary Processing” in the CBSA People 
Processing Manual, travelers scan identity documents and self-declaration forms (E311) at ABC 
kiosks. The kiosks generate a risk score and referral code for the traveler, and:  
The system generated results of the risk assessment and the traveler’s responses 
on the E311 [form] will determine if a referral to secondary processing is 
warranted. The kiosk will generate a receipt (copy of E311) and the traveler 
proceeds to the BSO performing document verification function to present their 
travel document and kiosk receipt… The BSO shall not release travelers if a 
secondary referral code is printed on the kiosk receipt but should direct the 
traveler to the BSO at triage (p. 151). 
 
                                                 
36 ABC kiosks are known elsewhere as Primary Inspection Kiosks (PIKs). 
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In this way, control over decision-making and the generation of secondary examinations is 
increasingly shifting from human officers to computers (kiosks) while also decreasing officer 
discretion (by mandating officers accept decisions generated by kiosks). Indeed, a CBSA internal 
document reported on by CBC in 2019 indicated that 93% of all airport secondary customs 
examinations and 88% of all airport immigration secondary examinations occurring in 2017 were 
generated by kiosks (with only 7% and 12% of customs and immigration examinations generated 
by BSOs, respectively) (Dyer 2019). Combined, RFID readers, policies mandating officers scan 
all identity documents, and ABC kiosks produce technologies of automation that serve to double-
down on computerized risk-management practices that govern the actions of officers vis-à-vis 
risk within the simulation. In short, risk management pervades and governs officer decision-
making regardless of their perceived levels of complicity. While the aforementioned analysis 
pertains exclusively to CBSA, the employment of risk-management practices, databases, RFID 
technologies, and document readers by U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Frontex, and other 
Western border agencies implies these practices are likely widespread. 
Additionally, the strength of the simulation metaphor for the governance of mobility and 
borders lies in its direct applicability not only to Canada Border Services Agency and other 
border agencies, but also to other fields of policing and security. Examples of such security 
simulation can be found in disaster and resilience planning scenarios that completely obscure the 
distinction between real and fake while supporting goals of maximal security and deterrence in 
making life programmatic (see for example Anderson 2010; Walklate, Mythen, and McGarry 
2012; Bourbeau 2013; Coaffee 2013). Whether security actors are participating in scenarios or 
“real-world” events, their actions and behavior in each case become indistinguishable and guided 
through risk. O’Malley (2010) documents the increased use of “telemetric policing” models such 
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as traffic light cameras issuing fines to drivers through license plate databases. Such modes of 
policing replace the individual with the digitized subject as the focal point of power within 
“simulated space”. Accordingly, such simulations ultimately serve to produce “simulated justice” 
whereby individuals are no longer permitted recourse. In fact, the individual need not even be 
physically present at the time of the offence to be fined, with “deeming provisions” within 
legislation placing a reverse onus on the “offender” to prove “either that the vehicle was not 
speeding or that another dividual owned or drove it at the time of the offence” (O’Malley 
2010:800). Similarly, many policing agencies have now adopted intelligence-led policing models 
driven by data collection. Initiatives like the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Criminal 
Intelligence Program function by collating information from investigations and “other sources” 
(i.e. phone records, bank statements, ISP data, and other third-party data), which is ultimately 
analyzed by criminal intelligence analysts to produce threat assessments (RCMP 2014). Such 
models of policing are inherently simulated and operate within the society of control in that, once 
again, the digitized subject serves as the unit of analysis in terms of identifying and acting on 
risk. Lastly, the use of ASBOs, licensing (Valverde 2003; Valverde 2012), zoning (Valverde 
2011; Hubbard and Colosi 2012; Crofts et al. 2013), and recent innovations such as off-limits 
orders (Beckett and Herbert 2008; Palmer and Warren 2014) are employed in urban 
environments to control conduct vis-à-vis employing logics of risk and computerization in 
excluding digitized subjects from mobility within various public and private social spaces.  
Simply put, simulation not only characterizes how contemporary borders are governed, 
but rather is symptomatic of governance efforts generally within the society of control. Such 
reliance on digitization and risk technologies in producing simulations is troubling for several 
reasons. Simulations ultimately unfold at the will (intentional or not) of software programmers. 
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Taylor (2003), in examining virtual worlds, concludes that a simulated environment exists the 
way it does because a human coded it to be so. The dangers for humans in terms of border 
simulations are easily identifiable. In short, mobility is only permitted insofar as it meets the 
“embedded values” (Taylor 2003:28) promoted in a simulation’s coding. As Lessig (1999) 
illustrates, the code – software and hardware that serve to render cyberspace – functions to set 
the terms by which digitized life within cyberspace is experienced. Code is not static but rather 
malleable, and this malleability can function to change the nature of cyberspace in rendering 
digitized life fundamentally governable (Lessig 1999:2). Accordingly, embedded values 
(including just what is considered ‘risky’) can possibly be adapted and changed. The current 
processes through which recoding is accomplished speaks to its undemocratic nature and 
potential for abuse: 
The code regulates. It implements values, or not. It enables freedoms, or disables 
them. It protects privacy, or promotes monitoring. People choose how the code 
does these things. People write the code. Thus the choice is not whether people 
will decide how cyberspace regulates. People – coders – will. The only choice is 
whether we collectively will have a role in their choice – and thus in determining 
how these values regulate – or whether collectively we will allow the coders to 
select our values for us (Lessig 1999:3). 
 
This speaks to the potentially undemocratic nature of the coding and recoding of cyberspace. 
While coders are able to embed values within coding, our inability (or unwillingness) to govern 
these coders – and thus also govern the embedding of values within code – is potentially 
problematic in terms of protecting our rights and freedoms when we are (re)constructed as 
digitized subjects (including anonymity, free speech, individual control, and so forth) (Lessig 
1999:1). In short, virtually any digitized subject can be rendered risky (and thus immobile) by re-
coding the parameters of the simulation. Rather than risk locating the truth, what is ‘true’ 
becomes generated by risk, with risk being particularly vulnerable to social definition and 
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construction in ways that are far from scientific or objective (Beck 1992:22-23). This conclusion 
raises further concerns about data “function creep” (Haggerty and Ericson 2006) and a general 
lack of avenues for individuals to “exit” simulations or seek judicial remedies for established 
risky digitized subjects. In short, simulations and the coding of digitized subjects render as 
fantasy any desire to manage or conceal “spoiled identity” (Goffman 1963). 
Indeed, it seems as if these concerns have played out in reality in terms of CBSA’s use of 
ABC kiosks in Canadian airports. A recent Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) internal 
investigation into potential bias and discrimination on the part of its officers and ABC kiosks 
revealed much evidence of machine bias. The report illustrates that while Iranian travellers (for 
example) were no more likely than Danish travellers to be referred by a human officer, they were 
on average about twenty times more likely to be referred for a customs secondary examination 
and six times more likely to be referred for immigration purposes (Dyer 2019). This suggests an 
inherent bias in the coding of ABC kiosks based on country of origin (and potentially ethnicity). 
Additionally, the report suggests that ABC machines may be incorrect in referring travellers 
(based on risk) about 60% of the time, and that ABC facial matching technology also produces 
false positives and false negatives (Dyer 2019). The error rate for facial matching technology 
was redacted from the released version of the report by CBSA under exceptions granted under 
the Canadian Access to Information Act. However, a recent study of major facial recognition 
technologies suggests that error rates may be as high as 35% for darker-skinned women and 12% 
for darker-skinned males (compared to rates no higher than 1% for lighter-skinned males) 
(Buolamwini and Gebru 2018:9). Collectively, such findings suggest that machines employing 
risk and biometric facial-recognition technologies (like ABC kiosks) may employ algorithms that 
175 
 
contain racialized and gendered biases that subsequently produce erroneous, racialized, and 
gendered secondary referrals.   
Conclusion 
 The aforementioned metaphor of simulation works for contemporary borders given it 
incorporates (as described above) each of the six principles agreed upon in the literature 
concerning contemporary border security. As borders unfold at an increasing variety of sites, 
simulation is ultimately employed to close the gap between virtual and physical governance of 
mobility. Risk is employed to accomplish telematic mobility governance and attempt prediction, 
with digitized subjects ultimately produced in databases that serve as the unit of analysis for 
agents within the border security assemblage. To constantly acquire and refine data and thus also 
ascertain the level of risk posed by digitized subjects, a variety of third parties are responsibilized 
in collecting and reporting data on behalf of the state. These third parties are responsibilized 
along with the state in serving as part of larger security continua that rely (in part) on borders to 
securitize an ever-increasing range of social life in feeding into neoliberal demands for data 
required for risk-management efforts focused on prediction and pre-emption. Such demands and 
the “routine failure of risk”, as Ericson (2007:12) contends, simply produces further pressure to 
collect more data to feed the continuum and govern risk. Diffusion of the continuum (including 
borders) in securitizing additional non-traditional sites becomes necessary to feed the insatiable 
appetite for data. Risk and insecurity only produce more risk and insecurity in an ever-
amplifying spiral of securitization. Simulation, then, serves to make virtuality possible, 
producing digitized subjects, controlling mobility under the guise of perfect predictability, and 
securitizing more and more social life through risk. While the aforementioned analysis 
exclusively considered the mobility of individuals, conclusions are transferable to mobility of all 
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things governed through risk, including (but not limited to) financial instruments, commercial 
goods, and information. 
The simulation of borders also coincides with Deleuze’s (1992) description of the society 
of control. As institutions characteristic of disciplinary society are increasingly abandoned as the 
model of governance of individuals and masses, the “dividual” – assumed to be a perfect copy of 
the embodied subject rather than the imperfect and distanced “digitized subject” that the profile 
represents in reality – is produced within the society of control. Power in societies of control is 
exercised not through the individual within institutions, but rather through the digitized subject. 
The data characterizing digitized subjects comes to replace the panoptic image of the individual 
as the focal point of control. In terms of border simulations, the individual does not need to be 
actively surveilled at physical borders to produce decisions regarding mobility. Rather, 
infinitesimal data points can be collected (including by non-state third-party actors) indefinitely 
to ascertain the risk of the digitized subject, generate passwords, and govern mobility through 
control. 
Lastly, the simulation metaphor also avoids debates surrounding binary border mandates 
and geographic imaginaries that have plagued recent interdisciplinary border literature. 
Simulation can accommodate (at the same time) the continued existence of traditional sovereign 
borders alongside “diffusion” to a potentially infinite number of non-traditional and/or third-
party sites. Debates surrounding the changing importance of physical borders within the context 
of telemetric borders are also increasingly irrelevant given that potentially each and every site 
contributes equally to the simulation of surveillance, the border security assemblage, and the 
production, analysis, and refinement of digitized subjects. Each site (whether at the frontier of 
the nation state or elsewhere) is coded to govern flows and mobilities according to the 
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simulation. Borders are not really “moving” or “spreading”. Rather, simulated borders are truly 
anywhere and anytime as part of security continua that serve to securitize an ever-increasing 
range of social life. This is the major conclusion that Vaughan-Williams (2010) and de Lint 
(2008) do not fully consider in discussing the simulation of borders – namely, via simulation 
borders exist anywhere social life is already securitized, anywhere security continua have already 
reached, and anywhere life and mobility are already simulated. It is through this conclusion that 
Baudrillard’s (1981) dystopian supposition – that the true nuclear fallout is simulation of our 
entire social world – becomes realized. Through simulation and virtuality, borders, as Lyon 
(2005) contends, are truly everywhere. 
 















Examining Official and Non-Official Interaction Narratives Concerning Digitized Risk 
Technologies Employed at the Canadian Border 
This article combines findings concerning institutional discourses with knowledge 
of frontline officials and non-officials gleaned from qualitative interviews to 
discuss the technologization of modern Canadian borders, as well as the extent to 
which institutional discourses and official and non-official frontline knowledge 
differ in terms of technologization of ports of entry. Ultimately, findings suggest 
there is much evidence to support claims made by Lalonde (2018) regarding the 
simulation (Baudrillard 1981) of contemporary borders and the reconfiguration of 
the BSO occupation as a form of cyborg work (Bogard 1996). Findings generated 
from interview data reveal that both frontline officials and non-officials experience 
a border where the personal narrative and performativity of the embodied subject 
traveller is increasingly irrelevant, with officer decision-making increasingly 
supplanted by information about digitized subjects (Goriunova 2019) contained in 
databases. Findings also explore various dangers associated with increased 
simulation and cyborg work, including database errors having demonstrable 
consequences on the mobility and rights of human beings; the colonization of the 
lifeworld of BSOs by digitized risk technologies ultimately rendering officers 
incapable of asking questions, looking for indicators, and making informed 
decisions on the basis of anything other than databases; and the associated human 
rights, privacy, and legal implications that are potentially wide-ranging and 
extremely troubling.  








Much contemporary border research has focused its lens on official knowledge, including 
the construction of public policy, state governance efforts, and the deployment of various 
technologies at borders (see for example Muller 2010b; Muller 2011; Broeders and Hampshire 
2013; Bosworth and Turnbull 2015; Bosworth 2016); the governance of global migration (see 
Aas 2012; Salter and Mutlu 2013; Mountz and Loyd 2014; Mountz 2015); and, to a lesser extent, 
the perceptions of border and immigration officers tasked with frontline border enforcement (see 
for example Côté-Boucher 2013; Pickering 2014; Pickering and Ham 2014; Aas and Gundhus 
2015; Côté-Boucher 2016; Côté-Boucher 2018). While examinations of official knowledge have 
served to generate important knowledge in the interdisciplinary border research, such findings 
are limited in that they largely ignore the perceptions of political subjects of (in)security 
(Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2016:43). By privileging institutional knowledge, such research 
ultimately ignores forms of subjugated knowledge (Foucault 1972), the role of diverse publics in 
shaping the field of (in)security, and makes invisible the presence of (in)security in everyday life 
(Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2016:43).  
As such, this article will examine the technologization of contemporary Canadian borders 
by contrasting institutional discourses with official and non-official frontline knowledge to 
consider how digitized border risk technologies are actually understood by social agents 
circulating within these “spaces of security” (Foucault 1978). First, this article will build on the 
work of Lalonde (2018)37 by considering prior findings concerning border technologization, 
including the simulation (Baudrillard 1981) of borders – whereby digitized subjects (Goriunova 
2019) contained in databases come to replace individuals as the unit of analysis on the frontline 
                                                 
37 This article is reproduced as Chapter 5 “Cyborg Work: Borders as Simulation” within this thesis. 
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within neoliberal risk-management forms of governance – and the reformulation of the Canada 
Border Services Agency (CBSA) border services officer (BSO) occupation as a form of “cyborg 
work” (Bogard 1996). Second, this article will analyze the results of a content analysis 
performed on coded transcripts generated from in-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted 
with ten BSOs currently or formerly employed at ports of entry in Windsor, Ontario. Third, this 
article will analyze the results of a content analysis performed on thirty in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews conducted with members of travelling publics, the majority of whom were current or 
former residents of the Windsor-Essex County region at the time interviews were conducted. The 
article will therefore address five key research questions: 1) How do BSOs and members of 
travelling publics perceive of digitized risk technologies employed at ports of entry? 2) How do 
institutional discourses regarding digitized risk technologies contrast with interaction narrative 
knowledge generated through perceptions of past social interactions occurring between BSOs 
and publics circulating through ports of entry? 3) To what extent can it be said that 
technologization contributes to the simulation of modern borders? 4) To what extent is 
technologization reconstituting the BSO occupation as a form of cyborg work? 5) How should 
the literature view border technologization through the lens of human rights, freedoms, privacy, 
and so forth? 
Literature Review 
 Much of the interdisciplinary border literature has analyzed various programs and 
policies related to the technologization of modern borders. Particularly, such research has 
focused on documentation, including passports, ID cards, visas, and the NEXUS program in 
North America (see Salter 2004; Salter 2006; Sparke 2006; Lyon 2009; Muller 2010b; Salter 
2011; McPhail et al. 2012; Bradbury 2013); biometric technologies, including fingerprinting, iris 
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scans, facial recognition, and so forth (see Amoore 2006; Muller 2009; Muller 2010a; Muller 
2011; Muller 2013; Popescu 2015; Leese 2018); the development of smart borders in Europe and 
North America (see Amoore, Marmura, and Salter 2008; Leese 2016); and the use of databases 
and algorithms on the frontline of enforcement (see Broeders 2007; Dijstelbloem and Broeder 
2015; Pötzsch 2015; Topak et al. 2015; Amoore and Raley 2017; Lalonde 2018). According to 
Ceyhan (2008), technologization – the process whereby identification technologies, surveillance, 
and risk assessment have become centrepieces of security policies and programs – has shifted the 
subject of migration and other forms of governance from marginal populations (i.e. immigrants) 
to also include entire populations, “meaning that all individuals are subject to technological 
identification and surveillance” (p. 103). Providing examples from France, the United States, and 
the European Union, Ceyhan (2008) demonstrates how electronic identification and surveillance 
tools (including biometric scanners, ‘smart’ cards, computer chips, CCTV, wiretaps, and so 
forth) are considered the “ultimate solution” for dealing with uncertainties generated by 
globalization and contemporary terror threats. Underpinning technologization are three 
interconnected logics: 1) a logic that security is achievable through the identification of threats 
and dangers and by intercepting risky people; 2) a logic that security involves managing flows of 
people, goods, and transportation; and 3) a logic of “ambient intelligence” promoting the 
integration of microprocessors into social life to make life more comfortable for individuals 
(Ceyhan 2008:108). This produces an increased appetite for information and data collection 
towards predicting the future as well as the pre-emption and prevention of threats of various 
kinds. According to Ericson and Haggerty (1997:117), this increased appetite is actually 
insatiable, and produces an “amplifying spiral” of surveillance. Neoliberal risk-management 
logics increasingly envelope large swaths of social life under an umbrella of calculability, 
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prediction, and pre-emption in attempting to effect security (Aradau and van Munster 2007:98). 
As Ericson (2007) indicates, however, ‘security’ is simply a liberal imaginary that is never fully 
achievable and simply results in more instances of insecurity and a greater need for surveillance 
and data collection. 
 Much recent research has documented the importance of risk-based algorithms as 
technologies increasingly designed to govern securitized social life. According to Bellanova 
(2017), ‘algorithmic governmentality’ is: 
…a governance steered by learning machines and intelligent computing systems 
that are able to automatically capture and process data from multiple sources, 
using statistical calculations that humans and socio-political institutions are by 
and large no longer able to understand and master (p. 330).  
 
Increasingly, algorithms operate on the level of ‘big data’. Aradau and Blanke (2017) argue that 
predictive big data technologies are increasingly adopted by security professionals and represent 
a shift from disciplinary and biopolitical governmentality. ‘Connecting the dots’ after the fact is 
no longer sufficient for security professionals who now seek to ‘find the needle in the haystack’ 
by promising the predictive potential of big data (Aradau and Blanke 2017:376). Accordingly, 
“Predictive analytics draws on techniques of traditional statistics, but also machine learning, 
artificial intelligence, and data mining in order to automate ‘data-driven algorithms [that] induce 
models from the data’” (Abbott 2014:3 as cited in Aradau and Blanke 2017:379). Such 
algorithms seek data from a variety of heterogenous sources and works on the assumption of 
‘collect it all’ (Crampton 2015 as cited in Aradau and Blanke 2017:379). Big data as a 
governmental apparatus differs from disciplinary and biopolitical governance in that it operates 
on the level of “pure relationality, of geometrical connection [between data points] as 
simultaneously similarity and difference” (Aradau and Blanke 2017:385). Increasingly, then, 
analysis of big data promises a ‘nothing personal’ approach in which “no personal information 
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about individuals or groups of individuals [is used], eliminating any personal liberties and 
profiling concerns” (Aradau and Blanke 2017:385). Such methods promise that being identified 
as a potential “subject of concern” is less about personal sociodemographic factors (i.e. race, 
gender, social class, and so forth) and more about being included within a certain “cluster of 
concern” constantly being calculated and refined as the algorithm acts on new and old data from 
a variety of heterogenous sources across time and space.  
While such technologies promise neutrality, the reality is that that they are “socio-
political and cultural artefacts that are transforming how we live, work and think about social 
problems” (Hannah-Moffat 2018:2). A recent Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) internal 
investigation into potential bias and discrimination on the part of its officers and primary 
inspection kiosks (PIKs) – machines used to perform primary inspections based on computerized 
risk assessments of air travellers at major Canadian airports – revealed much evidence of 
machine bias. Out of two million secondary customs inspections performed in 2017 by CBSA on 
airport travellers, only about 140,000 (7% of all referrals) were generated by border services 
officers (BSOs) – the rest were generated by PIKs (Dyer 2019). Immigration secondary 
inspections were similarly ordered by PIKs 88% of the time (Dyer 2019). The report illustrates 
that while Iranian travellers (for example) were no more likely than Danish travellers to be 
referred by a human officer, they were on average about twenty times more likely to be referred 
for a customs secondary examination and six times more likely to be referred for immigration 
purposes (Dyer 2019). This suggests an inherent bias in the PIK system – and the algorithms 
these machines use – based on country of origin (and potentially ethnicity). Additionally, the 
report suggests that PIK machines may be incorrect in referring travellers (based on risk) about 
60% of the time, and that PIK facial matching technology also produces false positives and false 
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negatives (Dyer 2019). The error rate for facial matching technology used by PIKs was redacted 
from the released version of the report by CBSA under exemptions granted under the Canadian 
Access to Information Act. A study conducted on three leading facial recognition technologies at 
MIT in 2015 provides potential insight into error rates. The study suggested that while machines 
had error rates of no more than 1% for lighter-skinned men, for darker-skinned women the error 
rates were between 20% and 35% (Buolamwini and Gebru 2018:9). Additionally, dark-skinned 
males had error rates between 0.7% and 12% (Buolamwini and Gebru 2018:9). While lighter-
skinned men experienced a false positive rate of no more than 1.1%, darker-skinned women 
experienced false positives at a rate between 16.3% and 25.2% (Buolamwini and Gebru 2018:9). 
Darker-skinned males experienced radically different rates of false positives across the three 
examined technologies, including rates of 1.2%, 7.9%, and 17.7%, respectively (Buolamwini and 
Gebru 2018:9). Collectively, such findings suggest that machines employing risk and biometric 
facial-recognition technologies (like PIKs) may be employing algorithms that contain racialized 
and gendered biases that subsequently produce erroneous, racialized, and gendered secondary 
referrals.   
As stated above, exemptions under the Access to Information Act have severely hampered 
academic research or media analysis of the algorithms and technologies used by Canada Border 
Services Agency and other federal policing and security agencies. According to section 15(1) 
part (f) of AITA, the Government of Canada may refuse to disclose information related to 
“methods of, and scientific or technical equipment for, collecting, assessing or handling 
information” related to the defence of Canada or intelligence related to foreign states or citizens 
of foreign states. This means that despite academic analysis regarding the functioning of 
algorithms used by security and other agencies gleaned from the Canadian and international 
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literature (see for example Amoore 2009; Amoore 2011; Salter 2013; Eubanks 2017; Aradau and 
Blanke 2017; Hannah-Moffat 2018), the nature of risk algorithms used by CBSA in particular 
(and outside of airport security governance specifically) has been effectively “black boxed” 
(Latour 1999). While we can speculate about the type and range of coded variables potentially 
contributing to “risk flags” generated by algorithms – flight route, payment type, passport used, 
country visited, and so forth (Amoore 2011) – and can also comment on outputs (in terms of 
embodied subjects “caught up” in predictive technologies), the “inner workings” of this 
processes are nonetheless largely opaque to researchers (see for example Hildebrandt and 
Gutwirth 2008; Leese 2014; Gillespie 2016; Introna 2016). The fact the Government of Canada 
can use section 15(1) of AITA to avoid releasing information regarding how PIK machines 
work, how CBSA databases calculate risk, which variables are held as “important” to predicting 
risk, which sources (or surveillance mechanisms) for data collection are employed, how 
predictive algorithms are coded, and so forth means that academic work on Canadian border 
algorithms is largely speculative. 
 Much research has nonetheless focused its lens on documenting the increased use of pre-
emptive risk-management technologies at Canadian and other borders. Muller (2009) discusses 
the overarching consequences of technologization in relation to contemporary borders. As 
biometric passports, trusted traveller and trader programs like NEXUS and FAST, as well as 
RFID identification technologies increasingly became the norm, border security and migration 
governance simultaneously shift from being predicated on a frontline visa / passport / 
immigration regime towards a pre-emptive, risk-based, surveillance scheme divorced from 
traditional geographic sovereign limits of the state (Muller 2009:75). This, according to Muller 
(2009), produces a proliferation of borders to a variety of non-traditional sites (such as airline 
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check-in desks) enabling a pre-assessment of risk long before one crosses a physical border. 
Technologies such as PIKs used by CBSA are enabled by such pre-emptive technologies 
designed to collect and analyze risk data long in advance of physical borders. Vaughan-Williams 
(2010) likewise explores the simulation of contemporary borders whereby borders employ 
panoptic risk logics as a “biopolitical apparatus of security in its mobility and enhancement of 
liberal subjects’ movement” (Vaughan-Williams 2010:1078). Borders spread to a variety of non-
traditional sites (away from the limits of the sovereign state) to form a continuum of surveillance 
designed to pre-emptively assess risk and permit circulation and flow. The subjects of 
contemporary border surveillance are therefore reconceived as virtual (digitized) neoliberal 
subjects made manageable through technologies of pre-emption, including, for instance, 
“algorithmic models of risk management based on the profiling of populations” (Vaughan-
Williams 2010: 1080). Finally, Lalonde (2018)38 refines Vaughan-Williams’ conclusion that 
borders are simulated by applying pre-emptive risk logics and technologies employed by Canada 
Border Services Agency as evidence of simulation within societies of control (Deleuze 1992). In 
this sense, contemporary border security and immigration governance schemes have shifted 
beyond panoptic surveillance and frontline determinations to pre-emptive, control-based, 
digitized surveillance and pre-packaged risk-based decisions generated from databases. 
Despite the importance of this research in documenting the contemporary 
technologization of border security and migration governance practices as well as the use of big 
data and algorithms in contemporary modes of securitization, prior research has largely failed to 
examine how this technologization is experienced and understood by the social actors who 
actually circulate within spaces of security. The interdisciplinary border literature typically 
                                                 
38 This article is reproduced as Chapter 5 “Cyborg Work: Borders as Simulation” within this thesis. 
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presents findings related to analyzing actual physical technologies, the analysis of policies 
related to technologization, and considering the human rights and privacy implications associated 
with the unfolding of digitized risk technologies at contemporary borders. Koslowski (2005), for 
example, examines the US-Canadian Smart Borders declaration post-9/11 and documents the 
subsequent deployment of pre-emptive border technologies at US and Canadian ports of entry. 
Examined technologies include the expansion of the NEXUS trusted traveller program, NEXUS 
RFID-enabled cards and card readers, the use of biometrics in permanent resident cards and 
other travel documents, enhanced sharing of advanced passenger information (API) between US 
and Canadian airline databases, the US advanced Container Security Initiative, the creation of 
the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) and Free and Secure Trade (FAST) 
to provide commercial carriers with trusted status in exchange for advanced reporting of cargo 
information, and so forth (Koslowski 2005). Muller (2010a) examines the development of the 
“biometric state” and the creation of “virtual borders” through the unfolding of biometrics and 
other risk-based technologies at borders. According to Muller (2010a), these technologies 
produce pre-emptive governance logics and contribute to the proliferation of borders into 
everyday life (i.e. commercial spaces such as airports). Ajana (2012) argues that pre-emptive, 
risk-based, biometric technologies are reconfiguring citizenship as “biometric citizenship”, 
which is centred simultaneously on notions of neoliberal and biological citizenship. Vaughan-
Williams (2010) concludes that the “offshoring” of borders and security via pre-emptive 
technologies does not necessarily eradicate “commonsensical geographical notions about the 
location of borders” (p. 1074). Vaughan-Williams exemplifies this by exploring the UK’s 
configuration of the border as a “security continuum” that accommodates the continued use of 
the physical border as part of a continuum that also includes other enforcement locales. This 
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continuum and the offshoring of borders is accomplished through deploying technologies such as 
advanced airline passenger data reporting and policing overseas as well as biometrics 
(fingerprints and iris scans) used to link potential migrants to immigration and asylum databases 
in order to deny mobility to those who are deemed risky (Vaughan-Williams 2010).  
 Two recent studies have queried frontline officials on the subject of digitized risk 
technologies. First, in the Canadian context, Côté-Boucher (2013) briefly explores BSO 
perceptions related to pre-emptive technologies. Findings suggest that officers lack confidence in 
the terms of low-risk determinations generated by criminal, immigration, and border crossing 
databases (Côté-Boucher 2013:176). Accordingly: 
Given the incomplete, even sometimes erroneous information contained in those 
databases, as well as the variety of private and public actors who contribute 
information to these systems with no overview process regarding their validity 
and up-to-date quality, officers' caution might be well-inspired. In any case, it 
confirms a repeated pattern of distrust of accessible data and a preference for the 
use of discretion (Côté-Boucher 2013:177). 
 
While such findings indicate BSOs distrust official databases, findings also suggest that the vast 
majority of officers interviewed nonetheless believed that customs and immigration databases 
are useful in terms of performing duties on the frontline (Côté-Boucher 2013:329). Additionally, 
Côté-Boucher (2013:330-332) suggests generational differences are at play in terms of officer 
perceptions in that more senior officers tended to see technologization as responsible for eroding 
officer questioning and decision-making skills at the frontline. While this research is valuable in 
documenting how actors responsible for unfolding mobility and security governance efforts at 
ports of entry perceive of technologization, such findings are inherently limited in that they 
privilege official knowledge while effectively ignoring non-official knowledge.  
 In a second recent study, Bourne, Johnson, and Lisle (2015) conducted interviews, 
observations, and ethnographic research with engineers and scientists responsible for developing 
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the EU-funded Handhold project, designed to create a handheld device for border officers in 
order to detect the presence of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear explosive (CBRNE) 
threats at the frontline. According to Bourne, Johnson, and Lisle (2015), it is impossible to 
understand “the operation of security technologies at the border without understanding how such 
devices were funded, designed, crafted, adapted, and tested before being deployed” (p. 321). 
Findings suggest that various assumptions are ultimately worked out in the laboratory, enrolling 
funders, scientists, and engineers in calibrating how devices will “give words” to CBRNE 
substances, and how these alerts will be presented to human border agents on the frontline 
(Bourne, Johnson, and Lisle 2015:321). In this sense, sovereign border decisions take place in 
the laboratory long in advance of the frontline, with ports of entry also reformulated as 
laboratories once devices are delivered (Bourne, Johnson, and Lisle 2015:322). While this study 
identifies knowledge-brokers functioning independent of institutional discourses, the findings 
nonetheless still privilege official knowledge in the form of scientists and engineers contracted 
by states to design frontline technologies. Absent is any consideration of non-official knowledge 
in terms of how travellers circulating within spaces of security experience and understand these 
technologies. 
While aforementioned examinations of official knowledge have generated important 
findings in the interdisciplinary border literature, such findings are ultimately limited in that they 
largely ignore the perceptions of political subjects of (in)security (Vaughan-Williams and 
Stevens 2016:43). By privileging institutional and elite knowledge, such research ultimately 
ignores forms of subjugated knowledge (Foucault 1972), the role of diverse publics in shaping 
the field of (in)security, and makes invisible the presence of (in)security in everyday life 
(Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2016:43). This study will therefore contrast institutional 
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discourses with frontline official and non-official interaction knowledge to determine how social 
actors who actually circulate within spaces of security understand border technologization. 
Theoretical Orientation 
 Lalonde (2018)39 attempts to carry forward the analysis of the technologization of borders 
by presenting contemporary borders through the lens of Baudrillard’s (1981) concept of 
simulation. Simulations unfold by employing logics of control alongside abandoning distinctions 
between “real” and “fake” in “an operation [designed] to deter every real process by its 
operational double, a metastable, programmatic, perfect descriptive machine which provides all 
the signs of the real and short-circuits all its vicissitudes” (Baudrillard 1981:4). In other words, 
simulation employs the “sign” not in reference to another object, but rather as the negation or 
replacement of every reference (Baudrillard 1981:11). The sign ultimately replaces the “real” as 
its perfect copy. The use of digitized subjects within contemporary border governance 
technologies provides an excellent example of how simulation functions within spaces of 
security. Contemporary borders are simulated to the extent that the digitized subject – contained 
in computerized databases employed by border officers on the frontline – becomes the unit of 
analysis, replacing the individual, and ultimately creating an insatiable need for the metastasis of 
pre-emptive data collection surveillance technologies deep into social life in order to refine and 
test digitized subjects. Individuals exist within the simulation only insofar as their mobile bodies 
(Rygiel 2012:150) can be used to call forth their digitized subjects for analysis. The personal 
historical narrative of the individual is ultimately replaced by the construction and analysis of 
risk data contained within the digitized subject and stored within various databases. 
                                                 
39 This article is reproduced as Chapter 5 “Cyborg Work: Borders as Simulation” within this thesis. 
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 Much evidence exists to suggest that the insatiable need for the metastasis of pre-emptive 
data collection has shifted border surveillance work to a variety of non-traditional sites away 
from ports of entry in order to produce and refine digitized subjects. Research and news media 
have documented the downloading of sovereign border and migration enforcement powers to: 
local, state/provincial, and federal policing agencies as well as intelligence services, consular and 
asylum authorities, and visa officers (Coleman 2007; Archibold 2010; Walsh 2014; Glouftsios 
2018); private citizens through the use of toll-free confidential reporting numbers (Walsh 2014); 
and private industry – particularly the commercial transportation and shipping industries – 
through state policies and sanctions surrounding carrier liability (Walters 2006a; Walsh 2014). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests other institutions have also been implicated, with data collected for 
the purpose of border security and mobility governance originating from healthcare information 
(Adams and Proskow 2014; CBC News 2014; OPC 2017), registrar offices at colleges and 
universities (Steffenhagen 2013; Topping 2014; LeBlanc 2017), landlords (Walsh 2014), and the 
private banking industry (FINTRAC 2015). Additionally, various instances of pre-emptive, risk-
based border governance technologies employed at ports of entry and elsewhere are identified by 
Lalonde (2018:1371-1374), including: CBSA policies mandating that BSOs scan all identity 
documents for every traveller in order to pull forth digitized subjects from databases; a range of 
“hits” related to digitized subjects in databases resulting in mandatory referrals of individuals 
and commodities to secondary inspection (i.e. intelligence lookouts, previous customs seizures, 
previous immigration enforcement matters, outstanding arrest warrants, stolen identity 
documents, and so forth); the presence of pre-determined lines of questioning designed to 
generate a limited range of responses from travellers; RFID machines installed at ports of entry 
designed to read identification documents at a distance before individuals reach officers; the 
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installation of Automated Border Clearance (ABC) kiosks – known elsewhere as Primary 
Inspection Kiosks or PIKs – at major Canadian airports, designed to process and question 
travellers in advance of human BSOs; and mandatory referrals to secondary inspection whenever 
ABC kiosks / PIKs generate referral codes after conducting risk calculations.  
 The aforementioned evidence collectively suggests that the BSO occupation may 
increasingly be considered a form of cyborg work (Bogard 1996:115) whereby perceived 
inefficiencies and problems associated with officer decision-making are designed out by 
governing officers from inside the simulation – namely by coding the simulation to produce 
automated responses to digitized subjects without allowing for officer discretion or 
interpretation. It is without doubt that the lifeworld (Habermas 1981) of border agents have been 
colonized by neoliberal risk-management forms of governance to such an extent that it is 
virtually impossible for officers to reach decisions concerning mobility and admissibility without 
reference to digitized subjects and databases. This article will contrast institutional discourses 
with frontline official and non-official interaction narrative knowledge concerning the 
technologization of borders in light of these recent theoretical developments in the 
interdisciplinary border literature.   
Methods 
 The Windsor Essex-County region was selected as the primary area of study for several 
key reasons. First, Windsor is unique in that it is home to five ports of entry – the Ambassador 
Bridge, the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel, Windsor International Airport (YQG), the Detroit-Windsor 
Truck Ferry, and a commercial train tunnel.40 Second, Windsor ports of entry are among the 
                                                 
40 Canada Border Services Agency also administers two “off-site” locations in Windsor, including the Ambassador 




busiest along the Canada-United States border in terms of total volume. The Ambassador Bridge 
ranks second for total traveller volumes entering Canada and is number one for commercial 
vehicle volumes (CBSA 2018b). The Detroit-Windsor Tunnel is also a high-volume port of entry 
for automobile traffic, and directly links the downtown cores of two major North American cities 
– Windsor, Ontario and Detroit, Michigan. As such, the Tunnel is an important gateway for the 
approximately 6,700 Windsor-Essex County residents who commute across the border daily to 
work in Detroit (Wilhelm and Reindl 2018). The Tunnel also provides an important gateway for 
Windsor-Essex County residents attending cultural and sports events in Downtown Detroit 41 and 
also shopping in Detroit’s suburbs. In short, the daily lives of Windsor-Essex County residents 
are inextricably linked to the Canada-United States border, the Windsor region itself serves as 
one of the highest-volume borderlands in North America, and residents frequently transit across 
local borders and therefore have a wealth of frontline interactions with BSOs and border 
technologies to draw from in participating in this study.  
Semi-structured, face-to-face, in-depth interviews were conducted with two samples from 
the Windsor-Essex County region in order to answer five key research questions: 1) How do 
BSOs and members of travelling publics perceive of digitized risk technologies employed at 
ports of entry? 2) How do institutional discourses regarding digitized risk technologies compare 
to interaction narrative knowledge generated through the circulation of BSOs and publics at ports 
of entry? 3) To what extent can it be said that technologization contributes to the simulation of 
modern borders? 4) To what extent is technologization reconstituting the BSO occupation as a 
form of cyborg work? 5) How should the literature view border technologization through the lens 
                                                 
41  Windsor residents travel to Downtown Detroit so often that Windsor Transit operates a special Tunnel Bus that 
shuttles Canadians across the border and back throughout the day, seven days per week. 
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of human rights, freedoms, privacy, and so forth? All interviews were audio recorded and 
subsequently transcribed.  
For the first sample, in-depth interviews of approximately one hour to one and a half 
hours in length were conducted with ten BSOs currently or formerly employed at ports of entry 
in Windsor. As obtaining access to BSOs was challenging,42 convenience sampling was 
employed for this study (Weiss 1994:25). Former colleagues of the researcher were interviewed 
first, as rapport had already been pre-established.43 Subsequently, this study employed chain-
referral sampling to gain access to other potential participants. The chain-referral sampling 
technique enables the identification and tracing of social networks using a small number of initial 
contacts who, in turn, provide researchers with an ever expanding set of potential contacts 
(Spreen 1992; Thomson 1997; Kuzel 1999). In total, the researcher forwarded twenty-five 
invitations to participate in the research and ultimately successfully recruited ten participants – 
seven current BSOs, two retired officers, and one former officer now employed elsewhere.44 A 
range of questions were posed to BSOs related to the key research questions of this study, 
including questions related to: 1) how technologies used at the frontline influence interactions 
with members of the travelling public, 2) perceptions regarding which technologies are most 
important in performing frontline duties, and 3) the total percentage of all duties involving the 
use of technologies. 
                                                 
42 Gaining access to BSOs was further complicated by CBSA twice refusing to assist the researcher with recruiting 
candidates or officially endorse the study. 
43 The researcher worked as a student border services officer through the Government of Canada’s Federal Student 
Work Experience Program from 2008-2009. 
44 It is likely that current officers were hesitant to participate in the project given CBSA did not give its formal 
approval for the study and given the researcher’s institutional research ethics board mandated the use of strong 




 In-depth interviews were also conducted with thirty members of the travelling public 
familiar with crossing the border and interacting with BSOs. The majority of interviews lasted 
about 30-45 minutes and were conducted in-person or via Skype. Participants had to be at least 
18-years-old to participate in the study. The vast majority of participants (24) were current 
residents of Windsor Essex-County at the time interviews were conducted. Four additional 
participants were residents of other Ontario municipalities – Kitchener (2), Toronto (1), and 
London (1) – and two additional participants were residents of Bangkok, Thailand and Charlotte, 
North Carolina (respectively). The participants from Toronto, London, Bangkok, and Charlotte 
were all formerly long-term residents of Windsor who subsequently moved elsewhere for 
employment (all within the past 5 years). One Kitchener resident had not lived in Windsor, but 
regularly crossed borders in Windsor when visiting friends in the Windsor Essex-County region 
and in Michigan. The final resident of Kitchener had little experience travelling through 
Windsor, but had ample experience travelling through Pearson International Airport in Toronto 
when returning to Canada from abroad (and was referred to the researcher by another 
participant). Participants were again initially recruited via convenience sampling of key 
informants known to the researcher (including participants who cross the border daily to work in 
the United States). Additional participants were then recruited via chain-referral sampling 
generated from referrals made by initial participants. Ultimately the researcher sent thirty-three 
invitations to participate in the study and successfully recruited thirty participants. Questions 
were posed to members of travelling publics related to the key research questions of this study, 
including questions regarding: 1) cataloguing the range of technologies travellers believe BSOs 
use at ports of entry, 2) how the increased use of these technologies influences frontline 
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interactions travellers have with officers, and 3) membership in trusted traveller programs like 
NEXUS and FAST. 
 Each set of transcribed qualitative interview data was subsequently analyzed via a content 
analysis designed to identify frequently-occurring information or symbols contained in text 
(Neuman 2006:44). A grounded process of variable identification was employed in conducting 
the content analysis. This allowed the researcher to analyze a subset of interviews and identify 
variables emerging from the message pool (Neuendorf 2002:103). Open coding was then 
performed utilizing initially identified variables from the sample. Axial coding was subsequently 
employed to focus researcher attention on the coded themes identified from open coding 
(Neuman 2006:462). Finally, selective coding was employed to identify cases that were 
especially illustrative of identified codes (Neuman 2006:464). A grounded (or inductive) method 
of analysis was used to allow key codes and illustrative cases to “emerge” from the data (Strauss 
and Corbin 2004). This method was particularly useful to the researcher given the breadth and 
depth of research literature related to the aforementioned key research questions is extremely 
limited in nature (Neuendorf 2002:103). 
Subsequent thematic analysis of interview data as well as obtained POERT training 
documents,45 CBSA manuals (such as The CBSA People Processing Manual and the CBSA 
Enforcement Manual), and agency websites and corporate documents allowed the researcher to 
identify key manifest (directly observable) and latent (underlying) themes from the data 
                                                 
45 Documents obtained from the now-defunct Port of Entry Recruitment Training (POERT) program are still 
applicable for two primary reasons. Firstly, the new OITP is built on the foundation of POERT and adds the duty 
firearm training component on the foundation of POERT training while also incorporating applicable policy 
changes. Secondly, according to CBSA corporate documents, the vast majority of BSOs currently on the frontline 







(Boyatzis 1998). Following Braun and Clarke’s (2006) method of thematic analysis, the 
researcher analyzed an initial sample of interview data and documents through the lens of 
aforementioned research questions in identifying primary themes. Subsequently open coding and 
focused coding were used to identify descriptive and analytic themes and overarching categories. 
Finally, a “story” of the research (related to the research questions) emerged (Broll and Huey 
2015:163).   
Findings 
Institutional Discourses  
While few details are provided in BSO training documents or CBSA manuals regarding 
technologization, discourses located within CBSA corporate documents reveal official agency 
knowledge related to increased tehcnologization at Canadian ports of entry. Generally, 
discourses gleaned from corporate documents exemplify that increases in technologization and 
digitization are presented by the agency as: 1) improving efficiency at the border, 2) augmenting 
officer decision-making, and 3) enhancing security provision. For instance, in CBSA’s 2016-17 
Departmental Results Report, an update is provided on progress related to the agency’s 
Electronic Manifest (or eManifest) program. The eManifest program is designed to simplify the 
process through which small- to medium-sized businesses electronically transmit pre-arrival 
cargo information through the Internet to CBSA as part of advanced reporting requirements 
(CBSA 2018a). The Departmental Results Report provides information on the intended benefits 
of the program:  
1) Enhance CBSA's capacity to provide a pre-arrival risk determination of goods 
arriving to Canada, 2) Improve the efficiency of administering pre-arrival 
determinations by using an improved risk assessment capability. 3) Provide the 
CBSA with the ability to conduct more effective enforcement activities. 4) Enable 
the CBSA to provide faster, more efficient frontline processing for legitimate 




Benefits here are couched in terms of pre-emotion, the efficiency of risk assessments, and 
enhancing the speed by which non-risky trade is able to transit through ports of entry. The CBSA 
2017-2018 Department Plan similarly highlights CBSA innovation in producing a suite of 
CanBorder smartphone and tablet applications designed to allow travellers to complete 
declarations in advance of arriving at ports of entry:  
CanBorder apps, the CBSA’s series of mobile apps, is geared towards improving 
border security, streamlining service, reducing border wait times and alleviating 
congestion for travellers entering Canada. The newest app, eDeclaration, allows 
travellers to complete their customs declaration in advance of arriving at the 
primary inspection line (PIL). Using the app will save travellers roughly 40% of 
the projected processing time upon arrival (CBSA 2017a:19). 
 
Again, benefits of pre-emptive risk-based technologies are couched in terms of efficiency and 
border security. A privacy impact assessment performed by CBSA in 2016 on the Interactive 
Advanced Passenger Information (IAPI) initiative details the purposes of expanding CBSA’s 
Advance Passenger Information/Passenger Name Record (API/PNR) program: 
The Interactive Advance Passenger Information (IAPI) initiative supports the 
perimeter security initiatives under the Canada–United States declaration entitled 
Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic 
Competitiveness (Action Plan). The Action Plan aims to, amongst other things, 
address threats earlier in the travel continuum, to enhance Canada's security and 
to facilitate the flow of legitimate goods and people into Canada. The IAPI 
initiative allows the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) to obtain passenger 
information prior to a commercial flight's departure to Canada, and provide a 
board/no-board message to the carrier (CBSA 2016a). 
 
Such findings confirm results from previous research (identified above) that various pre-emptive 
technologies are designed to push border and mobility governance away from ports of entry in 
order to identify, intercept, and prevent the mobility of risks in advance of the sovereign limits of 
the state. Such technologies are couched as improving efficiency in terms of the flow of 
legitimate travel and trade at the border, which in turn allows frontline officers to focus enhanced 
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attention on high-risk cases. This is further enhanced by programs like NEXUS and FAST, 
which are designed to identify and facilitate the movement of designed low-risk travellers and 
traders so officers can focus increased resources on high-risk travellers (CBSA 2012).  
With institutional discourses related to improving efficiency, augmenting officer 
decision-making, and enhancing security provision in mind, the article now turns to the results of 
interviews with frontline non-officials (members of travelling publics) and officials (BSOs). 
Knowledge of Members of Travelling Publics 
 A content analysis of CBSA training documents, manuals, and corporate documents 
determined that officers employ over 30 risk-based and other technologies in addition to nearly 
30 individual computerized databases on the frontline. Members of travelling publics tended to 
underestimate the range of technologies employed at the Canadian border. Travellers often stated 
in interviews that they were generally unaware of specific technologies employed by BSOs. 
When members of travelling publics did mention specific technologies, they usually limited 
discussion to one or two individual technologies, often citing objects that were overtly visible at 
ports of entry participants had travelled to. Travellers specifically identified: document / passport 
scanners, computer databases, license plate scanners, CCTV cameras, and ABC kiosks at 
Canadian international airports. Members of travelling publics generally articulated the 
perceived benefits of technologization in terms of efficiency and also more accurate decision-
making by officers at primary inspection. For instance, Thomas, a 58-year-old retired auto 
worker and small business owner, articulated why he felt he was subject to harsher examination 
by border officers in his youth: 
Well I think it could have been a number of things. It could have been because I 
was a younger person. So they assumed a lot more than what they should have – I 
did not have any criminal record nor have I ever had a criminal record. But I don’t 
think they had access to that information as quickly as they do now. So that made 
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them question… Because they didn’t have information and information gives you 
knowledge, right? So [databases] made it that much easier for them to process us. 
 
According to Thomas, it was possible that officers harassed him in his youth given that risk 
technologies – in the form of criminal information databases – simply did not exist for officers to 
determine that he was non-risky (leading to a focus instead on his youth as a feature of risk). 
Frank, a 61-year-old parts marketer for an automobile manufacturer, similarly argued that 
officers now ask him fewer questions than in the past because of frontline digitized risk 
technologies:  
Well they scan your ID every time you come through, right? Whether it’s a 
passport, your NEXUS card, whatever. Unlike before when you held up a birth 
certificate or whatever… And where that helps – a lot of times you used to get 
questioned. And I say ‘a lot of times’ in terms of twenty or thirty years ago before 
they had the electronic scanning and that there, [BSOs would ask]: ‘Well how do 
I know how long you were away? Do you have a receipt from the hotel or 
anything to prove that you’ve been gone 48 hours?’ I don’t get asked anything 
like that right now. And I think a lot of it has to do with they’ve got your ID… 
I’ve heard from somebody working there [at the border] – how true it is I don’t 
know – but that one side actually talks to the other electronically (that might be or 
might not be the case). So I find it helps it to go a lot smoother going through. 
 
In this case, Frank portrays officers in the past as essentially “stumbling in the dark” in terms of 
analyzing risk given the apparent lack of technological infrastructure and information sharing at 
the time. Officers in the present are portrayed as “illuminated” by digitized risk information 
generated from a variety of sources and held within accessible databases. Several participants, 
however, indicated that digitized risk technologies employed at the border have significant 
drawbacks. This generally included discussions of data errors causing travel problems, the 
NEXUS trusted traveler program and associated technologies being pointless or without tangible 




 Several participants indicated that they (or an acquaintance) had experienced delays at the 
border as a result of data errors contained in databases used by CBSA. Jim, a 33-year-old recent 
law school graduate, said he was once stopped because his NEXUS card number was flagged 
when a female traveller – who had (apparently) the same NEXUS card number – had recently 
experienced problems at the border. He said, “I don’t see how that could happen but… I was 
like, ‘Well, that’s obviously not me.’” The lack of common sense exercised by the officers 
involved in his case confused Jim. Victoria, a 30-year-old consultant in the medical marijuana 
industry, was actually arrested by BSOs for a mistaken outstanding warrant in the CPIC 
database: 
[They said,] ‘You have an outstanding warrant for your arrest. We’re placing you 
under arrest and we’re detaining you!’ And I’m like, ‘What is happening?’… The 
charges were all dropped because [the police] determined it was a civil matter. 
But it is still on my record. It’s still on my CPIC and everything… So it pisses me 
off now because they’re always like, ‘Were you ever charged with a crime?’ And 
technically I was, right? So it just follows you for life even though I was never 
convicted and the charges were unfounded when you look at it from that 
perspective. 
 
Despite the Canadian legal system clearing Victoria for improperly laid charges, she still 
experiences problems at ports of entry as a result of data points in the CPIC database indicating a 
prior criminal charge and issued outstanding warrant. These problems have also spilled over to 
Victoria’s interactions with CBSA’s equivalent in the United States – US Customs and Border 
Protection (US CBP) – given CBP also has access to CPIC. Other participants also indicated they 
have had similar data error issues with US CBP. Charles, a 30-year-old accountant, stated: 
Another example I can think of is one time I was crossing and they scanned my 
passport… And the information that popped up on the screen indicated that I had 
travelled to Texas in the past two weeks. And the officer asked me how Texas 
was. And I said that I didn’t go to Texas. And they said, ‘Well, your passport was 
used to board a plane to Texas’… So he referred me to secondary. And apparently 




While Charles indicated that he normally crosses the border without being subject to 
examination, in this case false passport data ultimately led the officer to refer Charles to 
secondary inspection for an exam. The experiences of Jim, Victoria, and Charles were echoed by 
other participants, and points to problems associated with increased digitization of border 
governance efforts and associated reliance on databases to accomplish border work (Lalonde 
2018).46 Once individuals are reconfigured as digitized subjects in databases, their digitized 
subjects become the unit of analysis for border officers, rendering the personal narratives and 
performativity of embodied subjects (travellers) effectively irrelevant (Lalonde 2018:1372). 
Ultimately, this simulation of border surveillance and policing produces very few avenues for 
those deemed “risky” to either exit the simulation or seek judicial remedies (Lalonde 
2018:1375). Victoria’s case in particular provides evidence that the technologization of borders 
and surveillance generally contribute to a “once a risk, always a risk” designation that ultimately 
irreversibly impacts the mobility rights of border subjects (with few available avenues for 
recourse).  
 When asked as part of this study about membership in the NEXUS trusted traveller 
program – which uses biometric and other technologies to pre-screen and designate certain 
travellers as “low-risk”47 – most members of travelling publics stated that they felt the advertised 
benefits of the program (namely, efficiency crossing borders) are either non-existent or 
irrelevant. For instance, John, a 58-year-old CEO of a local non-profit organization, indicated 
that rules associated with NEXUS thwart the technological benefits of the program:  
I used to be a member of NEXUS years ago when I was doing more business 
travel. But in order to go through the NEXUS lane everybody in the car has to 
have a NEXUS card. And, you know, normally I’m going across with somebody 
else and they don’t have a NEXUS card. So I don’t have one. I didn’t renew mine. 
                                                 
46 This article is reproduced as Chapter 5 “Cyborg Work: Borders as Simulation” within this thesis. 
47 The researcher applied for (and received) a NEXUS membership to gain context for this study. 
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Sometimes there’s a long lineup [of vehicles] and it would be nice to go through 
the NEXUS lane, but it’s not clear to me that it’s always faster.  
 
According to John, the exclusivity of the NEXUS program and lack of measurable benefits in 
terms of expedited movement across borders ultimately renders the advertised benefits of the 
program irrelevant. Others similarly indicated that they are usually not delayed long during 
questioning at ports of entry, so investing in a membership program promising less time spent at 
the border seems pointless. Aliya, a 29-year-old fast food restaurant manager and executive 
assistant at a local property management company, was asked if she would ever consider 
enrolling in NEXUS: “Honestly? Based on my own interactions – I don’t think so. Like, officers 
usually only ask, ‘How long away? Did you purchase or receive anything?’ I feel like it would be 
the same [with NEXUS].” Jessica, a 28-year-old nurse, similarly responded, “Well from what I 
understand it just helps you to get through quicker, and I always get through quick anyway – so 
no.” This assertion that interactions at ports of entry in the Windsor borderland are usually quick 
in nature was prevalent among responses by participants in the study, as was answers 
highlighting the associated perceived futility of the NEXUS program. Corporate documents back 
up the perception of members of travelling publics that increased efficiency in terms of time 
savings are minimal. The 2015-2016 CBSA Departmental Performance Report quotes an average 
time savings of just 34 seconds in NEXUS lanes versus regular primary inspection lanes (CBSA 
2016c:29). 
 Several members of travelling publics also explained to the researcher that digitized risk 
technologies employed at ports of entry seems to be functioning to make social interactions with 
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officers increasingly robotic and less organic.48 This enhances theoretical claims made by 
Lalonde (2018)49 that the BSO occupation is increasingly becoming a form of cyborg work, with 
the lifeworld (and hence decision-making) of officers increasingly viewed through the lens of 
technologization, digitization, databases, and digitized subjects. In terms of illustrating the 
robotic nature of technologically-mediated frontline interactions with officers, participants often 
cited Automated Border Clearance (ABC) kiosks they have interacted with when returning to 
Canada at Pearson International Airport (YYZ) following overseas trips. For example, Emily, a 
31-year-old grad student, documented her typical border experience arriving at YYZ from 
abroad: 
So now, because they have the new automated system, there’s much less person-
to-person interaction I find. So usually I go fill out the form, take the picture (I 
guess) at the end? At the beginning? Whatever. You fill out the forms on the 
screen and [the kiosk] prints out a number on the paper. No idea what that number 
means… And then you give [the paper] to an officer and they look at it and they 
say, ‘Ok!’ And I keep walking. And that’s pretty much the summary. 
 
Such findings indicate that officer discretion and decision-making is increasingly being replaced 
by risk-based determinations generated by artificial intelligence. Other participants who have 
travelled through YYZ echoed the conclusion that ABC kiosks are contributing to less 
questioning by BSOs and fewer face-to-face interactions with human beings. Rodger, a 37-year-
old pastor, documented what he perceived to be the very strange experience of interacting with 
ABC kiosks as forms of artificial intelligence, and the subsequent effects on frontline social 
interactions with BSOs: 
Because our flight was late, we got in at like 5am. And I had to figure out how to 
plug myself into a machine where it like holds my hand and I put my passport 
inside of it and it starts to move. And it wasn’t working properly. And it was 
                                                 
48 Members of travelling publics provided these conclusions unprompted. The researcher did not pose questions 
about simulation or cyborg work in order to ensure that knowledge provided by travellers was strictly derived from 
personal experience alone (and not informed or biased by prior research findings). 
49 This article is reproduced as Chapter 5 “Cyborg Work: Borders as Simulation” within this thesis. 
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going up and down and trying to line me up [for a picture]. And then every human 
interaction I had was just handing them something. I think there was another – 
they hand you something, then you hand that to someone else. I probably handed 
something to like four different people and they didn’t say a word to me… 
Because there’s physical interaction with the screen – it’s not just tapping the 
screen. There’s some kind of like intimacy that happens with the robot <laughs>. 
We share an embrace <laughs>… It’s like an episode of Black Mirror. So that 
was just disorienting not expecting it and then having to do it. And then feel like, 
oh, all the human people are kind of like robots too – I handed them something, 
they handed me back something, and it happened like four times. And then I was 
free to go. No words were exchanged at all. 
 
In this sense, Rodger articulated the bizarre experience of having an intimate (and perhaps 
invasive) interaction with an artificial intelligence and then comparatively superficial (or non-
existent) social interaction with human officers afterwards. According to Rodger, border officers 
seemed to solely rely on the printout generated by the kiosk, making decisions regarding 
admissibility strictly based on the information provided by the machine (and without posing 
questions and analyzing the traveller’s responses). The perception that officers are asking fewer 
questions as a result of digitized risk technologies was also shared by travellers who exclusively 
cross land borders in Windsor and therefore have never interacted with ABC kiosks. Jack, a 65-
year-old retired power line technician, stated: 
I think sometimes the technology circumvents what their job is. They put your 
name in a system, and if something happened in Detroit that night [and the 
suspect] had the same last name as you, they’re going to pull you over. I don’t 
think that’s the way the system should be run… It’s less their thoughts, and more 
of a database bias. 
 
According to Jack, officers appear to be biased by information contained in databases, deferring 
to decisions generated by information technology rather than rendering their own determinations. 
Jennifer, a 58-year-old self-employed bookkeeper, contrasted her divergent experiences in terms 




Coming back [to Canada]? Sometimes I don’t think it’s really strict enough – like 
I don’t think they ask enough. Sometimes it’s just too easy. You know what I 
mean? You pull up, sometimes they just swipe [your passport] and say, ‘Buy 
anything?’ And we’re like not waiting at all. Whereas if you go over there [to the 
United States] they seem to interrogate you and they seem to know exactly where 
you live and your relationships and stuff. Where they just don’t take anything for 
granted. Whereas here – sometimes I just think it’s too easy to come back into the 
country. 
 
These findings further suggest that officers in Canada increasingly render decisions based on 
determinations made by artificial intelligence (in this case, risk information generated by 
scanning traveller passports) rather than through questioning and interrogating travellers. In 
short, members of travelling publics who regularly cross borders in the Windsor-Essex County 
region often cited perceived deficits of border technologization - data errors; an irrelevant 
NEXUS trusted traveler program; and impersonal, computerized cyborg work – as outweighing 
any potential benefits in terms of efficiency and more accurate decision-making (i.e. the 
provision of security while facilitating legitimate travel and trade) that the agency asserts this 
digitized risk-based technology provides. While many participants reported that such 
technologies are potentially beneficial, those who have had direct negative experiences with the 
use of border technologies provide a much bleaker outlook in terms of digitization and its 
corporeal effects. 
Knowledge of Frontline Officers 
Border services officers participating in the study tended to reinforce the knowledge 
provided by members of travelling publics in relation to border technologies. BSOs also tended 
to underemphasize the extent of digitized risk technologies on the frontline, usually choosing to 
highlight a few key technologies rather than the entire range. Officers tended to discuss 
technologies they readily employ on a daily basis on the frontline, including the Integrated 
Primary Inspection Line (IPIL) system, the CPIC and US NCIC criminal databases, the FOSS 
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immigration database, the Cargo Management System (CMS) database, computer-generated 
lookouts, and document scanners. Interestingly, several officers identified a technology not 
officially mentioned in CBSA training documents or manuals – the Internet – as being highly 
influential in performing frontline duties. For example, when asked which frontline technologies 
he felt were most important in performing his duties, BSO 007 stated: 
I would have to say access to the Internet. There’s just so much information there 
that’s relevant to everything we’re doing. Whether, for example, if you’re 
performing a customs inspection – the ability to verify goods, origin, price. 
Particularly with people buying cars, boats – you could search those things to see: 
were they for sale? Where were they for sale? Someone who’s coming back from 
a road trip – you can route that out and ask: are they going through source areas? 
Or does their routing even make sense? From an immigration context – social 
media is all open sourced, so having that ability really opened the doors for us. 
 
In this sense, despite the presence of over 30 CBSA and other department databases containing 
official customs, immigration, criminality, and intelligence data, BSOs regularly employ an 
unofficial data source – the Internet – as the most important source of intelligence data necessary 
to verify declarations and perform officer duties. Particularly interesting is the fact BSOs employ 
social media data in terms of immigration enforcement – a finding that should be explored in 
greater detail in future interdisciplinary border research. 
In terms of the pros and cons of frontline technologization, BSO 008 – a former officer of 
5 years who ultimately moved on to another occupation – highlighted what he perceived to be 
the benefits and drawbacks of employing digitized risk technologies on the frontline: 
Well it’s helpful obviously. So when I was on primary [inspection], I could see if 
someone had prior customs or immigration problems, I could see if a lookout had 
been issued for the individual or the vehicle, etc. And that stuff can be really 
helpful in terms of making a referral… But on the other hand, technology can be a 
bit of a pain in the ass as well. Like some of the lookouts we had to respond to 
were based on such shaky evidence (or no evidence at all) but we would have to 
refer the person and do a search regardless… And then I also feel like some 
officers relied on technology more than on their questioning in terms of primary 
inspection. Like, yeah, the technology can help you. Sure. But if you’re not asking 
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the right questions and if you’re staring at your computer screen instead of 
looking inside the vehicle for indicators – well you are going to miss a lot.  
 
In this sense, findings indicate the presence of digitized risk technologies may be a double-edged 
sword for officers, providing pertinent risk information during certain interactions while also 
providing irrelevant or misleading risk information during other interactions. These findings are 
contrary to official discourses that highlight the supposed consistent efficiency and intelligence 
benefits derived from pre-emptive risk information. Particularly, official discourses surrounding 
efficiently allocating human resources may be especially dubious if misleading risk information 
sends BSOs down “rabbit holes” that do not generate enforcement actions.  
Several officers reinforced knowledge gleaned from interviews with members of 
travelling publics regarding digitized risk technologies potentially changing the nature of BSO 
work in a negative way. The majority of participants indicated that increases in technologization 
at the frontline has become a significant handicap for newer officers. For instance, BSO 005 
stated: 
And that’s why I think the [new recruits from the] OITP [Officer Induction 
Training Program], I think they need to shadow those of us who have been there. 
Those of us who have done that. You know? And I think for these guys? 
Technology is not helping. Because they’re relying on the technology part of the 
job as opposed to the actual interaction with people. They’re watching the screens 
looking for name hits and plate hits and whatever – they’re not looking at what’s 
going on in the car… And I think that’s where too much technology is not a good 
thing. It’s a false sense of security. Like they’re not looking at the big picture. 
They’re not looking at, wow, the passenger – this doesn’t look right. 
 
These findings suggest that new recruits (as a result of their formative training) become highly 
reliant on database information and consider the risk information presented on their computer 
screens exclusively rather than gleaning information from oral questioning and visual 
identification of indicators. BSO 007, who has moved into an intelligence role, echoed this 
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response, stating that officers he speaks with in an official capacity are often unable to articulate 
why they released a particular traveller without citing database information: 
I think technology has been a little detrimental… For example, in my line of work 
now away from the frontline, you might have somebody who entered the country 
and we may say, ‘How did this person come in?’ And you might reach out to that 
officer and they might say, ‘Well, you know, they didn’t flag in my system.’ So 
because the system didn’t flag, if there’s nothing that comes up in that standard 
ten or whatever amount of questions [they ask], you know, we’re not digging. 
And it’s very easy to become complacent. And I’ve seen it now from this end of 
the fence – there can be really blatant things staring at you and even the best 
officers are capable of letting things go. You’re just not paying attention and 
you’re relying on technology. 
 
Such findings suggest that – as Côté-Boucher (2013:329-332) indicates – while officers do find 
risk-based technologies useful in performing their duties, BSOs nonetheless project hesitancy 
and skepticism toward pre-emptive, risk-based database information as well as its apparent 
negative effects in terms of eroding the ability of officers to make informed decisions based on 
asking questions and looking for indicators. Côté-Boucher (2013) suggests this bifurcation may 
be generated by generational differences between officers, and knowledge produced from 
interviews with officers above suggests that this may be true, with a noticeable divide drawn 
between officers with frontline experience (and originally trained under the POERT program) 
and rookie officers (emerging from the new OITP). 
Conclusion and Discussion 
While officers in the Windsor-Essex County region did not mention ABC kiosks – likely 
because these machines are not employed at ports of entry in Windsor – combined, the results of 
interviews with officers and members of travelling publics suggest that there is much evidence to 
support the conclusion that border work is increasingly reconfigured as a form of cyborg work 
(Bogard 1996). As CBSA continues to employ and explore the expansion of pre-emptive, risk-
210 
 
based technologies catalogued by Lalonde (2018)50 and elsewhere, BSO decision-making will 
increasingly be mediated through the lens of databases, risk scores, lookouts, digitized subjects, 
and so forth. Evidence already suggests that CBSA is increasingly removing decision-making 
from BSO duties by reassigning such tasks to computers, machines, and databases. This has 
largely been accomplished by instituting mandatory referrals generated as a result of database 
information (i.e. intelligence lookouts, previous customs seizures, previous immigration 
interactions, outstanding warrants, and lost or stolen documentation alerts), referral codes 
generated by ABC kiosks, and computer-generated random examinations (Lalonde 2018:1373-
1374). In such cases, irrespective of officer questioning and the personal narratives provided by 
travellers, BSOs must refer travellers for secondary inspection. Such work is also accomplished 
by expanding traveller enrolment in pre-emptive risk-management programs such as NEXUS. 
Such programs function to provide officers with tailor made decisions regarding mobility by 
collecting risk data (including traveller biometrics) in advance of physical borders and by 
designating enrolled travellers as “low-risk”. This explains the emphasis by CBSA and the 
Government of Canada on increasing enrolment in the NEXUS program despite its apparent lack 
of tangible and measurable benefits (as identified in this study). Indeed, corporate documents 
indicate that Trusted Traveller Programs (TTPs) like NEXUS “provides the Agency with 
mechanisms that allow it to address increasing traveller volumes by expediting processing of 
low-risk, pre-approved travellers coming to Canada, and permitting the Border Service Officers 
(BSOs) to focus efforts on travellers of unknown and potentially high-risk (sic)” (CBSA 2017c). 
The fact this increased cyborg work is readily perceived as potentially negative by both officers 
                                                 
50 This article is reproduced as Chapter 5 “Cyborg Work: Borders as Simulation” within this thesis. 
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and travellers should be of great interest to policy-makers as plans for increased digitization and 
pre-emption of border surveillance and security governance forge on.  
Additionally, findings in this article further suggest that contemporary border governance 
increasingly unfolds within the realm of simulation (Baudrillard 1981), with digitized subjects 
contained in databases replacing individuals as the unit of analysis for frontline officers. As the 
responses of both officials and non-officials demonstrate, the personal narrative and 
performativity of embodied subjects (travellers) crossing borders is increasingly irrelevant, with 
officer decision-making to release or refer the individual increasingly colonized by information 
about the digitized subject generated by computers, machines, and databases.  
The potential dangers of the simulation of borders and the reconfiguring of the BSO 
occupation as a form of cyborg work are numerous. As members of travelling publics indicated, 
database errors have real consequences on the mobility and rights of human beings crossing 
borders (especially when data errors are taken as irrefutable evidence of risk by frontline 
officers). As border services officers indicated, digitized risk technologies may be colonizing the 
lifeworld of BSOs to such an extent that it is rendering officers incapable of asking questions, 
looking for indicators, and making informed decisions on the basis of anything other than 
digitized risk-management information contained in databases. The human rights and legal 
implications of these findings are potentially enormous and troubling. As Lalonde (2018:1375) 
points out, few avenues for recourse exist for individuals to challenge or reverse the riskiness 
portrayed (even betrayed?) by their “associated” digitized subject contained within various 
databases employed by BSOs. Additionally, the construction of risk in databases is anything but 
scientific or objective. In short, mobility is only permitted insofar as it meets the “embedded 
values” (Taylor 2003: 28) promoted in a simulation’s coding. As Lessig (1999) illustrates, the 
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code – software and hardware that serve to render cyberspace – functions to set the terms by 
which digitized life within cyberspace is experienced. Code is malleable for coders, and this 
malleability can function to change the nature of cyberspace in rendering digitized life 
governable (Lessig 1999:2). Accordingly, embedded values (including just what is considered 
‘risky’) can possibly be adapted and changed. Our apparent inability (or unwillingness) to govern 
coders means that coders are ostensibly able to select values for us, speaking to the potentially 
undemocratic nature of governance in cyberspace (Lessig 1999:3).   
In short, embedded values can be changed by database coders without judicial or 
legislative approval or oversight. Digitized subjects can therefore be rendered risky (and thus 
immobile) through processes of recoding the parameters of the simulation. The consequence to 
individuals is that it is virtually impossible to fully comprehend and discipline personal 
behaviour (as a neoliberal subject) within the rules of the “game” of security and surveillance 
given these rules are unpredictable, largely invisible, and can change arbitrarily and 
undemocratically. Rather than risk locating the truth, what is “true” becomes generated by risk, 
with risk being particularly vulnerable to value laden assumptions and constructions that are far 
from scientific or objective (Beck 1986:22–23). 
While this study had limitations in that its convenience samples are not representative of 
the entire population of officers or members of travelling publics in the Windsor Essex-County 
region, and also in terms of the researcher not having direct access to analyze actual frontline 
interactions involving the use of digitized risk technologies occurring between social actors on 
the frontline, the findings nonetheless demonstrate how official and non-official frontline 
knowledge can be used to call into question institutional discourses generated from programs, 
policies, and technologies of governance employed by the state and its agencies. In conducting 
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in-depth interviews with travellers and BSOs in the Windsor-Essex County region, this research, 
despite its limitations, indicates the presence of several troubling realities in terms of border 
technologization within the Windsor borderland and potentially elsewhere in Canada. 
Particularly the benefits of technologization promulgated by the state – improved efficiency, 
better officer decision-making, enhanced security provision, and so forth – are questionable at 
best (and fictitious at worst) when considered through the lens of official and non-official 
interaction narrative knowledge produced via the circulation of BSOs and members of travelling 
publics at Windsor ports of entry. 
 




 Through contrasting institutional discourses with frontline official and non-official 
interaction narrative knowledge generated through perceptions of past frontline social 
interactions between border services officers (BSOs) and members of travelling publics 
circulating at ports of entry in the Windsor borderland, this thesis has accomplished the work of 
considering border security and mobility governance as an everyday practice (Côté-Boucher, 
Infantino, and Salter 2014). While the literature has expertly documented the governmentality of 
modern borders, its privileging of institutional forms of knowledge means findings are inherently 
limited in that they ignore the role of diverse publics in shaping the field of (in)security, 
silencing subjugated forms of knowledge, and rendering invisible the presence of (in)security in 
everyday life (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2016:43). To this end, this thesis is unique in 
considering – for the first time – interaction narrative knowledge generated through the 
circulation of BSOs and members of travelling publics within a geographically specific 
borderland. This thesis is also unique in considering how interaction narrative knowledge 
generated from perceptions of past frontline interactions potentially challenges institutional 
discourses supplied by Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA). Lastly, this thesis is also 
unique in examining how border technologization and digitization generated through neoliberal 
risk-management models of governance potentially influence frontline social interactions, 
generate additional knowledge concerning the nature of digitized borders, and function to 
establish a gulf between institutional discourses and localized frontline practices.  
 Such research is vitally important to the interdisciplinary border literature in that previous 
research has remained largely silent in terms of analyzing interaction narratives generated 
through circulations at ports of entry given that BSOs are a difficult population to access and 
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recruit to studies. This can mostly be attributed to the notion that CBSA – ironically, the agency 
that polices Canadian borders – has erected walls between its officers and academia (as well as 
the Canadian media) that make it nearly impossible to access frontline official knowledge-
makers. By citing CBSA Code of Conduct section 5.1 – mandating that only authorized 
spokespersons can issue statements or make comments about CBSA – and section 8 – complying 
with provisions of the Privacy Act – and by instituting draconian measures in the form of 
consequences for any officer who dares speak out (career consequences up to and including 
termination, possible conviction of an indictable offence, possible liable suit, and possible post-
conviction fines and prison time), CBSA has effectively insulated itself as a bureaucracy from 
any sort of informed critical analysis or debate concerning the agency’s limited and carefully 
constructed public discourses as well as institutional knowledge. This is only further enhanced 
by CBSA’s ability to hide behind “national security” and “secrecy” imaginaries that essentially 
render the agency beyond reproach. Combined, these tactics constitute clandestine processes that 
– as Weber (1922) identifies – is a characteristic feature of bureaucracies generally. If the 
outsider can be kept in darkness in terms of the inner workings of state agencies, the outsider is 
therefore powerless against institutional knowledge and discourses. The outsider can only begin 
to speculate (using policy analysis and so forth) in attempting to critique the agency; to which the 
agency will inevitably always respond that the outsider is uninformed and a non-official. 
Institutional knowledge is protected by secrecy, which serves only to reproduce and reinforce 
such knowledge (by dismissing outsiders) in a never-ending spiral. 
 While many are quick to critique scholars conducting research on organizations that they 
were formerly members of, my unique position as a former student border services officer with 
Canada Border Services Agency (between 2008 and 2009) and my current standing as an 
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“outsider’s insider” (Gravelle 2014:59) provided me with an extraordinary opportunity to 
examine the processes previously undisclosed to travelling publics. As a former officer, I hold 
knowledge unique to the academic literature that informed several aspects of this thesis from key 
research questions, to methodology, to the wording and filing of ATIP requests with CBSA, to 
generating and posing interview questions, and finally in analyzing data and presenting results. 
My current position as an outsider’s insider presented initially as a burden to this study – I was 
not able to secure the level of access to CBSA and frontline social interactions that the research 
questions and resulting methodology demanded. Afterwards, my current position (informed by 
my past experiences within the agency) helped me overcome issues with lack of access 
(including officer recruiting problems, issues with research ethics, and the inability to perform 
frontline observations) and in informing subsequent methods employed. This included analyzing 
subjugated knowledge in the form of non-official perspectives generated through qualitative 
interviews with members of travelling publics. Finally, as with other policing studies conducted 
by former officers, my knowledge “provided [me] a greater understanding of the experiences and 
feelings described in the participants’ responses” (Reynolds and Hicks 2015:474). In short, in 
terms of analyzing secretive agencies like CBSA, the literature can only serve to benefit from 
research conducted by former officers and current outsider’s insiders. It is my sincere hope that 
with the increased emphasis on co-operative education programs – designed to place 
undergraduate and graduate students within government agencies and other organizations – that 
future master’s and PhD candidates as well as other scholars will have the courage and fortitude 
to use their real-world experiences as tools to generate quality research and expose secretive 
processes.   
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 A number of important findings were generated from this thesis. Underlying each of 
these findings must be a discussion of their relationship with neoliberalism and risk-management 
as greater trends in governance and power. As world economic systems under liberal systems of 
governance shifted from Keynesian welfare models to post-Keynesian advanced liberal schemes, 
the subject of governance shifted from the citizen requiring protection from the state to the 
subject of (in)security (Rose and Miller 2008). No longer the guarantor of social and economic 
security, the state is reconfigured under neoliberal economics as a laissez-faire actor 
guaranteeing only a framework for “free” social and economic life within which autonomous 
actors self-govern their own destinies. Within such schemes, “insurance against the future 
possibilities of unemployment, ill health, old age, and the like, becomes a private obligation” 
(Rose and Miller 2008:214-215). Given the various threats generated as a result of modernity, 
risk emerges as a scientific way to manage insecurities by “knowing” the future. By collecting 
data through various pre-emptive methods of surveillance, information can be collected, collated, 
and analyzed within electronic databases and harnessed to make predictions about the future. 
This, in theory, allows enterprising subjects the ability to manage uncertainty and maximize their 
own potential as neoliberal citizens. Such risk-management logics have subsequently spread 
throughout private industry, government, policing agencies, and other organizations to similarly 
govern additional insecurities associated with modernity. Pre-emptive risk-based measures create 
the need for further surveillance, more data collection, and greater risk analysis in a never-ending 
spiral of amplification. Perfect security is simply a liberal imaginary, implying that (in)security 
will be the only constant (Ericson 2007). Surveillant assemblages (Haggerty and Ericson 2000) 




 Canada Border Services Agency is not immune to these shifts in governance. As a result 
of the agency’s recent formation in 2004, CBSA serves as a perfect microcosm to allow a real-
time analysis of shifts that have occurred over centuries in other policing agencies. In shifting 
from an agency focused mostly on taxation prior to the signing of NAFTA and the subsequent 
terror attacks of September 11, 2001 to an agency dealing in national security and intelligence, 
CBSA’s infancy as an agency is marked with the language of risk, prediction, pre-emption, and 
securitization. BSOs began focusing on matters of security related to narcotics, weapons, human 
trafficking, international terrorism, transnational crime, and intelligence-gathering, and officers 
were increasingly equipped with the associated “tools of the trade” (i.e. batons, pepper spray, 
handcuffs, Kevlar vests, firearms, databases, and so forth). As agency and officer mandates 
shifted, so too did constructions of travelling publics – from taxpayers to potential criminals, 
terrorists, and risks. Various governance structures and technologies of governance (officer 
training modules, frontline reference manuals, CBSA memoranda, federal legislation, and so 
forth) emerge as the primary mechanisms through which this shift is formalized and controlled 
on the frontline of enforcement. The “facilitation” (CBSA 2018e:8) side of border work – 
communication, de-escalation, community engagement, educating the public, dealing with sick 
or disabled travellers, and so forth) are disregarded within officer formative training and other 
forms of governance. They are replaced with an emphasis on securitization, with communication 
and social interaction on the frontline reconceptualized as tools BSOs may use in order to elicit 
confessions, collect intelligence, and ultimately produce enforcement actions (i.e. arrests, 
seizures, deportations, and so forth). This shift was found to be a systematic bias in that the 
“facilitation” side of border work is incompatible with (and irrelevant to) modes of governance 
(and associated technologies) predicated on neoliberal risk-management practices, prediction, 
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and pre-emption. Ports of entry thus emerge as the “wild west of frontline border security”, with 
all interactions between officers and travelling publics constructed as “security moments” 
designed to fulfill security mandates; collect intelligence; predict, intercept, and interdict threats; 
and control dangerous publics. 
 It is through shifts in mandates toward a neoliberal risk-management order that borders 
are reconceptualized as simulations. As digitized technologies of surveillance proliferate and 
spread throughout social life, databases emerge as the primary way of collating and analyzing 
risk information. Relatedly, individuals and groups (the subjects of governance under Keynesian 
models of governance) are supplanted with digitized subjects (the subject of governance under 
neoliberal, risk-management models of governance). Digitized subjects are generated within 
databases through the aggregation of bits of data (generated through the spread of surveillance 
throughout social life). Digitized subjects come to form “passwords” (Deleuze 1992) for the 
purpose of governing mobility. Passwords can be considered as clusters of bits of data that 
reveal, conceal, and represent nothing but that serve as signs that mark access. Such passwords 
are held as “dividuals” – by governance authorities – that are “more real than our real selves” 
(Bogard 1996:21) and are ultimately mistaken as irrefutable copies of the embodied subject (the 
individual) in digital form. Biopower (having power over populations and human bodies) is 
reformulated into “cyberpower” or “binarypower”, with modern neoliberal states governing 
circulation vis-à-vis the control of digitized subject mobility. Given such shifts, technologies of 
pre-emptive border surveillance shift from the limits of the sovereign state (i.e. physical borders 
and ports of entry) to an ever-increasing variety of non-governmental sites. Evidence suggests 
that various third-parties are established as private petty sovereigns, collecting surveillance data 
on behalf of the state. Various institutions have been implicated, with information culled from 
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healthcare data (Adams and Proskow 2014; CBC News 2014; OPC 2017), registrar offices at 
colleges and universities (Steffenhagen 2013; Topping 2014; LeBlanc 2017), landlords (Walsh 
2014), and the private banking industry (FINTRAC 2015). 
 Furthermore, pre-emptive risk-management border governance technologies are 
employed regularly at Canadian ports of entry. Such technologies include: CBSA policies 
mandating that BSOs scan all identity documents for every traveller in order to pull forth 
digitized subjects from databases; a range of “hits” related to digitized subjects in databases 
resulting in mandatory referrals of individuals and commodities to secondary inspection (i.e. 
intelligence lookouts, previous customs seizures, previous immigration enforcement matters, 
outstanding arrest warrants, stolen identity documents, and so forth); the presence of pre-
determined lines of questioning designed to generate a limited range of responses from 
travellers; RFID machines installed at ports of entry designed to read identification documents at 
a distance before individuals reach officers; the installation of Automated Border Clearance 
(ABC) kiosks at major Canadian airports, designed to process and question travellers in advance 
of human BSOs; and mandatory referrals to secondary inspection whenever ABC kiosks 
generate referral codes after conducting risk calculations. The advanced collection of 
surveillance data by various third-party petty sovereigns, the unfolding of various pre-emptive 
risk-management border governance technologies at the frontline, and the mandatory use by 
officers of digitized, pre-packaged, pre-analyzed, and pre-determined mobility decisions in the 
form of digitized subjects contained in databases collectively suggests that the BSO occupation 
is increasingly reconfigured as a form of “cyborg work” (Bogard 1996). Perceived inefficiencies 
and problems associated with officer decision-making are designed out by governing officers 
from inside the simulation – namely by coding databases to produce automated responses to 
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digitized subjects without allowing for officer discretion or interpretation. It is without doubt that 
the lifeworld (Habermas 1981) of BSOs has been colonized by neoliberal risk-management 
forms of governance to such an extent that it is virtually impossible for officers to reach 
decisions concerning mobility and admissibility without reference to digitized subjects and 
databases. 
 Indeed, results generated in this thesis from qualitative interviews conducted with officers 
and travelling publics within the Windsor borderland suggest that these developments are beyond 
the realm of speculation and theorizing – the slippage of CBSA and its officers into neoliberal, 
risk-management schemes of governance is regularly experienced, perceived, and documented 
through social interactions occurring at ports of entry. First, institutional discourses constructing 
BSOs as service providers to “clients”, professionals, and experts at managing emotions differs 
greatly from aforementioned formative training as well as the personal experiences described by 
travelling publics and BSOs. For instance, knowledge generated from interview data suggests 
that various BSO activities – officers not conducting full primary inspections, violating freedom 
of mobility Charter rights, lecturing travellers about goods purchased abroad, instances of 
officers not managing personal emotions and yelling at travellers (and, in one case, a refugee 
claimant) – are irreducible to institutional discourses regarding frontline interactions identified 
above. Similarly, findings in this thesis reflect findings generated by Côté-Boucher (2013) in 
terms of BSOs perceiving a substantial gap between the institutional discourses located in 
nationally-generated agency training, policies, manuals, and corporate documents, and the 
official frontline knowledge of officers charged with enforcing agency mandates at localized 
ports of entry. Such findings illustrate a need for CBSA to consider how it will address local 
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borderland realities and differences in terms of providing formative training designed to prepare 
officers for frontline work. 
 Additionally, knowledge generated from interviews with travelling publics and BSOs 
also provided real-world evidence of the increased technologization and simulation of digitized, 
neoliberal, risk-management borders. Travelling publics provided evidence regarding database 
errors, an irrelevant NEXUS trusted traveller program, and the increasingly impersonal, 
computerized cyborg work that seriously question institutional discourses surrounding the 
perceived benefits of such technologies – improved efficiency in terms of the flow of legitimate 
travel and trade at the border, which in turn allows frontline officers to focus enhanced attention 
on “high-risk” cases. Findings generated through interviews with BSOs also provided additional 
critiques of institutional discourses, reflecting findings generated by Côté-Boucher (2013:329-
332) that officers project hesitancy and skepticism toward pre-emptive, risk-based database 
information as well as its apparent negative effects in terms of eroding the ability of officers to 
make informed decisions based on asking questions and looking for indicators. 
 Combined, findings related to interaction narratives and technologization generated from 
official knowledge provided by frontline BSOs and subjugated knowledge generated by 
members of travelling publics suggests a slippage between nationalized training and manuals and 
the local unfolding of governance practices at Windsor borderland ports of entry. When 
considered through the lens of risk-management schemes generated through neoliberalism, it is 
no wonder that such a slippage exists between institutional discourses and frontline practices. 
Given the increased emphasis on pre-emptively policing a public increasingly conceptualized as 
risky, dangerous, and threatening as well as the correlated emphasis on pre-emptive digitized 
technologies of surveillance, the BSO as a “service provider, professional, and emotion 
223 
 
manager” discourse is incompatible with (and, indeed not useful to officers in terms of) the 
realities of frontline mobility governance. Officers are therefore forced to develop their own 
collective techniques for managing various uncertainties generated by interactions occurring 
through the lens of digitized risk data. The “facilitation” side of border work gives way to 
security and intelligence-related pre-emptive forms of surveillance, data collection, and analysis 
toward reaching decisions regarding mobility irreducible to the efforts of BSOs. Relatedly, 
subjects of governance are reconfigured as digitized subjects contained within databases – pure 
simulations that supposedly represent (as “dividuals”) the riskiness of their referent irrefutably. 
While the promise of simulated borders is efficiency, significant slippage exists between 
discourses surrounding pre-emptive technologization generated by the state and the realities of 
the frontline – namely, skeptical results, greater uncertainty, and further “doubling-down” on 
pre-emption. BSOs – unable to “see” travellers outside of the lens of the digitized risk 
information they so skeptically employ, and also largely untrained in the “facilitation” side of 
border work – are necessarily forced to reconcile institutional discourses with the realities of 
localized frontline border work via collective ad hoc adaptations totally outside of lessons 
learned within formative training. Given this slippage, it is totally understandable why one BSO 
in this study stated he recommends to rookies that they: “forget all the shit they tell you in 
Rigaud and just listen to and watch senior officers. People in Ottawa designing federal policies 
haven’t ever even worked line / curb so they have no idea what they’re talking about.” 
 This vast gulf between national policy and localized frontline practice is regularly 
perceived by BSOs and was first reported by Côté-Boucher (2013) (and was reported again in 
this thesis). Furthermore, the findings generated from this thesis also indicate that the effects of 
this vast gulf are also perceived by travelling publics transiting across ports of entry managed by 
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CBSA. During the five plus years between the Côté-Boucher (2013) study and this study, 
Canada Border Services Agency has made little effort toward adding additional localized 
formative training for BSO recruits or in rectifying the aforementioned gulf. Rather, it seems 
CBSA is content with a “business as usual” approach in doubling-down on its national, uniform, 
one-size-fits-all training program administered at the CBSA College in Rigaud, Quebec. Given 
regional differences in the nature of social life as well as unique demographics and complexities 
surrounding individual ports of entry across Canada, it is doubtful that the current incarnation of 
the national training program captures the intricate realities of individual and geographically 
disparate borderlands. As such, it is also doubtful frontline officers are provided with a complete 
toolkit for handling the range of social realities and social interactions found at individual ports 
of entry, ultimately leaving it up to BSOs to learn and develop their own collective ad hoc best 
practices over time. Informal frontline learning strategies are questionable given identified 
knowledge concerning frontline abuses of power and human rights violations presented in the 
findings of this study. The question remains: will CBSA ever acknowledge the important work 
of Côté-Boucher (2013) and this thesis and revamp its training program accordingly? Given 
glacial adaptation over the past five years, progress seems (at best) doubtful.  
In terms of the literature, this thesis has demonstrated how analyzed subjugated 
knowledge speaks to the reality effects of simulation – while digitized subjects may be the 
contemporary subjects of governance, embodied subjects (individuals) are the ones suffering the 
effects of neoliberal risk-management models of mobility governance. As this thesis has 
demonstrated, simulated surveillance and borders serve to produce and reproduce real-world 
human rights, mobility, and life chance consequences for living, breathing, human beings. This 
knowledge could not have been gleaned through analysis of institutional discourses exclusively. 
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It also could not have been gleaned through interviews with frontline officers exclusively. Only 
travelling publics as subjugated knowledge-generators – frequently ignored by border and 
mobility research – could serve to illuminate the tangible effects of simulated borders. Many 
scholars have critiqued risk knowledge as socially constructed, potentially biased, 
undemocratically created, and subjective in nature. Indeed, findings generated through 
subjugated knowledge in this study provides much support for these critiques.  
Combined, interviews with officers and members of travelling publics challenge 
institutional discourses by identifying various dangers associated with the simulation of borders 
and the reconfiguring of the BSO occupation as a form of cyborg work. As members of 
travelling publics indicated, database errors have real consequences on the mobility and rights of 
human beings crossing borders (especially when data errors are taken as irrefutable evidence of 
risk by frontline officers). As border services officers indicated, risk-based technologies may be 
colonizing the lifeworld of BSOs to such an extent that they are rendering officers incapable of 
asking questions, looking for indicators, and making informed decisions on the basis of anything 
other than digitized information contained in databases. The human rights and legal implications 
of these findings are potentially enormous and troubling. As neoliberal risk-management 
technologization and surveillance expands and digitized subjects increasingly become the way 
decisions concerning mobility are generated and subsequently employed by BSOs, border 
securitization and the policing of mobility as governing practices become increasingly opaque 
and obscured. Accordingly, members of travelling publics and border officers are likely 
increasingly unaware of which specific data points coalesce to render digitized subjects “risky” 
and therefore immobile. Such opacity serves to maintain and reproduce bureaucratic secrecy 
within CBSA, where perhaps only a few select agents of the state have knowledge concerning 
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the “recipe of risk”. Officers and travellers are increasingly separated from corporeal social 
interactions and are supplanted within a digital realm of risk and decision-making that is 
decidedly incorporeal and abstract. The consequences in terms of mobility rights are potentially 
devastating. If it is true that individual narratives are increasingly replaced by risk information 
portrayed and betrayed by digitized subjects (pure simulations), it therefore becomes impossible 
for individuals to manage personal behaviour or maintain appearances in frontline border 
interactions given the “rules of the game” are unknown, potentially constantly shifting, and are 
largely unpredictable. Any attempts at self-governance are potentially futile guesses at what 
could or might be considered risky behaviour at any given moment in time (definitions that can 
readily change without notice). This futility is only further enhanced by the notion that frontline 
social interactions are becoming increasingly irrelevant within simulated borders, meaning much 
border and mobility “security work” now occurs away from borders and is therefore largely 
invisible and unintelligible to travelling publics and border officers. Combined, these findings 
suggest that the meagre rights guaranteed to members of travelling publics at ports of entry 
(especially those contained in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) are increasingly 
rendered irrelevant and non-existent in the face of pre-emptive, risk-based, and simulated 
mobility governance. Additionally, bureaucratic opacity and the irrelevancy of human rights 
within simulated border governance are only further confounded by the fact few avenues for 
recourse exist for individuals to challenge or reverse the riskiness portrayed by their associated 
digitized subjects contained within various databases employed by BSOs. 
While conclusions generated in this thesis pertaining to interaction narratives, simulation, 
and human rights were generated in relation to CBSA and Canada exclusively, findings 
generated here are likely also applicable to other states also employing neoliberal risk-
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management technologies of governance. Indeed, much evidence exists to suggest the United 
States (Amoore 2006; Epstein 2008; Muller 2010; Salter and Mutlu 2012; Popescu 2015), the 
European Union (Aas 2006; Broeders and Hampshire 2013), and Australian (Wilson and Weber 
2012) borders are characterized by a variety of pre-emptive surveillance technologies designed to 
produce risk information toward governing mobility. While, undoubtedly, additional research is 
needed to attempt to determine whether and to what extent slippages between formative training 
and localized frontline practices exist in other jurisdictions beyond Canada, certainly the 
unfolding of risk knowledge by a variety of states around the world suggests that similar effects 
are also likely occurring beyond Canadian sovereign borders.  
Future research should continue the work of examining non-official subjugated 
knowledge in terms of challenging institutional discourses surrounding security, 
technologization, and borders. Particularly, future studies should build on this thesis by 
attempting larger-scale, more representative samples of local borderland populations to glean 
additional important non-official knowledge. Future research could also continue this work 
outside of the Windsor borderland, identifying other localized realities, differences, and 
knowledges related to borders and state governance practices in regions across Canada. 
Researchers – no matter what the level of difficulty involved – should also continue to leverage 
contacts and lobby states to allow access to “secret” agencies and agents such as CBSA and its 
BSOs. Finally, much work is left to be done in terms of the technologization, digitization, and 
simulation of contemporary borders and border governance efforts within the context of societies 
of control (Deleuze 1992), risk society (Beck 1986), and the rise of network society (Castells 
2003). Accordingly, key areas for future research include: 1) systematically cataloguing and 
critically analyzing the entire spectrum of pre-emptive, digitized, risk-based technologies 
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employed within contemporary logics of border governance in terms of the Canada / United 
States border, 2) identifying the extent to which such technologies have metastasized away from 
traditional sovereign border sites, and demonstrating how the “tentacles of the security state” 
(Fekete 2004:6) increasingly colonize the social lives of Canadians, migrants, as well as the daily 
operations of corporations (see O’Connor and de Lint 2009), 3) investigating how contemporary 
border governmentality operates within societies of control, risk society, and network society, 
and how this ultimately serves to impact the lives, mobility rights, and freedom of human beings 
as well as productivity and viability of corporations, and 4) demonstrating how the “ferocious 
architecture” (Muller et al. 2016: 76) of pre-emptive technologies installed and used at physical 
borders serves to amplify the need for data collection and continued metastasis of border 
surveillance. 
Finally, in employing Baudrillard’s (1981) concept of simulation, this thesis moves 
beyond the bulk of the sociological literature that often chooses to ignore the applicability of the 
concept due to a host of critiques generated (now) long ago. “Forgetting Baudrillard” and simply 
allowing copies of Simulacra and Simulation to collect dust in the depths of stacks found in 
institutional libraries is not a solution to the complexities associated with reconciling his work in 
relation to the field of sociology. Rather, it is important for the research literature to expound on 
simulation, attempt to apply simulacra to contemporary social life, and consider phenomena like 
technologization, computerization, and digitization through this critical lens. As social processes 
such as policing, border security, and mobility control increasingly rely on digitized risk 
information generated through neoliberal models of governance, simulation emerges as a 
powerful way to document the extent of metastasis of surveillance deep into social life. Through 
such a lens, we can begin speaking of whether and to what extent our digitized selves can lay 
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claim to digitized rights, digitized mobilities, and digitized freedoms. Without the lens of 
simulation? Sociology can only analyze our social world at face value – we cannot possibly 
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professionnels de la sécurité frontalière.” Criminologie 47(2): 127-152. 
 
Côté-Boucher, Karine. 2016. “The paradox of discretion: customs and the changing occupational  
identity of Canadian border officers.” British Journal of Criminology 56(1): 49–67. 
 
Côté-Boucher, Karine. 2018. “Of “old” and “new” ways: Generations, border control and the  
temporality of security.” Theoretical Criminology 22(2): 149-168. 
 
Côté-Boucher, Karine, Federica Infantino, and Mark B. Salter. 2014. “Border Security as  
practice: An agenda for research.” Security Dialogue, 45(3): 196-208. 
Coutin, Susan Bibler. 2005. “Contesting criminality: Illegal immigration and the spatialization of  
Legality.” Theoretical Criminology 9(1): 5-33. 
 
Coutin, Susan Bibler. 2010. “Confined within: National territories as zones of confinement.” 
Political Geography 29(4): 200-208. 
 
Crampton, Jeremy W. 2015. “Collect it all: national security, Big Data and governance.” 
GeoJournal 80(4): 519–531. 
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